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ABSTRACT 
The present thesis is concerned with the relationship between price 
adjustments in response to changes in economic conditions and industrial 
market structure. Its point of departure consists of abandoning the time- 
honoured assumption that firms in industrial markets act as if they were 
price takers. Instead, attention is focused on the determinants of price 
adjustment in"a more realistic industrial setting. 
Following the introductory analysis, a synthesis is proposed 
between the long-standing "administered prices" hypothesis, and the recent 
theories associated with the "new view" of Keynes. It is suggested that 
both approaches have common theoretical underpinnings which are themselves 
closely related to this thesis. 
The main body of analysis consists of a theoretical and an empirical 
-1 
investigation. In the theoretical section, two distinct aspects of the 
price adjustment decision are examined. The first concerns the comparative 
statics of adjustment and involves an analysis of the factors which deter- 
mine the magnitude of price adjustments following changes in cost and demand. 
Moreover, the influence of market structure on the adjustment process is 
examined through its impact on the costs of search which are associated with 
the pricing decision. The second, and no less important aspect of the 
theoretical investigation concerns the dynamics of price adjustment. The 
object of this analysis is to assess the impact of market structure on the 
rate of price adjustment over time. 
The two hypotheses developed in the theoretical section are put to 
extensive empirical testing. The quantitative analysis involves mainly 
time-series and cross-section regressions, but other statistical techniques 
such as rank correlation and covariance tests are also employed. 
The first of these hypotheses is that price adjustments in response 
to short-run changes in demand could be attenuated relative to those 
-6- 
occasioned by changes in marginal costs. The rationale for this asymmetry 
is based on the unequal impact of search costs. The empirical findings, 
whilst by no means conclusive, do not contradict this view. 
The second hypothesis suggests that a high degree of industrial 
concentration will be associated with high rates of price adjustment. This 
is because concentration facilitates the process of dynamic co-ordination 
amongst firms by reducing the costs of search. The empirical results come 
out strongly in favour of this hypothesis. The consequential implications 
regarding "administered prices" and the management of inflation are explored 
in the concluding chapter of this thesis. 
i 
0 
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Chapter er 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Origins of the Thesis 
This thesis lies within the field of industrial economics, yet it 
owes its origin to the fundamental-question concerning the process of 
adjustment from disequilibrium. This question, which pervades the cognate 
areas of inflation and general equilibrium theory, remains an unsettled 
issue both in the theoretical and empirical literature. The analysis of 
price and quantity adjustment generally depends on which conceptual 
framework is adopted, that is, on whether the analytical foundations are 
based on the Keynesian macro-system or the neo-classical theory of general 
equilibrium. 
This thesis originated as an attempt to examine closely the specific 
influence of structural and behavioural characteristics of the market on 
the adjustment process. However, before outlining its objectives we shall 
elucidate the analytical approaches mentioned above, and examine their 
relationship to the present thesis. 
The majority of the current elementary macroeconomic texts analyse 
the behaviour of economic aggregates in terms of the simplified Keynesian 
model. It is generally assumed that aggregate supply is infinitely 
elastic at current prices up to the point of full employment of resources. 
Aggregate output is a function of the level of income in this model, and 
the level of income is directly influenced by aggregate effective demand 
through the familiar multiplier process. If the level of income is in 
excess of that which is consistent with full employment, the result would 
be the emergence of an "inflationary gap"; output would not increase any 
further and instead the price level would begin to rise. Thus up to the 
full employment, level of output the economy would respond to disequilibrium 
6 
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through adjustment in aggregate supply - i. e. quantity adjustments. 
This, briefly, is the conventional paradigm of macroeconomic 
behaviour, cast in the Keynesian tradition. By contrast, the neo-classical 
theory of general equilibrium, which purports to explain the interaction 
of all markets in-the economy and thus relates to macroeconomics per se, 
presents a very different picture. In this model changes in demand or 
the emergence of excess demand in any market is followed by an instantaneous 
adjustment of price which restores equilibrium in the market. Furthermore, 
this system precludes any resource unemployment since excess supply is 
incompatible with the concept of Say's Law and the flexibility of prices. 
Thus, the fundamental dichotomy of economic behaviour presented by 
the two contrasting approaches discussed above is rather perplexing. 
The Keynesian model of income determination emphasises the role of output 
adjustments, whilst the general equilibrium schema is couched in terms of 
competitive price adjustments. Hence, the nub of this paradox would seem. 
to be whether price or quantity adjustments provide the essential mechanism 
through which equilibrium is restored, and this issue continues to be the 
subject of debate in the literature. This is illustrated by the fact that 
even the recent developments concerning the integration of value and 
monetary theory have not shed much light on this problem, as exemplified 
by Friedman's policy oriented restatement of the quantity theory of money: 
"It [the equation relating income, Y, to the 
quantity of money, H] then says that changes 
in money income mirror changes in the nominal 
quantity of money, but it tells nothing about 
how much of any change in Y is reflected in 
real output and how much in prices". 
(') 
(1) Friedman (1956), p. 15. 
0 
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The problem of decision making facing the firm when the market is in 
disequilibrium had been largely sidestepped until Arrow first looked 
at this issue in 1959. His seminal contribution, entitled "Toward a 
Theory of Price Adjustment". began with the following statement: 
11 . there exists a logical gap in the usual 
formulation of the theory of the perfectly 
competitive economy, namely, that there is no 
place for a rational decision with respect to 
prices as there is with respect to quantities". 
ý1ý 
Arrow specifically considered two related problems associated 
with market disequilibrium. The first concerned the lack of 
information relating to the true state of demand, whilst the second 
and no less important question concerned the lack of information 
about how other firms are responding to disequilibrium. However, 
the detailed discussion of Arrow's analysis will be deferred to a 
subsequent chapter. 
It is interesting to note that the contemporary debate on the 
.0 
reappraisal of Keynesian economics is concerned with the closely 
related question of the influence of adjustment problems at the firm 
level on aggregate economic activity. Not surprisingly, therefore, 
much of the analysis represents a logical extension of Arrow's 
pioneering contribution, a fact which is amply reflected in the fol- 
lowing statement by one of the principal contributors to the debate: 0 
(1) Arrow, in Abramovitz et al. (1959), p. 41. 
0 
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"The main innovation - and virtually the only major innovation - 
attempted in the General Theory was the effort to provide a 
'systematic' analysis of the behaviour of a system that reacts 
to disturbances through 
_quantity 
adjustments rather than through 
price-level or wage rate adjustments". 
(') 
In the next chapter the common theme between this thesis and certain 
issues associated with the "new view" of Keynes will be looked at more 
closely. We shall also examine the link between the present thesis and the 
celebrated "administered prices" hypothesis, although a critical appraisal 
of the hypothesis will be postponed until the review of empirical studies 
on the behaviour of industrial prices. 
We would therefore emphasise that this thesis is rooted in the some- 
what varied strands of theory and empirical evidence concerned with the 
subject of price flexibility. The growing body of literature, which is 
often contradictory in character and which has generated a perennial 
debate, highlights the fact that the price adjustment decision in a modern 
industrial environment is a complex question which is open to more than 
one analytical approach. The line of thought which will be adopted in this 
thesis is based on the premise that the institutional environment, as 
manifested in market structure, bears an important influence on price 
adjustments in response to disequilibrium. 
It should also be stressed that although there exists a substantial 
body of empirical work in this area, most of it is highly aggregative and 
'' relates to United States data. There is therefore a pressing need for dis- 
aggregated empirical work which relates specifically to the United Kingdom 
economy. 
(1) Leijonhufvud (1968), p. 24. 
a 
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1.2 The Objectives of the Thesis 
The objective of this thesis, briefly stated, is to examine the 
role played by industrial structure in the price adjustment process. 
Our aim is to analyse its influence both on the absolute magnitude of 
price adjustment and on its rate of change over time. 
There is currently no general agreement among economists regard- 
ing the impact of market structure on the movement of prices. Perhaps 
the most widely accepted view on this subject is that of Stigler, 
which is summarised in the following statement: 
"The traditional economic theory argues that 
oligopoly and monopoly prices have no special 
relevance to inflation. 
(') 
Nevertheless, some economists have recently suggested that the 
present inflation is the symptom of a deep-seated struggle between 
competing socio-economic groups who are attempting to shift the 
distribution of income in their favour. Those who argue along these 
lines see market structure, and in particular the trend toward 
increasing concentration in product and factor markets, as an impor- 
tant influence in this process. 
(2) 
On the same theme, but focusing on the product market, Cowling 
and Waterson (1976) found that increases in the level of concentration 
were associated with significant increases in industrial price-cost 
margins. If such increases take place over a relatively short time 
period, and if wage rate adjustments follow quickly as employees 
hasten to restore real incomes to their former levels, the resulting 
process of inflation would thus be complete. 
(1) Stigler (1962), p. 8. 
(2) For interesting expositions of this view see Wiles (1973) and 
Panic (1976). 
- 12 - 
A price adjustment is defined as the change involved in moving from 
one equilibrium price to another over an arbitrarily specified period of 
time. But it should be stressed that we shall not be concerned with the 
fundamental causes of inflation per se, that is, with the recurrent 
sources of disequilibrium which lead to price changes. The aim will be 
to examine the factors which influence the price adjustment process in 
response to an exogenous disturbance, and in particular, to analyse the 
way in which market structure may affect the adjustment decision. 
Our basic assumption will be that firms attempt to maximise profits 
and, in addition, that they recognise the benefits to be derived from 
joint profit maximisation. We shall also assume that this recognition 
does not depend on whether industrial structure is characterised by a 
tightly knit oligopolistic group or by a large number of firms. However, 
what stands in the way of collective profit maximisation and the 
co-ordination of price and output policies which it necessitates, is the 
problem of information and the associated costs of obtaining it, in short, 
the problem of search costs. Not until Stigler's contribution concerning 
the economics of information was this problem explicitly recognised and 
given proper attention in the literature. Before then it had generally 
been accepted that, assuming the effective operation of markets in the 
economy, the problem of'information was unambiguously solved by virtue 
of the parametric function of prices. 
Yet once the assumption about the perfect functioning of markets 
which was criticised by Arrow is relinquished, the problem of information 
becomes an important and integral aspect of the decision making process 
associated with price adjustment. For the crucial feature of a non- 
Walrasian market setting is that firms are no longer price takers; they 
0 
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must adjust prices individually but not without due consideration of the 
potential reactions of their competitors. Therefore in this setting the 
costs of search may have a crucial influence on the adjustment process. 
Thus, an important objective of the thesis will be to integrate 
search activity into the price adjustment decision. We shall give 
particular attention to the question of differences in the impact of 
search on price adjustments to changes in cost and demand. Furthermore, 
the postulated relationship between the costs of search and industrial 
market structure, will be seen to have a central role in our thesis. The 
analysis of price adjustment will be both theoretical and empirical, and 
the hypotheses which will be derived from, the theoretical models will be 
put to extensive empirical testing. The findings will then be evaluated 
and compared with those of other researchers. 
An additional but incidental objective will be to put forward a 
synthesis of the recent theoretical controversy associated with the. "new 
view" of Keynes and the empirically based "administered prices" hypothesis. 
1.3 Outline of the Research 
Following this introduction, chapter 2 will contain a broadly based 
discussion of the determinants of price adjustment. Its purpose will be 
to consider all the factors which are of relevance to the price adjustment 
decision as a first step toward the subsequent formalising in the theoretical 
analysis. In this chapter we shall consider in some detail the theoretical 
and empirical controversies which have been referred to in the preceding 
section. 0 
Chapter 3 will consist of a review of the literature on the subject 
of price adjustment. The chapter will be divided into two main sections, 
the first dealing with the literature on price adjustment per se, and the 
second with the question of risk and uncertainty. 
I 
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In chapter 4 we shall present the theoretical analysis of price 
adjustment. This will consist of essentially two price adjustment models. 
The first will be concerned with the comparative statics of adjustment, 
that is, with the magnitude of the price change which will restore equilib- 
rium. The second model will focus on the dynamics of adjustment, i. e. on 
the optimal rate of price change over time. 
Chapter 5 will contain a detailed discussion of methodological 
questions in connection with the empirical analysis. It will also include 
a comprehensive review of several previous empirical studies. Their 
methodology will be critically examined in an attempt to improve the 
statistical reliability of our tests. The chapter will be concluded with 
a detailed description of the data and, where appropriate, the methods 
used in constructing additional series from primary sources. 
In chapter 6 we shall report the empirical findings. These will 
involve mainly the estimation of industry price adjustment equations, but 
other statistical tests will also be included. ) 
The final chapter of this thesis will contain three sections. The 
first will be concerned with an overall appraisal of the theoretical analy- 
sis and the empirical results. In the second, the policy implications of 
these results will be discussed. Finally in the third section we shall 
suggest some directions in which this research, may be usefully extended. 
00 
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Chapter 2 
THE DETERMINANTS OF PRICE ADJUSTMENT 
2.1. Introduction 
In this chapter we shall draw together the main strands of the 
theoretical and empirical analysis which will be developed in subsequent 
chapters. The purpose of the discussion is to examine the price adjustment 
decision in the widest possible context, including the theoretical under- 
pinnings of Walras (1874) and Marshall (1920). We shall also explore the 
short-run alternatives to price adjustment which exist in a modern indus- 
trial setting, namely the strategies' of advertising and quality change. 
With these thoughts in mind, we shall also suggest that the present 
thesis is closely related to two important controversies in the theoretical 
and empirical literature. Both are concerned with the behaviour of prices 
in the modern industrial economy and thus with issues which are fundamental 
to this thesis. 
2.2. The Theoretical Controversy 
This controversy concerns a suggested re-interpretation of the 
Keynesian contribution to economic analysis. The protagonists of this 
debate are Clower (1965), Leijonhufvud (1968), and Hines (1971), but there 
are other participants. The essence of the controversy is the suggestion 
.0 
made by the above-mentioned authors that Keynes' General Theory has been 
narrowly interpreted by mainstream economists since its appearance in 1936. 
The conventional interpretation of the General Theory is, briefly, that 
government participation in the management of a market economy is both 
necessary and desirable because, left to itself, the economy will not 
gravitate towards a full-employment equilibrium position as the neo-classical 
theorists suggested it would do. In terms of the modern paradigm, the 
a 
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equilibrium level of income is determined by the equality of aggregate 
planned expenditure and aggregate realised spending. Since these can 
be equal at less than full-employment, the equilibrium level of income 
is consistent with unemployed resources, and furthermore, there are no 
automatic forces which would restore full-employment in the economy. 
Consequently the government has the important role of managing aggregate 
effective demand to ensure full-employment. 
This synthesis of the textbook approach to Keynesian economics is 
.0 
necessarily oversimplified, but is sufficient to illustrate the gulf 
which exists between this income-expenditure approach, as it has come to 
be known, and the "new view" adopted by its critics. They suggest that 
the Keynesian contribution has a far greater theoretical significance. 
They claim, essentially, that the General Theory constituted an attack 
on the neo-classical theory of market behaviour with important implica- 
tions for the macro-economy. This attack is based on the notion that 
the orthodox theory of exchange assumes an institutional environment 
within which the information required for optimisation by decision- 
makers is readily available. More specifically, in markets which have 
an exchange clearing system, known in the theoretical literature as the 
"Walrasian auctioneer", firms do not adjust prices individually. They 
respond, instead, with a quantity adjustment to a price change which is 
determined in the market. In such a system prices are parametric; they 
provide the necessary information with which the firms can make an 
optimum quantity decision. Leijonhufvud (1968) argued, however, that 
the neo-classical assumptions as laid down by Marshall (1920) were 
fundamentally misleading. This is because the assumption that price 
adjustment velocities were infinite by virtue of the exchange clearing 
mechanism, and that consequently it was quantity supplied which displayed 
a slower rate of adjustment, could only be sustained in rather special 
circumstances. Thus, in markets with different institutional arrange- 
ments, that is, with no auctioneer and where firms undertake their own 
price adjustments, this ranking of velocities no longer holds: 
0 
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"In the Keynesian macro system the Marshallian ranking 
of price and quantity adjustment speeds is reversed". 
(') 
Thus, in terms of the "new view" of Keynes the emergence of unemployed 
resources is caused by quantity adjustments which occur more rapidly than 
price adjustments. The ranking of velocities is reversed because of the 
problems associated with optimal adjustment in a limited information 
market environment. Although the exposition of the reinterpretation of 
Keynesian economics is grossly oversimplified, the nexus between this 
thesis and the "new view" should now be clear. But although the present 
thesis is also concerned with the problem of price adjustment, it places 
greater emphasis on the role of industrial structure in the adjustment 
process. Before going any further with this discussion however, we shall 
briefly review the empirical controversy mentioned above. 
2.3 The Administered Prices Controversy 
The administered prices hypothesis was first promulgated by Means 
(1935) as an explanation of price rigidities in times of recession. More 
recently, Means (1959,1972) has reiterated his position and has found 
growing support among economists, most notably from Galbraith 
(1957) and 
Ackley (1959). According to the hypothesis, the pricing behaviour'of 
firms in industrial markets does not conform to the traditional pattern 
dictated by supply and demand. Furthermore,. the scope of the hypothesis 
has been widened recently by Means (1972) who suggested that, the post 
second World-War phenomenon of simultaneous recession and inflation 
is 
caused by price administration. 
An administered price is defined as: 
" ... a price set for a period of time and a series of ; 
transactions". 
(2 
It is clear, therefore, that the hypothesis is concerned with pricing 
behaviour over time. It purports to explain the way in which industrial 
prices are adjusted to'changes in economic conditions, and consequently 
it falls within the gamut of the present thesis. 
(1) Leijonhufvud (1968), p. 52. 
(2) Means (1972), p. 292. 
0 
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The important feature which is stressed by Means is the rigidity 
of industrial prices relative to market dominated prices. The concept 
of rigidity is carried one step further, to suggest that administered 
prices actually move countercyclically - rising in recessions and 
falling in periods of expansion. Thus, the theory purports to explain 
the emergence of simultaneous recession. and inflation. However, the 
administered prices thesis has been hotly debated since it first 
appeared in 1935. Claims and counter claims have been *put forward but 
the evidence remains inconclusive and the theoretical underpinnings are 
not convincing. The debate has also been confounded by different inter- 
pretations of price flexibility. 
The main problem with the administered prices hypothesis is that it 
suffers from a lack of theoretical precision. This manifests itself in 
two ways: f irst, the definition of market dominated prices is not made 
explicit. Are these prices set in low concentration industrial markets 
or in perfect markets of the traditional kind, i. e. commodity and stock 
markets? Second, no attempt is made to distinguish between administered 
price adjustments to changes in cost and demand. The distinction is 
important for without it an assessment of price inflexibility relative 
to what it would have been in traditional markets cannot be made. For 
example, in an upswing, not all industries experience the same degree 
of cost increases. If no allowance is made for these differences our 
observations on price movements across industries will not be comparable. 
For proper comparison the exogenous conditions behind price movements 
must be standardised. 
It is evident that the administered prices thesis has concentrated 
on the empirical evidence without attempting to relate the phenomenon of 
price inflexibility to the specific market environment within which it 
takes place. A recent attempt in this direction by Gordon and Hynes (1970) 
0 
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did not, however, go very far in this direction. 
The important question which must now be asked is: how are these 
two controversies related and what is their special relevance to the 
present thesis? The answer to the first part of the question is, it 
will be argued, that both controversies stem from the often overlooked 
dichotomy between the'orthodox theory of markets with its instantaneous 
adjustments to disequilibrium and the real institutional setting of the 
modern industrialised economy. As Arrow pointed out as early as 1959, a 
theory of price adjustment is required precisely because this dichotomy 
exists. The implications of this dichotomy have not yet been entirely 
uncovered. 
Essentially, we can view the modern economy as being divided into 
two market types. The first is the traditional perfect market in the 
neo-classical sense, where buyers and sellers meet at regular trading 
periods, and where the price adjustment process is carried out by agents 
whose specific task is to clear the market. In such markets, buyers and 
sellers respond passively to impersonal price adjustments in which they 
play no part. The second type is the modern industrial "market". 
The term market is really inappropriate here because it conjures up'the 
wrong model. For, in these markets, buyers and sellers do not trade 
collectively but do so individually through retail intermediaries. 
Moreover, the crucial feature 'of these is that firms have to make a 
price decision as well as a quantity decision and hence in the dynamic 
context they have to adjust prices whenever changes in the economic 
climate are in evidence. Therefore, as Arrow (1959) pointed out, one 
cannot blindly apply traditional market analysis to questions of price 
adjustment, for if we assume that each seller is a price taker, as we 
do in the orthodox case, then there is no one left whose responsibility 
it is to change prices when the market is in disequilibrium. 
- 20 - 
This distinction, if it is made, casts the process of price adjustment in 
an entirely different scenario. It further highlights the fact that to 
class low-concentration industrial markets as competitive in the 
traditional sense is to invite considerable analytical confusion. 
2.4 A Synthesis of Theory and Empirical Evidence 
From this discussion it would appear that the two controversies are 
themselves related to one another. As will be suggested below, at the 
heart of the matter lies the divergence between neo-classical market 
theory and the reality of modern industrial markets. Furthermore, we 
4ould contend that this dichotomy stems from one central and inappropriate 
assumption - namely the existence of market clearing agents such as the 
Walrasian auctioneer. As will be discussed in chapter 3, the recontract- 
ing or auctioneer assumption ensures ipso facto that trading takes place 
at equilibrium prices and that adjustments to disequilibrium take place 
instantaneously. This dichotomy is boldly recognised by proponents of 
the "new view", for as Leijonhufvud (1968) states: - 
"This condition that prices be parametric - that all transactors 
be "price-takers" - rules out the possibility of a state in which 
markets do not clear at the actual price of the moment. To make 
analysis of adjustment processes in an atomistic market possible, 
this condition must be relinquished. "(') 
Leijonhufvud goes on to discuss the implications of abandoning this 
assumption, including the resulting problems of information which may 
lead to short-run quantity adjustments. He also suggests that the 
reversal of price and quantity velocity rankings leads to a deviation- 
amplifying process through which the emergence of recession and unemployment 
(1) Leijonhufvud (1968), p. 69. 
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of resources comes about. 
Regarding the administered prices hypothesis, it is evident that 
the pricing behaviour which is being described emanates from a modern 
industrial environment and not from a traditional, neo-classical, market 
setting. Although the theoretical foundations of the hypothesis have 
never been made explicit by its proponents, the underlying rationale is 
perhaps best illustrated by the following notion which suggests that the 
administered prices hypothesis ".... is more fruitfully linked to the 
degree of uncertainty and the resulting problems of learning that face 
the decision maker". 
ý1ý 
This problem of uncertainty and learning is essentially the same 
as the information problem associated with price optimisation which was 
emphasised by Leijonhufvud (1968) and others. Thus the common ground 
between these two views should now be apparent: it concerns the problem 
of price adjustment in a limited information industrial environment. 
However, the "new view" focuses primarily on the implications of sub- 
optimal price adjustments at the firm level on the attendant outputr 
adjustments which are amplified as a result and, in'particular, on 
the 
consequences for aggregate economic activity. On the other hand, the 
administered prices hypothesis concentrates essentially on the apparent 
inflexibility of industrial prices, although the implications for large- 
scale fluctuations of economic activity have also been considered 
in 
this context. 
(2) More specifically, the proponents of the hypothesis 
have recognised that relative price inflexibility would lead to con- 
siderably magnified output adjustments, with serious consequences in 
times of recession. 
(1) Gordon and Hynes in Phelps ed. (1970), p. 392. 
(2) See Means (1935). 
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This does not mean that in the traditional setting price and quantity adjust- 
ments will not be observed to take place simultaneously. Rather, what is 
implicitly suggested is that where price adjustments are attenuated relative 
to what they would be under pure Walrasian conditions, the corresponding 
quantity adjustments will be increased relative to what they would otherwise 
have been. 
The existence of this analytical tie does not in itself provide many 
answers. We need to develop the analysis further and focus on the particular 
relevance of industrial structure to the price adjustment process. 
2.5 The Price Adjustment Decision 
Our point of departure will be the distinction between competitive 
markets in the traditional sense of having market clearing agents, and 
industrial markets conventionally termed atomistic on account of their low 
level of seller concentration. It is generally accepted that. competitive 
markets in the Walrasian tradition will display perfect price flexibility, 
as amply testified by price movements in commodity and stock markets. 
Therefore, the problem of price adjustment exists in industrial markets 
as previously defined. In these, whether atomistic or oligopolistic, the 
price adjustment decision rests with each firm individually, although the 
potential action of its rivals needs to be taken into account. However, 
before examining the factors which affect the price adjustment decision we 
need to be more precise about the meaning of price flexibility. In the 
", past, price flexibility has been defined in three different ways. First, 
it was associated with the number of tinges that prices were changed over 
an arbitrarily selected time period. Alternatively, it was related to the 
absolute magnitude of price movements over such a time period. Finally, 
taking an initial and final equilibrium price after an exogenous disturbance, 
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price flexibility would be measured by the rate at which the final equilib- 
rium price is approached. The latter is in effect a measure of the speed 
of adjustment and cannot be discussed in isolation from the magnitude of 
adjustment. From the literature, (Means 1972, Lustgarten 1975) it appears 
that the administered prices thesis relates largely to the directions and 
magnitude of price changes over selected time intervals. 
In this section, the discussion will be concerned with price adjust- 
ments defined in a general sense. Thus we shall refer to price changes 
without distinguishing between the static and dynamic concepts. 
A. fundamental determinant of price adjustment, given changes in cost 
or demand, is the degree of uncertainty associated with those parameters. 
It will be argued here that this degree of uncertainty differs substantially 
between adjustments to changes in cost and in demand. 
It is true that some uncertainty always exists as far as cost changes 
are concerned since at least some input prices fluctuate. But the degree 
of uncertainty for a given change in input prices is mitigated by the fact 
that once input prices are known, then cost conditions are internal to the 
firm. That is to say, even if a producer has no precise knowledge of his 
input-output relations, in principle his cost function can be estimated 
for a given set of input prices. Furthermore, once the cost-output relation 
has been determined for one set of input prices, it can be determined for 
any set. 
With demand changes, these conditions are different. A rational price- 
", output decision following a change in demand requires that the entire new 
demand schedule be known. However, this information is not internal to the 
firm and necessitates active search. A producer may observe a fall in 
demand at the current price, but he knows little about how demand now 
responds to a change in price. In addition, his demand schedule will be 
affected by action taken by his competitors which is subject to conjecture, 
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whereas their response to cost changes cannot affect his unit costs. 
To illustrate this problem consider the following example: firm i 
has a demand schedule which is given as: 
(1) qi =a+ ßlpi +z ßl <0z= z(O, a2) 
where qi is demand, pi is price and z is a random variable capturing such 
effects as random switching between sellers by buyers. 
We can think of the firm as determining the parameters of its demand 
function a, ßl and a2 through a learning process over time. Actual demand 
in each of its past trading periods constitutes a sample observation on 
AA 
which a, ßl and the prior distribution of z are based. Since every change 
in demand is observed in terms of z, the question arises: at what critical 
value of z should the firm reject the null hypothesis that the parameters 
of its demand function have not changed? Supposing the null hypothesis 
is not rejected, then there is an additional question as to whether the 
variance of z is changing. 
Hence the decision making problem is highly complex. A number of 
alternatives are open to the firm. First, it. can perform a "hypothesis 
test" using its current observation on z, rejecting the null hypothesis 
if the test statistic exceeds a certain critical value. However, if the 
alternative hypothesis is accepted, the firm will not yet have sufficient 
ww 
information to determine the new values of a and ßl. 
On the other hand the firm may choose to increase the sample of 
observations on z before considering a permanent shift of its demand 
parameters. But this leads it into further decision problems for it now 
has to decide on the optimal stopping point i. e. when to stop collecting 
further observations on z. This is a complex question in information 
theory to which economic principles have been applied to derive optimal 
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stopping rules. McCall (1965) and Stigler (1961), among others, have 
investigated the way in which optimal search criteria might be derived. 
It is noteworthy that both authors evinced that some prior knowledge on 
the relevant distribution of events being sampled is necessary before 
optimisation can take place. 
Kirman (1975) has developed a duopoly model in which firms learn 
about demand conditions. By continually revising their estimates of 
the true demand parameters, the firms are shown to reach an equilibrium 
which is consistent with the one they would have reached had they been 
fully informed about their environment. In Kirman's model the informa- 
tion problem relates to ignorance about the effect of a rival's price 
on the firm's own. demand, whilst overall demand conditions remain 
constant. The learning process may in fact be totally different when 
external demand conditions are changing and firms cannot predict their 
rival's responses to those market signals. Thus Kirman does not explore 
the fundamental question of uncertainty which concerns us here, namely, 
that the firm cannot determine a priori whether demand conditions in 
general have changed or whether it is experiencing the effects of 
rivals' predatory behaviour. In, the event of general upswings or down- 
swings in demand there is the additional problem of predicting the 
responses of other firms in the industry. The above discussion illus- 
trates the problems of uncertainty associated with demand fluctuations 
in relation to those associated with cost changes. 
It is clear that in an uncertain environment the problem of obtain- 
ing information is another important influence on the price adjustment I 
decision. As suggested in the previous chapter, the signals which tell 
the firm that its decision variables are sub-optimal are in themselves 
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insufficient for determining their new optimal values. Thus, unless it is 
to remain in disequilibrium, the firm must search for additional information 
on which it will base its adjustment decision. 
Stemming from the recognition of uncertainty and lack of information 
in the firm%s immediate environment, this subject has been widely discussed 
in the context of resource unemployment and its causes. Aichian (1970), 
referring specifically to the labour market, states that: 
"The key which, until recently, seems to have been 
forgotten, is that collating information about potential 
exchange opportunities is costly and can be performed in' 
various ways. "(') 
This remark is equally applicable to goods markets. In its efforts to 
restore equilibrium of its policy variables, the firm collects information, 
but this activity is costly. The information requirement is two-fold: the 
first relates to actual market conditions while the second relates to the 
need to estimate rivals' reactions, for ultimately the firm's optimal 
decision variables depend in part on those of its rivals. Together the 
amount of information required is considerable and as LeijQnhufvud (1968) 
stresses, the conjectural problems facing firms are immensely complex. 
The next question is: what factors influence the cost of obtaining 
information? One critical factor, it will be argued, is market structure. 
When firms determine their optimal price-cost margin they need to take into 
account the pricing decisions of rivals. They will recognise the benefits 
of collusion but they will also be aware of the costs of policing. When 
in disequilibrium through an exogenous change in demand, the firm requires 
information about rivals' adjustments. For if they do not react in 
accordance with the previously established pricing structure, the firm in 
question will need to revise its optimal decision variables. The problem 
(1) Alchian, in Phelps ed. (1970), p. 28. 
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is then one of collusion costs where these are information costs. The 
latter will be influenced by market structure since where there are few 
firms the costs of obtaining information will be low. Stiglert(1961) 
suggested that information costs increase with the size of the sample. 
This view was endorsed by Alchian (1970)(1), and hence it is not implaus- 
ible to hypothesise that information costs rise with the number of firms 
in the industry. It is through the costs of obtaining information. that 
the effect of market structure has a bearing on price adjustment. Its 
static and dynamic consequences will be developed in the price adjustment 
model. All that we have attempted to show here is that, in an uncertain 
environment, the costs of obtaining information are an important factor 
which influences the price adjustment decision. 
The existence of uncertainty leads directly to consideration of risk 
attitudes as the third important influence on price adjustment. This 
point was raised by Arrow (1959) who stressed the impact of risk bearing 
capabilities of firms on the speed of adjustment. The survey of the 
extensive literature on risk and uncertainty suggests that attitudes 
towards risk will affect optimal policy variables. However, these effects 
are not easily generalisable, and they depend on a number of specific con- 
ditions such as the type of risk aversion or preference, the nature of the 
demand function and the like. Although it appears intuitively plausible 
that risk aversion should dampen price adjustments in favour of , quantity 
adjustments, on the grounds of an unwillingness by the firm to alter a 
policy variable without being certain of its effect on profitability, the 
models discussed in the next chapter demonstrate that this need not be so. 
A risk averter is defined as a decision-maker who prefers a certainty 
payoff 7T , to a range of payoffs each with a probability attached 
to it so 
(1) To be discussed at length in the review of the literature. 
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that their expected value is E(ns). In order that E(ns) and ns yield 
equal utility to the risk averter a risk premium must be added to E(ns). 
We shall now consider a firm which is faced with an unanticipated 
increase in demand. At least initially, the firm will not know whether 
this increase is "random" in the sense of being temporary, nor can it 
predict how other firms are responding to this change. Therefore it is 
not implausible that a risk averse firm may leave price unchanged and 
simply increase quantity supplied subject to its capacity constraints. 
However, a decrease in demand presents additional considerations. 
Firms may wish to avoid price reductions when demand falls because, 
when it picks up again and prices need to be restored to their former 
levels, they will need to consider the conjectural problems regarding 
rivals' adjustments. Thus, reducing prices in times of falling demand 
does not imply that they can be as easily increased when demand recovers. 
Although these arguments will not be developed further in this chapter, 
they indicate that attitudes towards risk in an environment of uncertainty 
and limited information need to be considered in the context of price 
adjustment. 
So far, the analysis has been confined along traditional lines, to 
the use by the firm of two decision variables, namely price and quantity. 
However, in a world of product. differentiation a discussion of price 
adjustment cannot omit two additional policy variables which are within 
the reach of the firm. These are advertising and quality change. 
Although usually viewed as part of the long-term corporate strategy of 
the firm, recent. studies have suggested that these may also provide a 
useful tool'for short-term competitive responses. 
i 
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The basic theory underlying quality changes in this context is that 
in oligopolistic industries, where potential retaliation by rivals presents 
firms with a considerable threat, quality changes are a means of concealing 
price changes. Furthermore it is suggested by Cowling and Cubbin (1971) 
that quality changes are particularly effective as price reductions to which 
retaliation must necessarily be delayed by the length of time it takes to 
alter product characteristics. 
To test this hypothesis hedonic price indices were used. Cowling 
and Cubbin (1972) showed that the quality adjusted price index for motor 
cars in the U. K. varied by more, over a selected time period, than the 
ordinary index published by the Department of Industry. The hedonic price 
index is derived by estimating a "shadow price" for each of the product's 
characteristics and then computing the predicted price on this bäsis. Thus 
if, when quality increases in terms of characteristics, the predicted price 
rises above the actual price, then a price reduction, in real terms, has 
been effected. 
The relevant question is: how are quality adjustments used as policy 
variables? The proposition put forward by Cowling and Cubbin (1971) is that 
quality changes are used mainly in reducing price and that this vindicates 
the kinked demand curve hypothesis. The reasoning goes as follows: since 
firms are fearful of retaliation following price reductions, they choose 
to do so in real rather than nominal terms so that these are not easily 
detected, and when they are, a. corresponding quality change by rivals would 
take a considerable period of time to implement. 
Cubbin (1975) analysed the relation between quality changes and 
pricing behaviour for the U. K. motor industry over the 1956-68 period. Out 
of 147 price changes, 46 were decreases and 101 were increases. These 
were further split into quality changed-and-unchanged categories. Cubbin 
I 
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found that quality changes were more strongly associated with price 
decreases than increases, and this association was statistically 
significant. This evidence supports the view that quality adjusted price 
decreases are used as a means of avoiding oligopolistic retaliation. 
Firms will want to conceal price reductions, but they will want price 
increases to be followed by other firms. Hence quality adjustments will 
be used for reductions but not for increases. This is consistent with 
what Cubbin 'finds. 
The argument could be carried a stage further by suggesting that 
quality changes could be used in response to short-term changes in demand 
for the reasons outlined above. However, if it takes several months to 
implement a modification of the product, then the firm runs the risk of 
realising a price adjustment when it is no longer required. Furthermore, 
Cubbin argued that quality-adjusted prices did not appear to respond to 
changes in sales or market share. This implies that quality adjustments 
are part of the long-run pricing strategy, rather than a short term adjust- 
ment tool. The ability of producers to disguise price decreases via 
quality changes also crucially depends on the characteristics of the product 
in question. Motor cars are particularly suitable for quality-adjusted- 
price competition. 
To sum up, both on a priori and empirical grounds, it would appear 
.0 
that price adjustments via quality changes form part of the firm's medium- 
to-long term competitive strategy. As far as adjustments to short-run 
changes in demand are concerned, quality adjustments suffer from the same 
problems as pure price adjustments with one important exception: they are 
less easily detected and may not be as quickly neutralised. 
Lastly, we have to consider advertising as an alternative or 
complement to the price adjustment decision. The static optimum ratio 
6 
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of advertising expenditures to sales revenue is determined by the ratio of 
the advertising to the price elasticity of demand. This is the familiar 
Dorfman-Steiner condition('), which in itself says little about the 
potential trade-off between price and advertising adjustments to changes 
in demand. On the empirical side however, Cowling and Cubbin (1971) found 
that advertising expenditures responded to short-run changes in firms' 
market shares. But the latter reflect the effect of intra-industry 
competition rather than exogenous changes in demand which is what concerns 
us here. 
on a priori grounds, it could be'argued that advertising changes 
1-1 
.0 
can provide effective short-run "stop-gap" adjustments to downward move- 
ments in market demand. First, advertising messages can be delivered in 
much shorter a time than say, quality changes take to implement. Also, 
the risks of making short-run adjustments to the price-cost margin which 
are difficult to redress are avoided by the use of advertising. However, 
the advertising decision is also subject to retaliation by rivals, parti- 
cularly if market shares are closely guarded. Thus an adjustment to 
exogenous changes in demand may be mistaken for predatory behaviour by 
rivals hence inviting further retaliation. Of interest here is the finding 
by Cowling and Cubbin (1971) that advertising expenditures by U. K. motor 
manufacturers were sub-optimal in terms of the Dorfman-Steiner condition. 
The authors explained this finding by invoking the argument, previously 
suggested, that in a hostile retaliatory environment firms take account of 
the dangers of an advertising war and reduce expenditures accordingly. 
Hence the same argument would apply to. the use of advertising as a short- 
run substitute to price adjustment. Again this would indicate that 
advertising is part of long-term, intra-industry competitive strategy 
(1) For a concise restatement see Cowling et al (1975), pp. 5-6. 
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which firms may be unwilling to disturb in the face of changes in economic 
conditions which are shrouded in uncertainty. 
2.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter we surveyed the broad background to the price adjust- 
ment decision. We attempted to establish an association between the 
recent reinterpretation of the General Theory, known in the literature as 
the "new view" of Keynes, and the long-standing administered prices hypo- 
thesis. It was suggested that both controversies had common theoretical 
underpinnings and that they stemmed from the analytical confusion 
surrounding the theory of price adjustment in a non neo-classical market 
setting. This scenario is characterised by the problem of imperfect 
information which faces firms, and it is this information problem which 
links the present thesis with the ongoing controversies. 
The gamut of factors which influence the price adjustment decision 
.I 
was explored in this chapter. Turning our attention away from quantity 
adjustments, we examined the effect of limited information, uncertainty, 
attitudes towards risk, quality changes and the role of advertising on 
the price adjustment decision. The overall conclusion which may be 
tentatively drawn is that in view of the environment in which the firm 
operates, it cannot rely on the different policy instruments listed 
above to provide a risk-free alternative to price adjustment. This is 
so because these alternative decision variables also carry with them 
the potential threat of competitive retaliation. Hence in the f5nal 
analysis, quantity adjustments may provide the solution to the firm 
which is in short-run disequilibrium but which does not wish to disturb 
the competitive status quo in the industry by adjusting its price. 
Further theoretical developments which will focus on the price 
adjustment decision and, in particular, on the problems of co-ordinating 
0 
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such adjustments with rival firms when information is scarce, will be 
presented in chapter 4. In the next chapter however, we shall present 
a review of the theoretical literature which is relevant to the price 
adjustment process. 
.0 
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Chapter 3 
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
a 
3.1 Introduction 
The subject of our thesis requires that the literature review should 
extend into two fairly distinct but complementary areas. The first con- 
cerns the pure theory of price adjustment. Until recently, there was no 
theory of price adjustment per se. In the formal work of Walras and 
0 
Edgeworth, instantaneous price adjustment was guaranteed by certain theore- 
tical assumptions. Following growing criticism of the time-honoured 
assumption that tätonnement models with an impersonal market auctioneer 
adequately describe the adjustment of price, there has been a resurgence 
of interest in the subject with a number of recent contributions. 
The second part of the literature review concerns the theory of 
decision making under uncertainty. Once we reject the assumption of an 
impersonal market agent adjusting prices to which all participants respond, 
the adjustment process is left squarely within the decision-making set of 
individual firms. It is not implausible to suggest, therefore, that the 
dynamics of adjustment are closely tied to the firm's attitude towards 
risk and uncertainty. This is because the firm faces the dual problem 
of imperfect information and a lack of certainty about the future outcome 
of current policy decisions. 
3.2 The Pure Theory of Price Adjustment 
The analysis of price adjustment has traditionally been linked to 
the fundamental theory of Supply and demand. Adjustment was subsumed in 
the "law" in terms of the prediction that whenever demand exceeds supply 
prices will rise, and conversely when supply exceeds demand. This pre- 
diction was often verified in the literature by submitting evidence on 
price movements in competitive markets. 
However, the more. formal literature of the turn of the century recognised 
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that this adjustment process required some very special assumptions about 
market structure. For example, Walras (1874) introduced the concept of a 
presiding auctioneer who would instantaneously and costlessly adjust 
prices in the market whenever the quantities supplied and demanded at a 
given price, "crie au hazard", were not equal. This special assumption 
ensured that exchange would always take place at equilibrium prices. 
Edgeworth (1881) used a similar assumption, namely that of "recontracting", 
to achieve the same end. Thus no contract was binding unless exchange in 
the market took place at equilibrium prices. 
It is interesting to note that the dynamics of price adjustment were 
not explicitly discussed in the literature until Samuelson (1947) formalised 
the "law" of supply and demand in the well known price adjustment model 
which is given below: 
(1) d] = H(qD - qS) = H(D(p, a) - S(p)) H'>O 
dt 
In equation (1) D(p, a) is the demand function and S(p) the supply function. 
However, this differential equation of price adjustment did not constitute 
an attempt to formulate a theory of adjustment for markets in disequilibrium. 
Its purpose was the analysis of the stability properties of competitive price 
equilibrium. Using equation (1) Samuelson derived the Walrasian stability 
condition for a single market. A market was said to be Walras stable if, 
whenever quantity demanded exceeded quantity supplied, the price would rise. 
Thus the stability condition holds whenever, starting from disequilibrium, 
the equilibrium price is approached as time tends to infinity. Solving and 
simplifying equation (1) Samuelson was able to show that stability would be 
guaranteed by the positive'slope of the supply curve, or in the event of it 
being negatively sloped, if it was less steep relative to the price axis 
than the demand curve. Samuelson also extended the stability analysis to 
the multiple market case, but the price adjustment specification remained 
the same. 
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The importance of Samuelson's contribution lies in the formal 
specification of the price adjustment process as in equation (1) The 
latter was to provide a focal point for critical reappraisal at a later 
stage. 
Arrow (1959) took up the discussion by pointing to the fundamental 
inconsistency of the price adjustment model of equation (1). The inconsis- 
tency of the model arises out of a conflict with the central assumption of 
perfectly competitive markets, the behaviour of which it supposedly depicts. 
A perfectly competitive market is one in which sellers are price takers - 
they face an infinitely elastic demand curve at the current market price. 
However, equation (1) states that when supply and demand are unequal the 
market price will change. But since all sellers are price takers by 
assumption, there is no one left whose decision it is to change the market 
price in accordance with (1). Thus the crucial importance of having the 
Walrasian auctioneer is made evident; not only is the assumption necessary 
to guarantee that transactions occur at equilibrium prices, but 
it is also 
indispensable to ensure that market prices adjust instantaneously out of 
disequilibrium. 
Arrow went on to explore the determinants of competitive price adjust- 
ment. He showed that whenever a market which would conventionally be classed 
as competitive is in disequilibrium, individual sellers become monopolists. 
To see this consider the situation of excess supply at the current market 
price. Some sellers cannot dispose of the output they wish to sell on the 
basis of equating price with marginal cost. They could increase their sales, 
ceteris paribus, by lowering their price. Clearly therefore, the price 
elasticity of demand which they face when the market is in disequilibrium 
is 
less than infinity. 
Arrow specifically considered the situation of excess demand. Here 
each firm may be gradually increasing its price and quantity until the new 
equilibrium is reached. It was stressed that in disequilibrium each firm is 
tentatively feeling its way toward the new optimal price and quantity, so that 
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different prices may prevail in the market simultaneously. Uncertainty 
about the true state of demand is the pervasive feature of the adjustment 
process. 
Three factors were suggested to influence the speed of price adjust- 
ment. The first was the degree of capacity utilisation which would 
determine the rate of adjustment through its effect on the slope of the 
marginal cost curve. The second factor was the ability of producers to 
accumulate or run down their inventories. Finally, the third factor was 
the degree of uncertainty facing each firm, implying. that the speed of 
adjustment will be an increasing function of the availability of informa- 
tion about demand. 
Arrow's pioneering contribution left a number of questions 
unanswered. First, the problem of excess supply was not explored, yet 
this is a potentially more complex question. This is because while a 
risk averse firm facing excess demand may choose to ration its output 
among buyers or simply let some go without, a situation of excess supply 
involves a drain on the firm's resources with consequential pressures to 
adjust price or output. Furthermore, the problem of monitoring rival's 
behaviour was not given any attention. This is an important problem 
since in disequilibrium the outcome of any firm's policy decision depends 
also on what its rivals choose to do. 
" Gordon and Hynes (1970) prefaced their analysis of price dynamics 
by considering the Lange (1944) model of monopolistic price adjustment. 
In this model price adjustment is a function of the difference between 
., marginal revenue and marginal cost, i. e.: 
(2) dp =G (RI - Cl) G' <0 
dt 
Gordon and Hynes questioned the validity of such an adjustment 
process on the grounds that if the monopolist possessed perfect informa- 
tion about marginal revenue and marginal cost he would instantly adjust 
0 
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the price. An alternative rationale for such a process was that the costs 
of adjustment would increase with the rate of price change, but they also 
found this argument unsatisfactory. It was their view that equation (2) 
could only be rationalised in terms of the very limited information avail- 
able to the monopolist about his demand curve. Underlying equation (2) 
is the process of search for information about the relevant parameters for 
equilibrium price adjustment. They supported this view by pointing out 
that since transactions are discrete rather than continuous in time, the 
process of exploring the demand curve cannot take place instantly and 
costlessly by briefly changing the price. Therefore disequilibrium price 
dynamics arise out of "Knightian" uncertainty which implies that the para- 
meters necessary for equilibrium adjustment are temporarily unknown. 
Gordon and Hynes specified an expected demand schedule for the firm 
as follows: 
(3ý xe= fe(g, Ps u1, u2, u3' ae) 
where -xe is expected demand, v= (vl ... vm) is a vector of 
information 
variables and the u's are random variables with zero mean and constant 
variance. Thus u1, u2, and u3 represent the firm, industry, and aggre- 
gate demand respectively. Finally, ae is an estimated shift parameter. 
In their analysis of inflationary trade-offs the authors omitted 
ul and u2 from equation (3) and assumed, for analytical convenience, 
that unpredictable shifts in demand result only from changes in monetary 
policy. They considered a once and for all increase in the nominal 
supply of money, and assumed that in order to restore equilibrium in the 
current period a 10% rise in money prices was required. 
The first signs of disequilibrium will be excess demand and a run- 
down of inventories. A representative firm's demand schedule is given 
by equation (3) and it is assumed that the historically set price is 
consistent with an inventory level or its corresponding resource 
9 
- 39 - 
unemployment rate of U*. The shift in demand causes observed U* to fall to 
U'. The firm will increase its price but not by the 10% required, since past 
values of ae still enter the expected demand schedule of xe. The firm is 
assumed to possess a prior distribution of ae which is continually modified 
in light of recent observation. The firm will learn that the excess demand 
is temporary because in successive time periods it will increase price by 
more than what is required to restore equilibrium. Thus it will then begin 
to observe excess supply, which will lead to a downward revision of ae. In 
this manner the path to equilibrium is shown to be stable. 
The authors stress that any disequilibrium states with unemployment 
above or below U* are transitory so that the authorities cannot use continual 
increases in the money supply to reduce U* permanently. If they attempt to 
do so the steady state inflation rate necessary to maintain dynamic equilib- 
rium at U' will be incorporated by firms in their estimates of ae. The net 
result will be an equilibrium level of unemployed resources U* with a stable 
rate of inflation. Hence the existence of a long run trade-off between 
inflation and unemployment is denied. 
The hypothesis that individual decision-making units eventually learn 
about stable dynamic situations forms the basis for Gordon and Hynes' refuta- 
tion of the widely used learning process known as the "adaptive expectations" 
model: 
(4) at = XEil-lý)iat-i 
This model (4) implies that current expectations always lag behind current 
observations. It would permit the authorities to establish a stable trade- 
off since, by changing demand in each period by a given percentage, firms' 
price adjustments, would always lag behind thus maintaining a state of 
permanent excess demand. 
However whilst rejecting (4), Gordon and Hynes do not1rigorously specify 
the learning process of firms. In a world of uncertainty it is difficult to 
see how firms can form expectations which are always true to actual events. 
0 
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The adaptive expectations model has the virtue of being consistent with 
the behaviour of risk averse decision makers. But although the authors 
argue that price inflexibility to demand changes is simply a reflection 
of the existence of uncertainty, they do not analyse explicitly the 
factors which underly this type of pricing behaviour. 
Fisher's (1970) price adjustment model is set within a more abstract 
and rigorous framework, and its purpose is to examine the convergence of 
prices to the competitive equilibrium. In this model consumers search 
for low-price sellers and firms set prices on the basis of the observed 
difference between expected and actual demand. However, the way in which 
firms derive their expectations about demand constitutes the most funda- 
mental and contentious assumption of Fisher's model. According to this 
assumption, each firm believes that it actually faces a horizontal demand 
curve at the equilibrium market price - but the latter is not known with 
certainty. Furthermore, each firm makes an independent estimate of the 
equilibrium market price, and then proceeds to supply up to the point 
where marginal cost equals the estimated price - pe. Thus, if actual 
demand is less than expected, pe is lowered. In the converse case when 
0 actual demand exceeds expectations, pe is raised. 
It is also assumed that low-price firms have at least as many 
customers as high-price firms so that search by consumers is efficient. 
Marginal costs are assumed to be constant (c' > 0) and identical for all 
firms. Finally it is assumed that consumers have the same demand curve 
and that there is a unique equilibrium price, p* > 0, at which demand 
and'supply are equal. For each firm the adjustment process is given as 
(5) dpi Hi(xi) 
dt 
where xi is the excess demand facing the i'th firm. From this set of 
assumptions the following propositions are derived: 
0 
- 41 - 
a) If two firms charge the same price p', they encounter 
the same demand. 
b) If Pmin is the lowest price charged by the set of firms 
an 
c) If 
xi 
d) If 
i Amin 
P< P'" 
>0 als 
Amax is 
p*, then for all firms charging pmin, xi > 0. 
and if for firms charging p', xi >. 0 then 
D for firms charging p. 
the highest price charged by the set of firms 
and if Pmax > Pmin >, p* then for firms charging pmax, xi < 0. 
e) For any c>0 there exists a6>0 such that pmax > p* +C 
and pmin > p* -6 imply that for those charging pmax , xi < 0. 
The five propositions above follow almost directly from the assumptions. 
The propositions and assumptions are then used to prove the convergence 
theorem, which is as follows. 
In this model, as time goes to infinity, all prices converge to 
the competitive price, p*. This result is not surprising. It stems 
directly from two assumptions, the first about consumer search for low 
priced firms, and the second about firms behaving "as if" they were 
perfect competitors when they clearly are not. This latter assumption, 
that firms estimate an equilibrium market price at which demand is 
infinitely elastic, and its subsequent adjustment in light of excess 
demand, is difficult to rationalise. This behavioural assumption 
effectively ensures that firms can ignore the actions of rivals, since 
firm interdependence has no place in the model. 
The analysis in the model thus concerns the convergence of 
different initial prices charged by firms to the unique competitive 
price. Of greater interest would be the analysis of adjustments by 
individual firms to changes in the relevant demand and cost parameters, 
but this aspect of price adjustment is not discused by Fisher. 
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Diamond's (1971) price adjustment model differs from Fishers' in two 
important respects. The first is the nature of consumer search. The second 
is the actual behaviour of firms. The model is one of discrete period t 
optimisation. There are many firms and customers. In each time period a 
firm sets aprice and a consumer enters the store at random. The consumer 
is uncertain about future prices. The cost of search is the disutility of 
further price sampling in future periods and is assumed to be an infinitely 
increasing function of search. In any time period every consumer has a cut- 
off price below which he will make a purchase in the current period. Thus 
search activity in this model is characterised as a time-process rather than 
a cross-section activity of searching for the lowest price store at any time. 
Consumer's utility is assumed to be a function of the price at which the 
purchase is made and the number of periods elapsed before purchasing. It 
is 
assumed also that all consumers have the same underlying demand resulting in 
a continuous quasi-concave firm revenue function with a maximum at a price 
so that: 
p. x(p) increases for p< p* where x(p) is demand 
p. x(p) decreases for p> p* 
For convenience, production costs are assumed to be zero. Denoting aggregate 
demand by Xt(p) then if there are m stores each firm will face an identical 
demand curve given as: 
(1/m) Xtip) 
This result is guaranteed by the nature of the search process described above. 
Since store search is random, it is rational for each firm to maximise profits 
discretely in each period. Its past and future prices will have no significant 
effect on current profits. Since all firms are assumed to have zero costs and 
identical demand curves, their optimal price in any period will be the same. 
a 
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The crucial dynamic element of the model is the process of change 
in the cut-off price for existing consumers, and for those entering the 
market for the first time. In the former case it is assumed that a con- 
sumer who does not purchase in any one period, raises his cut-off price 
in the next period. This is justified on account of rising search costs 
in future pebiods which are a disincentive to the consumer's extension 
of price sampling. Those entering the market for the first time adjust 
their reservation or cut-off price on the basis of future price expecta- 
tions. Since the latter are some weighted average of the former, the 
presence of search costs ensures that the reservation price of a new 
entrant will be higher than the current observed price. 
Given these consumer search dynamics, Diamond shows that there 
exists a time period t' such that: 
pt = p* for all t> t' 
In other words, firms' equilibrium prices converge to the joint profit 
maximising (monopoly) price. This result follows directly from the 
twin assumptions about firm and consumer behaviour, and stands in stark 
contrast to Fisher's result. This is because in Diamond's model, firms 
are aware that their demand curves are downward sloping, so that price 
changes have an effect on marginal revenue which is in direct antithesis 
to Fisher's "as if" perfectly competitive firms. Furthermore, in Diamond's 
model, the random, non-rational nature of the search ensures that firms can 
ignore the action of their rivals because, a) store selection is not based 
on past pricing history so consumers do not remember low price stores, and 
b) by the law of large numbers each store ends up with the same demand curve. 
Thus the search specification precludes any competition between stores. 
I 
On the other hand, Diamond's model shares some common drawbacks with' 
Fisher's model. Both look. at the convergence of an initial set of different 
prices to a unique equilibrium, and disregard the problem of adjustment 
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following changes in underlying costs or demand. Both models abstract 
from problems of information on the firm's side and the relevance of 
risk-averse behaviour. 
Fisher's 1972 model of price adjustment is essentially a general 
equilibrium extension of the single market, 1970 result. The scenario 
consists of n markets in each of which there are many "dealers" for the 
homogeneous commodity. These dealers set their price and then wait for 
buyers to come and transact with them. Dealers are generally sellers 
and customers are buyers, but the possibility of dealers buying is not 
excluded. As in the single market model each customer searches among 
dealers for the lowest price and the fundamental assumption is that 
every dealer believes that he faces a horizontal- demand curve at the 
equilibrium price. He quotes a price believed by him to be the latter. 
If his estimate is proved wrong, he adjusts it in the direction indicated 
by excess demand. Consumer search is assumed to be costly, i. e. informa- 
tion has an opportunity cost. The set of dealers known to customers is 
assumed to be fixed over time thus guaranteeing a non-repetitive sampling 
process. 
Although imperfect information may result in several prices exist- 
ing simultaneously in any market at a given time, arbitrage is ruled out. 
Trade takes place instantaneously until all excess demands are zero. 
Continuity of the demand and supply function is also assumed. We denote 
x as quantity, To as initial money stock, z as excess demand, h as consumer 
subscript and i as commodity su}1script. All superscripts denote dealers. 
The convergence theorem is preceded by three propositions: 
a) A quasi-equilibrium is defined as a set of non-negative prices 
and stocks of i 'and m such that for every h and i, 
zhi ,0 and Exh and Emh = Iý 
b) A competitive-equilibrium is defined as a quasi-equilibrium in 
which for every i, pid =piri. e. all dealers' prices are the same. 
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c) Every quasi-equilibrium is also a competitive equilibrium. 
This proposition is proved. 
Using the above, Fisher demonstrates that every limit point of the prices path 
is a quasi-equilibrium and therefore a competitive equilibrium. Furthermore, 
if pid < pir and Ezhi > Ezhi, then the economy is globally stable i. e. from 
any initial position it converges to competitive equilibrium. 
This latter result is of crucial importance. It states that any devia- 
tion from equilibrium will be self correcting if and only if the consumer 
search process is efficient. This is defined such that if two dealers quote 
different prices, the dealer with the higher price will experience a lower 
level of excess demand than the dealer with the lower price. 
The basic criticisms of the model apply equally to the 1970 partial 
equilibrium version. The greatest weakness is the assumption about dealers 
pricing behaviour - "as if" they were perfect competitors. Again the model 
concerns itself with convergence to a single equilibrium and does not consider 
adjustment from one equilibrium to another. 
Barrots model (1972) differs from the Fisher and Diamond analysis in 
one significant respect: it recognises explicitly the monopolistic nature of 
disequilibrium price adjustments. Thus the demand curve facing the firm is 
stochastic and price elasticity is less than infinity. The distinguishing 
feature of Barro's analysis-is a derivation of the difference in profit 
between a continual price adjustment profit function, and a static-price 
profit function. Price adjustments are considered in relation to changes 
in the stochastic component of demand. This cost of not adjusting price 
continually, i. e. the forgone profit, is then set against the cost of 
adjustment to derive the optimality criteria. The first step is to examine 
the effects of changes in the random component of demand u on profits: - 
Demand schedule: 
Cost schedule: 
Y=Q(P)+u=a -ßP +u 
C(Y) =at by t cY2 
a 
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Thus: 
(6) As(u) =P- C'(Y) 
If u is varied from an initial value u0 to ul the corresponding change in 
profit is: 
6 
(7) An = 
ull1r' 
(u) du = 
uI 
l EP - C' (Y)] du 
00 
Using the explicit functional forms, equation (7) is computed for continual 
price adjustment and for a fixed value of P. 
P, determined by u=0 and 
unchanging when u0 becomes u1. The difference between these is the profit 
gain from price adjustment: 
(8) Air (0qu) - AW(o, u) 
- (1 + 2cß)2 u2 = Out 
4ß 1+cß) 
It is assumed that price adjustment costs are purely administrative and there- 
fore lump-sum (y) independent of size or direction. Output adjustments have 
zero cost. The random component u is assumed to be generated by a symmetric 
random walk with constant time interval between steps; c'. The firm -then 
selects ceiling and floor values of demand, he and hf, at which price adjust- 
ments occur. Since equation (8) is independent of a, he and hf remain optimal 
after adjustment. If m denotes the number of adjustments over some time 
interval T, the expected cost per unit time will be: 
(9) E(Cost/Time) = 7E(m/T) + E(Air - A7r) = yE(m/T) + OE(u)2 
The firm selects h= he = hf (since costs are symmetric) to minimise the value 
of (9) above. Using some simplifications and approximations the latter can be 
rewritten as: 
(10) E(Cost/Time) u2+Z 
h 
where v2 is the variance of the random walk and can be viewed as a measure of 
demand variability. The value of h2 that minimises expected cost per time is: 
4 
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(11) (h)2 =vY9 
The next step involves using this result to determine the optimal relation 
between price change per unit time and current excess demand. This 
coefficient of price adjustment (k) is shown to be: 
(12) k a(1 t 2cß)2 3/2 
4P 6Y[ß(1 t cß)] 
This expression is the key result of the model. The coefficient of price 
adjustment k is positively related to demand variance a2, inversely related 
to adjustment costs y and the price sensitivity of demand ß.. The reason 
for the latter is that a high value of ß implying high demand sensitivity 
makes small price adjustments sufficient to re-attain equilibrium. 
Although Barro's model scores in that it emphasises the monopolistic 
nature of price adjustment it shares some shortcomings with the Diamond and 
Fisher models. The model considers only changes in the random component of 
demand u and their effect on price; changes of the cost and demand coef- 
ficients b and ß on adjustments are not analysed. Furthermore the problem 
of rivals'' actions and their effect on the adjustment process is entirely 
ignored by virtue of the assumption that -the firm is a monopolist. Finally 
the firm is taken to be maximising its current profits. No allowance is 
made for risk averse behaviour and the trade-off which it implies between 
output and price adjustment. 
Hey (1974) has developed a price adjustment model using the Diamond 
and Fisher framework but modifying the specification of consumer search and 
firms' pricing strategy. It is assumed that firms know that they face down- 
ward sloping demand curves. The position of each firm's demand curve depends 
on its own price relative to that of its rivals. Consumer search is costly. 
k is the optimal number of firms searched, the same for all consumers. It 
is derived through the trade-off between disutility of seach and increased 
expected utility from lower price. Price is denoted x, and its distribution 
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function among firms F(x), with a density function f(x). Denoting 
g(x/k) as the probability density of the lowest price in a sample of 
k firms, it is stated that: 
(13) g(x/k) = kf(x) [1 - F(x)] 
k-1 
If N is the ratio of buyers to sellers, the ratio of customers to firms ' 
at any price x is given by: 
(14) R(x/k, N) = N. g(x/k)/f(x) = N. k[l - F(x)ik-1 
Clearly this ratio depends only on N, k and F(x). This means that assum- 
ing N and k are-constant, if a firm remains at the same point in the dis- 
tribution of prices it will have the same number of customers in any two 
periods'. The firm's demand curve is given as D(x) = R(x/k, N). d(x) where 
d(x) is the consumer's demand curve - identical for all consumers. Assum- 
ing these have constant demand elasticity 0, and firms maximise profits 
with constant marginal costs y; then the profit maximising price is: 
(15) x' =y &= y6 where 6 stands fore 
0-1 e -l 
However, since different firms charge different prices but have identical 
costs they must have different perceptions of 6 with those charging higher 
prices having higher estimates of 6. Each firm's estimate of d, denoted 
as 6 is assumed to be revised according to an adaptive expectations 
model in multiplicative form i. e. 
(16) dttl = dtxdt-a 
t or log at+i =a log at + (1 - ))log 6 
The author then draws upon the result that if in period t the price dis- 
tribution is Pareto, and if all firms change their prices according to an 
adjustment process given as: 
(17) Xttl = atxtt 
then the price distribution in period t+1 will also be Pareto. In addition 
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we note that all firms observe the same price elasticity 9. 
From (15) above we have that xt+l Ydt+l and substituting for 
dttl in the above expression we obtain: 
(18) Xttl ' loth al-a 
However, since St = xt/y, expression (18) can be rewritten as: 
(19) xý ýyoýl-axa t+l 
Expression (19) is equivalent to (17) with a= (y6) and b=A. Thus 
the, key result of this model is that the limit of this adjustment pro- 
cess is a degenerate distribution at the single value of y6 i. e. the 
monopoly price. The speed of convergence to yd clearly depends on X. 
Hey's model resembles those of Fisher and Diamond in that the 
analysis centres on a convergence theorem to a unique equilibrium mar- 
ket price. The main difference lies in the price adjustment process 
ascribed to firms and the pattern of consumer search. 
The main drawback with Hey's model is that the result depends 
crucially on firms remaining on the same point of the price distribu- 
tion through time, and this latter condition will only be guaranteed 
if N, k and F(x) remain constant through time. It is not difficult 
to accept that N may not change over time if the number of buyers and 
sellers is very large; but the same cannot be said of k and F(x). 
The author himself suggests that k will change as consumers learn 
through the sampling process, and for F(x) to remain unchanged very 
special assumptions are required about the price adjustment process of 
firms and the initial distribution of prices. 
The problem of rivals' action and its effect on each firm's adjust- 
ment process is removed by assuming identical, constant elasticity demand 
curves for all consumers in conjunction with the assumption of a constant 
ratio of customers to firms. Finally, in common with the Fisher and 
- 50 - 
Diamond models, Hey abstracts from the question of price adjustment to 
changes in perceived costs and demand. The analysis rests on deriving 
a convergence theorem from an initial distribution of prices. To that 
extent, therefore, the models abstract from the central question of 
price adjustment as originally posed by Arrow. 
Excluding the contributions by Arrow (1959) and Gordon and Hynes 
(1970), the recent models on the subject of price adjustment suffer from. 
three related drawbacks. First, the models do not specifically con- 
sider the problem of disequilibrium price adjustments induced by changes 
in the cost and demand parameters. Second, within a realistic decision 
making framework the question of risk aversion by firms, imperfect infor- 
mation, and rivals' reactions cannot be ignored, but the models do not 
examine these problems. Finally, within the context of temporary mar- 
ket imperfections during disequilibrium, the potential trade-off between 
price and quantity adjustment as suggested by Leijonhufvud (1968) and 
Hines (1971) needs to be rigorously examined. 
3.3 The Theory of Decision Making by the Firm under Uncertainty 
The assumption that price adjustments can be viewed "as if" effected 
by impersonal market agents has come under increasing criticism in 
recent years. The traditional scenario was that price adjustments per 
unit time were a function of the gap between supply and demand. A con- 
sensus is now emerging regarding the inadequacy of this scenario for the 
analysis of adjustments in modern industrial markets. It is now widely 
recognised that firms in these markets make price and quantity adjust- 
ments individually - that is in isolation from but not without recogni- 
tion of their rivals., This conceptual change leads to the question of 
a realistic framework within which the analysis of price adjustments can 
take place. 
For the firm considering an adjustment of its policy variables to a 
new optimum there exists a two-fold decision making problem. The first con- 
cerns imperfect information. This arises because an essential feature of market 
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disequilibria is that the signals which reveal to the firm the change in 
its environment are themselves insufficient for determining the new optima. 
In other words even if a firm observes that it is out of equilibrium, it 
will nevertheless not have sufficient information to get back to it. For 
optimal adjustment, the firm needs to search for and acquire additional 
information. However, search is a costly activity and hence it must be 
explicitly considered as part of the decision making process. 
The second problem, distinct from the first, is that even if full 
information were obtained, the stochastic nature of economic phenomena 
means that the success of policy decisions could not be determined with 
certainty. This is particularly relevant in a dynamic context where the 
result of current decisions only emerges at a future date. Thus for each 
decision taken there is a range of potential outcomes, each of which has 
a probability attached to it. The gathering of additional information 
would make the probability statement more definitive but it would not 
render potential outcomes deterministic, i. e. certain. 
Firm decision making is therefore subject to some "uncertainty" - 
loosely defined. Hence it is clear that the firm's attitude towards 
risk is crucial as regards its decision making. 
Rigorous analysis of the economics of information began with Stigler's 
seminal contribution in 1961. The basic premise adopted by Stigler is 
that information is scarce and therefore has an opportunity cost. Given 
that the decision-maker requires information before he can take decisions, 
his first problem is to determine what amount of search activity is optimal. 
Since information yields benefits but is also costly, an economic problem 
is involved in deriving an optimal quantity of search activity. 
Stigler's framework is as follows: consumers search among stores in 
order to discover low priced stores. The problem is when to stop searching. 
The distribution of store prices is known a priori. An additional assumption 
0 
0 
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is that at any time there will be a frequency distribution of prices quoted 
by sellers and that the dispersion of prices is sufficiently large to pro- 
vide an adequate incentive for consumers' search of low priced dealers. 
Stigler specifically considers a case where the distribution of 
sellers' prices is uniform between zero and one. Using the statistical 
properties of this distribution he shows that the distribution of minimum 
prices with n stores being searched is: 
(20) n(1-p)n-1 
where p is price. In deciding on the number of stores which would consti- 
tute an optimal amount of search, the consumer has to take account of the 
expected benefit of additional search as compared to its cost. Thus the 
relevant question relates to the expected minimum price of n stores searched. 
For the uniform distribution and from (20) above this is given as: 
(21) E(Pmin(n » 
ntl 
Clearly the expected minimum price declines with additional search but at 
a decreasing rate. Stigler then shows that this result also applies to 
rectangular and normal distributions of sellers' prices. For the consumer, 
the optimal number of stores searched is obtained when the expected benefit 
of an additional store searched equals the cost of the search. Assuming 
the latter to be constant and denoting it by (c); assuming also that the 
expected gain of search is the saving incurred thereby i. e. quantity 
purchased (q) times the unit reduction in price, then it is optimal to 
search n stores if 
(22) Etkmin(n-1) - Pm in(n)]q >, c> E[Pmin(n) pm in 
(n+1)] q 
As Stigler puts it: 
"If the cost of search is equated to its expected marginal 
return, the optimum amount of search will be found. "") 
(1) Stigler (1961), p. 216. 
0 
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There seems to be no problem in assuming the costs of search to be 
proportional to the number of sample units. More contentious is the 
assumption adopted by Stigler that the distribution of sellers' prices is 
known a priori, so that expected minimum prices can be determined. Stigler 
is in fact assuming that consumers already have a significant amount of 
relevant information. 
In the wake of Stigler's contribution it has been suggested that the 
fixed-sample search rule is not optimal and should be substituted by a 
sequential sampling process (notably McCall 1965). Thus if the present 
minimum price is s, and if the expected decrease in minimum price from 
additional, search is g(s),. then it pays to search continually until 
c. g(s). However, it appears that the optimality of this decision rule 
depends on the amount of prior information which the consumer has on the 
distribution of sellers prices. 
While Stigler's analysis opened up a number of interesting questions, 
as Rothschild (1973) points out in his survey article the important question 
of why a dispersion of sellers' prices should persist is not given any 
attention. Its importance stems from the fact that with efficient search 
by consumers and competition among firms, the distribution of prices would 
shrink to a point. Hence the particular conditions relating to the persis- 
tence of sellers' price distribution require analysis. Stigler's model is 
therefore said to relate to one side of the market only. From a price 
adjustment viewpoint the question of sellers' search is of great relevance. 
The problem of information and its specific implications for macro- 
economic aggregates has cropped up in the unemployment disequilibrium 
literature with most noteworthy contributions by Leijonhufvud (1968) and 
Alchian (1970). These discussions address themselves primarily to the 
question of resource unemployment'following reduction in aggregate demand. 
Alchian interprets the emergence of labour unemployment in terms of 
the costs of gathering information about potential exchange opportunities. 
9 
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He suggests that these costs account for the setting-up of institutions 
such as markets and commodity exchanges, for these minimise the costs of 
generating information by bringing buyers and sellers together.. 
Aichian proceeds to lay down two central propositions in connection 
with information costs. First, dissemination and acquisition of informa- 
tion obeys the ordinary laws of production, i. e. the faster the rate the 
higher the cost. This is illustrated by a simple example. Given the 
sampling distribution of buyers' offers, as the sample is enlarged the 
observed maximum offer will increase but at a diminishing rate. 
Second, the costs of collecting and disseminating information are 
reduced through specialisation in this activity. Thus in relation to a 
person seeking a job, this is more efficiently done while that person is 
unemployed and able to "specialise" in collecting and disseminating 
information. Alchian suggests this as a reason why it may be economic to 
refuse a salary cut and become unemployed whilst looking for another job. 
The author also suggests that in many cases price stability, with 
its associated need for inventories and- queues, has an economic justifica- 
tion because such stability minimises the costs of search by customers. 
If retailers always adjusted prices to clear their stocks, customers would 
be faced with a different distribution of store prices in each period, so 
that search will be required in each period. Thus greater search will be 
required when prices are relatively unstable. Consumers may be willing to 
trade off disutility of queuing against the costs of extra search neces- 
sitated in order to find low priced stores. Hence a seller who willingly 
stabilises his prices, offers his customers savings in terms of reduced 
search costs. i 
Of special relevance to this thesis is the suggestion that quantity- 
adjustments may replace price-adjustments in the exchange process where the 
problem of search is explicitly introduced into the optimising calculus of 
A 
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economic agents. The same suggestion is more forcefully made by Leijonhufvud 
(1968) in his theoretical reappraisal of the Keynesian contribution to the 
theory of exchange. Whilst Alchian confines himself to customer and employee 
search costs and their effect on optimisation, Leijonhufvud goes a step 
further to recognise the fact that: 
".... atomistic markets in disequilibrium present individual 
transactors with conjectural problems of immense complexity"*(') 
Thus although both authors stress the importance of search for informa- 
tion they do not relate it specifically to what concerns us here, namely the 
need for information on rivals' behaviour and changes in demand. 
The literature on decision making under uncertainty has been extensively 
developed in recent years. Its essential feature consists in comparing the 
utility of choices between outcomes which are known with certainty and those 
to which probabilities are attached. This approach stems fromthe 
Von Neumann-Morgenstern analysis of utility measurement, and its widest appli- 
cation has been in the study of decision making involving risk. 
The two classical contributions in this field are by Pratt (1964) and 
Arrow (1965). As their respective papers are fairly close substitutes, we 
will review Arrow's work and draw the parallels with Pratt's work where 
appropriate. 
The starting point of Arrow's analysis rests on the fundamental proposi- 
a. 
tion that the utility of an action to which a finite number of possible out- 
comes are attached with different probabilities, is equal to the weighted 
average of the utilities of these outcomes. The weights are the respective 
probabilities. Thus, call the probability of an event i Pi, wealth it, and U 
utility, then the formal expression of the proposition is: 
(23) 
nn 
U[. E Pi(wi)] E Pi[U(ii)] 
1=1 i=1 
(1) Leijonhufvud (1968), p. 77. 
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Note that the R. H. S. of (23) is the formula for expected utility E(i). 
Now the analysis of choices involving risks consists of comparing the 
utility derived from a payoff which is certain with another which is 
probabilistic. For example if an individual is indifferent between a given 
wealth n3 and a collection of possible wealth values with an expected value of 
W3 i. e. E(1j ), then we say that the individual is risk neutral. The stochastic 
(probabilistic) nature of his payoff does not effect his utility. 
Thus if: 
(24) UO i)= U[E(nj)] = U[£jPj(Trj)] 
then the decision maker is risk neutral. 
This analysis provides a basis for an evaluation of the nature of the 
utility function of"a risk-averse individual. For the latter the utility of 
an outcome known with certainty will not be equal to its equivalent expected 
value, i. e. the risk averse decision maker will always prefer the certain 
outcome. Thus for him: 
(25) U(7i )> U[E(Trj)] 
Arrow's specific example incorporates a positive increment of wealth (h), and 
his equivalent statement to (25) is' as follows: 
(26) U(7r 
0)> 
(1) U[rto - h] + (3) U[Tro + h] 
In other words risk aversion implies preference of n over an equal chance 0. 
(1) of getting iro -h and 7r 0+h. 
Rearranging (26)we have: 
(27) 
1 
U(io) - U(no - h) > U(io + h) - U(ro) 
It can be seen that (27) implies a utility function which is concave to the 
origin as depicted in the diagram below: 
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Figure 3.1 
A Concave Utility Function 
U(n) 
T 
This property of risk aversion, namely diminishing marginal utility of 
wealth, can be used to derive an index of the aversion to risk. The 
second derivative of the utility function U"(ir) <0 could be used as 
such an index, but as Arrow pointed-out, the numerical value of U "(W) 
will vary with the numerical value of the utility function U(70. To get 
around this problem Arrow proposed two measures of risk aversion which 
remain invariant under positive linear transformations of U(ir): 
RA(n) -U"(n)/U'(A) is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion 
RR(W) -nU"(n)/U(A) is the coefficient of relative risk aversion 
Both Arrow and Pratt demonstrate that the coefficient of risk 
aversion corresponds to a risk premium with which an individual must 
be compensated if he is to accept the risky alternative. Pratt con- 
siders an individual who is faced with a random income of an expected 
value E(Y), and a certain income, Yo. A risk averter would be willing 
to accept a value of Yo somewhat less than E(Y) and this difference 
may be thought of as the risk premium, P. 
Thus P= E(Y) - Yo 
Pratt then goes on to show that: 
(28) P= 1/2 oY RA(Yo) + terms of higher order. 
From this expression it can be seen that the risk premium increases 
with the degree of risk aversion. 
0 
-h it n +h 000 
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Mills (1959) developed a model of decision making under uncertainty 
which was not cast in the utility of profit framework. In what was the 
earliest contribution in this area, Mills examined the optimal price and 
output decisions of the firm which faces a stochastic demand schedule. 
In Mills' scenario the firm determines optimal price and output in 
advance of the trading period, that is before demand can be observed. He 
lays stress on the fact that a true state of uncertainty would not exist 
if the firm only had to determine in advance one policy variable, letting 
the other find its own equilibrium ex post. The demand schedule is 
defined as follows: 
(29) x= x(p) tu E(u) =0 
where x is quantity demanded and u is the random variable with zero mean. 
Since this is a one period model the problem of inventories is ignored. 
The firm is assumed to maximise expected profits, which implies that, 
since E(u) = 0, the optimal price set by this expected profit maximiser 
and that of the firm which faces certain demand will be the same. This 
is because, on average, the random variations in demand are zero, and 
the expected profit maximiser is only concerned with the mean values of 
the variables. 
However, Mills' innovation consists of introducing uncertainty 
into the model through the specification of the, expected revenue function. 
He distinguishes between actual demand (x) and output produced (z), since 
these will generally not be the same. Thus, total realised revenue will 
be equal to: 
(30) R*(z, p) = jpx if x .5z lpz ifx'r- z 
In this model it is explicitly recognised that demand may exceed output 
produced. Expected profits will be given by: 
(31) E(u) = px(p) - pD_(z, p) - c(z) 
0 
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where D(z, p) represents the shortage function, that is, the mean revenue 
lost due to unsatisfied demand and c(z) are the costs of producing z. 
The next step is to derive the optimal values p1' and z* in the 
uncertainty case and compare them with their certainty equivalents. In 
the certainty case, optimal price p is that which equates riskless marginal 
revenue and marginal cost i. e.: 
(31) X(p) t px'(p) = c'(z)x'(P) 
In the case where demand incorporates a random component the first order 
condition for expected profit maximisation is: 
(32) x (p'°) t p* = c'(z) t D(z, p*) 
x'(pst) x'(p*) 
From the above expression it can be seen that in the uncertainty situation 
the firm equates marginal revenue to marginal cost plus a second term.. 
Since the latter is negative, it can be seen immediately that the optimal 
price p* will be lower than in the certainty case. Mills then proceeds to 
generalise this result and shows that usually, but not invariably, the 
optimal price p* will be lower than p. However, optimal quantity produced 
in the uncertainty case z* may be equal to, greater than, or less than its 
certainty equivalent z depending on the nature of the demand schedule and 
the marginal cost curve. 
The notable feature of Mills' model is that it analyses the effect 
of uncertainty on. decision making without assuming risk aversion on the 
part of firms, given that the objective function involves maximising 
expected profits. The particular result shown above, i. e. p* .<p, stems 
from the fact that a fall in price, whilst increasing total expected revenue, 
1 
also increases the expected shortfall of production, i. e. shortage. 
' -Since 
the latter is a cost in terms of lost revenue, the producer balances these 
two effects in deriving the equilibrium values of the decision variables, i. e. 
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the optimal price p*. The net effect is the lower price p* than that 
under the certainty model. Mills' result therefore depends crucially 
on the existence of positive expected shortage. If p or z were large 
enough to make shortage impossible then we would have p* = p. 
In Horowitz (1970) an entire chapter is devoted to the subject 
of price-quantity determination under uncertainty. Much of the dis- 
cussion consists of a review of previous work, but Horowitz's own 
contribution is also included. A distinction is made at the outset 
between price taking and price quoting firms and those with linear and 
non-linear risk preferences. 
The starting point of the analysis consists of a presentation of 
Mills' model which has already been discussed. Even though Mills' 
firm is risk-neutral, uncertainty leads to results which are in stark 
contrast to the certainty case. 
In the context of non-linear risk preferences Horowitz discusses 
the contribution by Hyman (1966). Hyman's scenario is that of random 
demand and uniform competitive price, P, which firms cannot influence. 
Hence it is a price-taker model. Unsold output is scrapped so there 
is a cost to overproduction. Optimal output is determined by maximising 
utility of profit function U(j) with respect to output. This is 
'established when: 
(34) PQ/ U' f(Q)dQ 
_ 
dC 
Co dQ* 
DI 
UI f(Q)dQ 
where U' = U'(n). The term in the squared brackets appears because, as 
in the Mills model, there is a cost imputed to discrepancies between out- 
put and demand. It is then shown that a risk-averse firm will have a 
smaller output than a risk neutral firm. furthermore since the term in 
square brackets in (34) above is less than one, this implies that at 
optimal output P> dC/dQ*, which implies that the price-taking firm under 
uncertainty produces less than it would under certainty. However as the 
firm's willingness to accept risk rises the bracketed expression approaches 
unity so that optimum output approaches its certainty equivalent. 
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In Dhyrmes (1964), price is the random variable and the firm has 
to determine the optimal output level. The firm's attitude towards risk 
is expressed in terms of a utility function quadratic in profit, which 
under the assumption of additive random demand simplifies to: 
(35) E(U) = n(Q) +I aQ2a 
where a is to be interpreted as the propensity to accept risk. 
With a=0, the firm is risk neutral and with a<0 the utility function 
is strictly concave and the firm is a risk-avoider. The first order con- 
dition for maximising (35) with respect to Q yields an optimal quantity 
produced which satisfies the condition: 
(36) MR = MC -IaQ 
Thus if a=0 we get the certainty result MR = MC. For a<0 we note 
that the risk-avoider will produce an output lower than under certainty. 
Dhrymes' result is therefore consistent with that of Hyman. 
We turn now to Horowitz's own contribution (1970). His model relates 
to the price quoter and he stresses the relevance of this institutional 
setting by suggesting that: 
"price quoting behaviour would seem to be the prevailing 
modus operandi of the business world"01) 
It is assumed that at any price, P. demand, Q. is a random variable. The 
firm attempts to satisfy all the demand at the optimal price P* with the 
qualification that with rising marginal costs, production will be halted 
at Qm 9 where price equals. MC. Hence under rising MC expected profits are 
not equal to price times expected demand minus costs. Instead we have: 
(37) E(i) = 
ÖItPQ 
- C(Q)) f(P; Q) dQ t (PQM - C(%» ff(P; Q) 
dQ 
% 
Horowitz shows that maximising the above expression with respect to P for 
the risk neutral firm the resulting optimum is equivalent to the certainty 
(1) Horowitz (1970), p. 393. 
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case. The firm quotes a price F* which gives an expected output E(Q") at 
which a species of marginal revenue is equated with a species of marginal 
cost. 
The firm with non-linear risk preferences maximises an objective 
function of the form: 
(38Y EEU(n)] = of 
U(ir) f(P; Q) dQ + U(wm)QMf 
co 
f(p; Q)dQ 
As Horowitz shows, it is difficult to generalise the effects of non-linear 
risk preferences on the decision variables. A risk-evader may prefer a 
higher or a lower optimal price than a risk neutral firm, depending on the 
utility function of the firm and the cost and demand functions. This re- 
suit is consistent with that of Leland (1972) which will be discussed below. 
Of particular' interest is Horowitz's analysis of the effect of a 
change in demand on optimal price. The type of demand change considered is 
a shift in the entire distribution f(P; Q) so that expected demand is higher 
at every price. Horowitz demonstrates that a risk neutral firm will increase 
price for upward demand shifts provided marginal cost is not a decreasing 
function of output, in which case a price decrease is possible. 
For a risk-evader generalisations are again difficult to make. If 
d2C/dQ2 > 0, there is a likelihood of a price increase when demand rises. 
Horowitz's survey demonstrates that a variety of results is possible 
when uncertainty and attitudes to risk are introduced into the decision 
making process. Notably absent from these discussions are considerations 
of uncertainty induced by interaction amongst *competing firms in an industry. 
A more specific model of the firm under uncertainty has been 
constructed by Sandmo (1971). The firm is assumed to maximise utility of 
profit U(r) and a fairly general form of risk aversion is introduced by 
specifying U'(n) >0 and U"(ir) < 0. The firm's profit function is: 
n(x) = px - C(x) -B where B= fixed costs. Price is taken to be the 
random variable with a density function f(p) and mean E(p) = V. The firm is 
therefore a quantity-setter with price freely determined ex-os t. The first 
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order condition for utility maximisation is: 
(39) EfU'(n) (p - c' (x))] =0 
Assuming risk-aversion on the part of firms, Sandmo then examines the 
effect of uncertainty on optimal output. Under certainty, price would be 
equated to marginal costs, while under uncertainty, Sandmo demonstrates 
that the condition for optimal output is: c'(x), < p where p= E(p). 
Thus, marginal cost is less than expected price which implies that 
optimal output is less than its certainty equivalent. Sandmo also shows 
that decreasing absolute risk aversion (RA) is a necessary and sufficient 
condition for fixed costs to affect the decision variable (x), in contrast 
to the certainty case where fixed costs have no influence. Similarly, an 
increase in the tax rate will increase, leave constant, or reduce output 
depending on whether relative risk aversion (RR) is increasing, constant, 
or decreasing. Sandmo's result is consistent with those of Hyman and 
Dhyrmes which were reviewed above. 
Leland (1972) has generalised the analysis of firm behaviour under 
uncertainty to cover both price and quantity setting firms. Demand is 
assumed to be random and Leland also invokes the "principle of increasing 
uncertainty" which is crucial to the analysis. The "principle" implies 
that, as total expected revenue increases, so will its dispersion. The 
demand function in its implicit form is: f(p, q, u) = 0. The first case 
examined by Leland is the quantity setting firm - i. e. optimal output is 
determined ex ante. Profits are given as: it = p(q, u, )q - C(q) - f, 
where f represents fixed costs. The firm maximises the expected utility 
of profit and the first order condition for a maximum with respect to q 
yields: 
(40) EC[MR(q, u) - MC(q)] U'(n)] =0 
where MR is marginal revenue and MC marginal cost. 
a 
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In order to compare optimal quantity under uncertainty with its certainty 
equivalent, Leland defines certainty demand as the expected-price demand 
curve. Taking the firm facing certainty demand to choose optimal output 
qc, Leland shows that optimal output under uncertainty will be smaller 
than qC if the first order condition (40) is negative when q= qc. If the 
principle of increasing uncertainty holds, this will be the case provided 
the firm is risk averse, i. e. (U"(a) < 0). Thus risk aversion and uncertain 
demand implies lower optimal output than under certainty. The converse is 
proved for risk preferring firms. This result accords with the ones 
previously cited. 
The price quoting firm is considered next. In this case profit is 
given as: 
it = pq(p, u) - cq(p, u) -f 
Maximising this function with respect to p gives: 
(4i) E [u'(n) (an/ap)] =o 
If we assume that the optimal price under certainty is pc, then the 
deviation of the optimal price under uncertainty from pc depends crucially 
on attitudes towards risk. However, in contrast with the quantity setting 
firm, the shape of the cost curve is also critical in determining optimal 
price. With risk neutrality, UI(w) is constant for all n. Leland 
demonstrates that for a risk neutral firm with constant MC, uncertainty 
does not affect optimal price, but if MC rises at a non-decreasing rate, 
optimal price will rise above its certainty equivalent. 
With risk aversion the analysis is considerably more complicated. 
If pu is optimal price for the risk neutral firm, then with risk aversion 
optimal price will be greater than, equal to, or less than pu depending on 
whether the first order 'condition (41) is greater than, equal to, or less 
than zero evaluated at pu. 
The conditions affecting the sign of (41) are complex and cannot be 
generalised. For a specific example of a demand curve additively separable 
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in p and u, and with non-decreasing marginal costs, Leland shows that 
optimal price for the risk averse firm will be lower than under uncertainty. 
Thus Leland's model extends in scope and degree of generalisation much of 
the previously reviewed work on decision making under uncertainty. 
From the above discussion it is clear that all the models with 
identical scenarios yield similar results. Yet the striking impression 
which emerges from the literature is that a variety of results may be 
obtained regarding the influence of uncertainty on pricing behaviour, and 
consequently it is not possible to make meaningful generalisations. In 
effect, the particular influence of uncertainty on'decision making depends 
largely on the type of model being considered. 
3.4 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter we presented a fairly extensive review of the 
literature which is relevant to the analysis of price determination and 
adjustment. In the first section we examined a number of recent contribu- 
tions to the burgeoning literature on the pure theory of price adjustment. 
The main thrust of these lies in the derivation of convergence theorems 
to the single competitive or monopoly price based on special assumptions 
about the behaviour of market participants. Our major criticism of this 
approach was that the behavioural assumptions adopted by these authors, 
e. g. Diamond and Fisher, were highly contentious and were not compatible 
with a realistic scenario of industrial organisation. Their analysis of 
the price adjustment process is therefore hindered by the institutional 
environment which they consider and the behavioural patterns which they 
assume. By contrast, the objective of this thesis is to examine the 
adjustment process in a realistic industrial setting and to pay special 
attention to the problem of imperfect information. 
a 
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On the question of uncertainty, the literature reviewed in this 
chapter indicated that since the effect of uncertainty on the optimal 
price is ambiguous and depends on the type of model being considered, 
its influence on the price adjustment decision is also likely to be 
ambiguous. However, uncertainty is closely related to the problem of 
imperfect information about rivals' behaviour, and we shall examine 
its influence as part of our theoretical analysis in the subsequent 
chapter. 
In summing up it may be appropriate to quote Rothschild's conclu- 
sion, from his extensive survey article, that the only generalisation 
which can be unambiguously stated is that uncertainty does influence 
firm behaviour: 
"Although the different models studied lead to an 
embarrassing diversity of conclusions, they agree on 
the basic proposition that uncertainty does affect firm 
decision and hence short-run industry equilibrium. "(") 
". 
(1) Rothschild (1973), p. 1,291. 
0 
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Chapter 4 
A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF PRICE ADJUSTMENT 
4.1 Introduction 
The distinguishing feature of the theoretical analysis in this 
chapter is the explicit role which is assigned to search activity in the 
decision making process. Like the determination of equilibrium price,. 
the adjustment decision in a non-Walrasian environment cannot be taken 
without acquiring information relating to the true state of disequilib- 
rium and the likely behaviour of competitors. But the search for 
information which this necessarily involves is a costly activity which 
must therefore be considered as an integral part of the optimisation 
process. Hence the purpose of this chapter is to develop testable hypo- 
theses concerning the impact of market structure on price flexibility by 
examining the relationship between search costs, market structure and 
the price Adjustment decision in a rigorous theoretical framework. 
The theoretical analysis will be divided into two distinct but 
complementary parts. The first will be concerned with the comparative 
statics of adjustment, that is, with the absolute change involved in 
moving from one equilibrium price to another. The second part will. be 
concerned with the dynamics of price adjustment, i. e. with the optimal 
rate of price change over time. 
Thus, the analysis which follows can be characterised by a 
"dual-decision" approach whereby the firm-first establishes the degree 
of adjustment which is required in order to restore equilibrium, and 
then reaches an independent decision as to how much of this price 
change it should pass on in the current. period. The alternative is to 
develop a dynamic optimisation model in which. the magnitude and rate of 
adjustment are determined simultaneously. However, a recent theoretical 
0 
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I 
study of optimal advertising strategies by Glaister (1974) showed that a 
fairly general dynamic formulation of the problem posed immense analytical 
difficulties. Yet a detailed examination of some special cases gave 
results which were very similar to those obtained from a more conventional 
comparative statics framework. This would suggest that abandoning the 
dynamic optimisation technique in favour of the "dual-decision" approach 
should not affect the substance of our analysis, and whilst this method- 
ology is not entirely without drawbacks, its advantage is that it avoids 
some of the major analytical complexities. 
Section 4.2 of this chapter will be devoted to a detailed 
examination of search activity and the determinants of its cost. 
We 
would justify this in-depth discussion on grounds of the important role 
given to search in the price adjustment decision. 
In section 4.3 we shall develop a comparative statics model of 
price determination and adjustment. Oligopolistic interdependence will 
be introduced explicitly through the demand curve and search costs will 
also be. incorporated in the model. In addition we shall examine the 
influence of risk and uncertainty. 
In section 4.4 we shall examine the dynamics of adjustment by 
means of a partial price adjustment model. The impact of search and 
the influence of market structure on search costs will be explicitly 
considered in the model. 
Finally, section 4.5 will contain an outline of the hypotheses 
derived from the theoretical analysis in addition to a few concluding 
observations. 
4.2 Collusion, Information, 'and Search Costs 
The fundamental assumption underlying the analysis in this chap- 
ter is that firms recognise the benefits of joint-profit maximisation, 
0 
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although they are not always able to achieve it. The ability of firms to 
sustain higher prices than those which would prevail if each firm acted 
independently depends on the degree to which they succeed in co-ordinating 
their price and output policies. 
(l) 
The problem of co-ordination exists 
because under any non-competitive price structure there is an incentive for 
each firm to reduce its price unilaterally thereby expanding its sales at 
the expense of its rivals. This incentive stems from the difference which 
exists, under a non-competitive price structure, between the firm and 
industry price elasticities of demand. 
(2) 
The difficulty of monitoring or policing any collusive price struc- 
ture, whether tacit or overt, depends crucially on the availability of 
information concerning the prices charged by other firms in the industry. 
But it should be emphasised that it is the transaction prices which need 
to be identified, since the list prices which can be easily discovered 
could be merely the veil behind which secret price reductions may be 
taking place. The importance of this point was stressed by Stigler (1964), 
who stated that: 
"In general the policing of price agreements 
involves an audit of the transaction prices .... 
Ultimately there is no substitute for obtaining 
the transactions prices from the buyers. , 
(3) 
Thus the acquisition of information necessitates active search, 
a scanning process by the firm aimed at detecting discrepancies between 
nominal and transaction prices. This is supported by evidence contained 
in a recent empirical study which examined in some detail the problems 
(1) We shall abstract for the moment from other relevant decision 
variables, namely advertising and product quality. 
(2) See Stigler (1964), pp. 45-46. 
(3) Stigler (1964), p. 45. 
0 
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associated with the search for accurate information on transaction prices. 
(') 
One solution to this problem would be to monitor prices collectively through 
trade assocations. However, in practice such institutional policing arrange- 
ments are seldom effective due to the ease with which the information submit- 
ted can be falsified. 
The importance of information on prices has also been recognised in 
the theoretical. literature of oligopoly. Nicholson (1972) analysed the 
behaviour of oligopoly using a game-theoretic approach. One of his conclu- 
sions was that the pricing strategy, because it is highly flexible and can 
be used as a competitive weapon at relatively short notice, is particularly 
suitable. for collusion. 
(2) 
However, Nicholson also recognised that the 
flexibility of the price strategy is conditional upon the availability of 
information: 
"The view that pricing is a flexible strategy in 
comparison with other strategies is based on the 
view that the prices on the market are readily 
known to the participants in the market. This is 
not necessarily the case, however. 
ý3ý 
Before going on to discuss the determinants of search costs it is 
necessary to consider how the equilibrium level of search- activity might 
be attained. A rational optimisation process would involve two basic rela- 
tionships; the first between search levels and the associated benefits, and 
the second between the level and the marginal costs of search. Looking at 
the benefits of search, it is clear that this activity yields a return to 
the firm, irrespective of the degree of industry collusion, by enabling it 
(1) Hague (1971), pp. 122-123. 
(2) Thus Nicholson is implying that collusion over advertising and quality 
changes is less easily achieved. 
. (3) Nicholson (1972), p. 199. 
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to optimise its decision variables in relation to the observed behaviour of 
competitors and thus to obtain maximum profits. Furthermore, since search 
constitutes a form of policing, it will raise profitability at the industry 
level by deterring secret price cuts. Regarding the relationship between 
the marginal returns and the level of search, some evidence on this subject 
is available from the contribution by Stigler (1961) which was reviewed in 
the preceding chapter. Although Stigler's analysis is based on the search 
by consumers for low-price sellers, it is equally applicable in the context 
of the firm's search for secret price cuts, since the underlying process of 
search is the same. Stiglerts conclusion was that: 
"Whatever the precise distribution of prices, it is 
certain that increased search will yield diminishing 
returns .... "(l) 
Thus, if the benefits of search for the representative firm are given 
by the function B= B(S) where S denotes the level of search activity, we 
would expect it to have the following properties: B'(S) > 0, and B"(S) < 0. 
However, the ceteris paribus nature of this functional relationship must be 
strongly emphasised; for the marginal benefits of search are conditional on 
the structural and behavioural characteristics of the industry, amongst 
which the degree of collusion is particularly important. An increase in the 
degree of collusion will shift the B'(S) schedule so that the marginal bene- 
fits of search will now be higher at every level of search activity. This 
is because a higher degree of collusion implies that greater joint profits 
can be achieved by the industry if secret price cutting is deterred. Another 
factor which might be expected to influence the marginal benefits of search 
(1) Stigler (1961), p. 215. This result is based on the fact that with a 
uniform distribution of asking prices, the expected minimum price 
declines at a decreasing rate as the number of units searched increases. 
" This result also applies for other distributions. 
- 72 - 
is the lag of rivals' retaliation. Thus, the longer is the time required 
to adjust prices once secret cuts have been detected, the lower will be 
the benefits of additional search. 
We must now consider the nature of the marginal costs of search 
function, C. (S). What evidence is available on this subject suggests 
that the costs of search are proportional to the number of units searched, 
therefore implying constant marginal costs, i. e. C'(S) >0 and C"(S) = 0. 
(1) 
We shall therefore assume, for purposes of analysis, that the marginal 
costs of search activity are constant. However, as with the benefits of 
search B'(S), the marginal cost function CI(S) is conditional on the 
characteristics of the industry, so that a change in any one of these will 
cause it to shift. The relationship between these characteristics and 
marginal search costs will be examined later on. 
We can now determine the equilibrium level of search activity for 
the representative firm. 
(2) 
The first order condition for the maximisation 
of net search benefits requires that the marginal benefits and costs be 
equal. Such an equilibrium is depicted by the intersection of the Bk(S) 
and Ct(S) schedules in figure 4.1 below: 
Figure 4.1 
The Equilibrium Level of Search 
Benefits, Costs 
3) 
Search 
(1) This relationship was suggested by Stigler (1961). 
(2) We are therefore implicitly assuming that collusion over search activity is not possible. 
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Now consider the effect of an increase in the degree of collusion 
on the B'(S) and C'(S) schedules. Taking B'(S) first, it has already been 
argued that this schedule will shift to the right as illustrated by B'(S) 
in the figure. But what will the effect be on the C'(S) schedule? It 
could be argued that it is easier to detect secret price cutting when the 
degree of collusion is high and output considerably restricted than when 
it is relatively low and output is near the competitive level. This is 
based on the notion that price cutting can be inferred from movements in 
sales levels, or as suggested by Stigler (1964), by comparing the expected 
and observed variance of sales. However, Scherer, (1970) was critical of 
this assumption on the grounds that it implies a "sophisticated notion of 
randomness" on the part of firms which is scarcely tenable. 
(') 
On the other hand it could be argued that at high levels of collusion, 
mindful of the fact that the detection of secret price cuts is made easier 
through their effect on sales, firms may attempt to offset this tendency by 
making greater efforts to conceal transactions prices. One way of doing 
this is by increasing the degree of product differentiation. Hence it is 
difficult to specify the relationship between marginal search costs and 
the degree of collusion a priori, and consequently we shall assume that 
C'(S) remains invariant with respect to the degree of collusion. 
Thus, an increase in the degree of collusion will shift the B'(S) 
schedule to the right whilst not influencing C'(S). As can be seen from 
figure 4.1, the equilibrium level of search activity will therefore rise, 
and since marginal search costs are assumed constant, total expenditure 
on search activity will also increase. In conclusion, this implies that 
the total costs of search will be positively related to the degree of 
collusion. 
(1) Scherer (1970), p. 208. 
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Before examining the structural characteristics which influence 
search costs we need to say something about the actual search process. 
Collecting information involves scanning in order to detect discrepancies 
between the list and transaction prices, and there are two main ways in 
which firms can do this. The first involves finding out the transaction 
prices directly from buyers, but as was argued by Hague (1971), this 
constitutes an open invitation to bluff. The other method is for firms 
to pose as potential buyers, but this is also fraught with difficulties, 
particularly since there is a need to consider such factors as differences 
in product quality, the cost and length of deliveries, differences in the 
liability accepted by the seller for his product, and the type of credit 
facilities offered. By far the most important are differences in quality. 
In an earlier chapter we referred to the findings by Cowling and 
Cubbin (1971) which suggested that quality changes can be used to conceal 
price reductions. Thus, by making price cutting more difficult to detect, 
quality changes lengthen the process of search and thereby reduce the speed 
with which rivals can retaliate. This implies that undercutting prices 
through quality changes is an effective competitive strategy, particularly 
since: 
"The longer the adverse consequences of rival retaliation 
can be forestalled, the more attractive undercutting the 
accepted price structure becomes. "(') 
Given that differences in quality increase the complexity of search, 
we would expect marginal search costs to be positively related to the degree 
of product differentiation in an industry. 
Another important determinant of search costs is the frequency of 
transactions, i. e. the prevalence of one-off contracts. Where buying is 
infrequent and involves competitive tendering, the discovery of transaction 
(1) Scherer (1970), p. 208. 
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prices may not take place until it is "too late", that is, until the 
contract has been awarded to a competitor. Under these conditions 
search activity could become highly intractable and this may account 
for the observed instability of oligopolies in industries where trans- 
actions are "lumpy". and therefore infrequent. 
(') 
Since this pattern 
of transactions is more closely associated with capital goods industries 
than with consumer goods industries, we would expect marginal search 
costs to be higher in the former than in the latter, ceteris paribus. 
As regards the impact of the number and size distribution of 
sellers on search costs, we shall begin the discussion by considering 
Stigler's (1964) analysis of the factors which influence the detection 
of secret price cutting. Stigler's approach was based on the premise 
that secret price cuts could be identified from discrepancies between 
the observed and expected variance of sales. If the number of new 
customers is given by n, and the probability of attracting a customer 
, 
is proportional to the firm's share of total industry output (x), then 
the variance of the firm's share of sales to new customers is given as 
x(1-x). Summing over all firms in the industry we get: 
C= nEx(l-x) = n(1-Ex 
2) 
= n(l-H) 
2 
where H= Ex is the Herfindahl index of concentration. Thus as H rises 
towards its upper bound of unity and the variance of sales falls, so the 
detection of secret price reductions becomes progressively easier. This 
implies that the costs of search will fall as industrial concentration, 
measured by the Herfindahl index, rises. 
Stigler extended the analysis by taking into account the variance 
of sales to existing consumers, but the results. remained essentially the 
(1) Both Scherer (1970) and Nicholson (1972) stressed the importance of 
this point.. 
0 
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same. Yet the difficulty with this approach, as has already been 
mentioned above, lies in the notion that firms can infer the extent of 
price cutting from differences between the observed and expected 
variance of sales. Furthermore, there remains the question concerning 
the source of the price cuts which cannot be discovered in the manner 
suggested above. 
Search must therefore be concentrated on prices. What relation- 
ship would we then expect between search costs and seller market 
structure? It has been suggested by Stigler (1961) that search costs 
will rise in proportion to the number of units sampled, i. e. the number 
of firms in the industry. 
(1). 
On the other hand, Scherer (1970) has 
shown that the number of information channels or links between firms 
rises more than proportionately to the number of firms in the industry. 
Thus in the context of tacit or overt communication between firms, the 
number of information channels is related to the number of firms by the 
combinatorial expression N(N-1)/2, so that with four firms the number 
of channels is six, with six it rises to fifteen and so on. 
(2) Therefore, 
taken together these propositions suggest that marginal search costs are 
an increasing function'of the number of firms in the industry, ceteris 
paribus. 
However, we must also consider the size distribution of sellers 
in the industry, not only their absolute number. The search for price 
information is likely to be weighted, for each firm undertaking search 
activity, by the estimated impact on sales of the potential price 
reductions of its competitors. Since any firm which is engaged in 
secret price cutting must have the capacity to meet the anticipated 
(1) Stigler (1961), p. 216. 
(2) See Scherer (1970), p. 184. 
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increase in demand, a price cut by a firm with a large market share will 
have a greater weight than a price cut made by a relatively small firm 
with an insignificant market share. Thus the impact of secret price cuts 
will be related to the existing market shares of the firm responsible for 
them. We would therefore hypothesise that search costs are more approp- 
riately related to the level of industrial concentration, as measured by 
the Herfindahl index or the concentration ratio, than to the absolute 
number of firms in the industry. 
Finally, we need to consider the effect of the number and size dis- 
tribution of buyers. On the one hand, Stigler (1964) demonstrated that 
the probability of a rival learning about secret price cuts rises rapidly 
with the number of buyers in the industry. But on the other hand, any 
firm engaged in search activity will need to discover the extent and the 
source of price reductions and, consequently, the difficulties of search 
will increase with the number of buyers. Given these two offsetting 
tendencies, the impact of buyer concentration on marginal search costs 
cannot be determined with certainty. 
To conclude, it was suggested in this section that collusion can 
only be sustained with search for information on transaction prices. 
We also examined the optimisation process whereby the equilibrium level 
of search is attained and the structural factors which influence the 
costs of search. The impact of search costs on price adjustment will 
be examined in the next two sections of this chapter. 
4.3 The Comparative Statics of Price Adjustment 
In this section we shall develop a static model of price deter- 
mination and adjustment for a representative firm, i. Oligopolistic 
interdependence will be introduced explicitly through the firm's demand 
I 
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curve, and it will be assumed that, like all other firms in the industry, 
firm i is an aggressive profit maximiser. Inventory problems will be 
ignored and it will also be assumed that firms are price-quoters; they 
supply whatever is demanded at the equilibrium price. In addition, it 
will be assumed that the products of different firms within the same 
industry are slightly differentiated. Finally, for the sake of analyti- 
cal convenience linear cost and demand functions will be used and the 
resulting implications will be assessed at the end of this section. 
The demand curve facing firm i is defined as: 
(1) Qi = a+Blei+ups+z ßl< 0, u>0, 
where Q denotes quantity demanded, P denotes price, P7. is the average 
price of all firms in the industry other than i, and z is a random 
variable with zero mean and variance a2. This last variable captures z 
such influences as the random switching of consumers between sellers 
and thus introduces uncertainty into the model. The restriction 
/u/< /ßl/ is imposed in order to ensure that firm its demand curve 
retains its negative slope when collusion is perfect and all firms 
charge the same price. Thus if Pi = Pj and if market shares are fixed, 
firm i will face a demand curve with the same slope as the industry 
demand curve, (ßl t u). 
Firm i's cost function is defined as: 
(2) ýi - ßo t 02Qi 02>0 
To specify the search expenditure function along the lines 
suggested in the preceding section it is necessary to have some measure 
of the degree of collusion as perceived by the representative firm under 
consideration. Two related measures suggest themselves, the first being 
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the average price charged by firm i's competitors, and the second being 
an estimate of the average price-cost margin. 
(') 
Our choice between these alternative measures was largely 
influenced by the fact that the equilibrium price-cost margins is deter- 
mined not only by the degree of collusion but also by other factors which 
are not associated with inter-firm co-operation. Among the most important 
of these is the price elasticity of demand. Thus even if there was no 
collusion in the industry, as in the Cournot case, the price-cost margin 
would vary with changes in the elasticity of demand and the number of firms 
in the industry. Yet the degree of collusion would be zero and invariable 
by assumption. For this reason we considered the price level to be a more 
appropriate measure of collusion although, as will become clear below, 
using the price-cost margin as a proxy for collusion did not affect the 
substance of our results. 
However, two central aspects of the proposed index of collusion 
require clarification. First, it is important to distinguish. between the 
nominal and the effective degree of collusion. Firms observe the list 
prices of their competitors and use this information as the basis for 
expectations about effective collusion. If expectations are revised 
after search, it is likely that list prices will ultimately fall to 
reflect transaction prices once more, since they cease to be the veil 
behind which secret price cutting can take place. This would constitute 
a collusion breakdown. On the other hand an equilibrium will be achieved 
when nominal and effective collusion, as perceived by all firms, are equal 
and search activity is maintained at constant levels. 
The other important issue concerns the fact that the absolute 
price level as measured by Pi will change over time without necessarily 
implying a change in the conduct of firms. We therefore need to define 
(1) This would be an approximation to the Lerner index of monopoly power. 
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the index of collusion as a price relative, that is, in terms of Pj divided 
by a given base price. The latter may be specified as firm i's estimate of 
the long-run industry equilibrium price in the total absence of: collusion 
and with the existing number of firms. However, since we shall assume that 
this estimate does not change in the short-run and hence with the parameters 
in our model, we shall specify the search expenditure function simply in 
terms of where this represents an index of the average competitors' price 
relative to a predetermined reference level. Thus the search expenditure 
function is given as: 
(3) Csi = cs(Pj , CR) aCsi >0 
aP. 
where CR stands for seller concentration. 
(') Equation (3) implies that 
search expenditure never falls to zero, not even in the absence of price 
co-ordination when each firm sets its price independently of its rivals, 
since Pj > 0. This characteristic of the expenditure on search will be 
explained later in the context of the determination of the equilibrium 
price Pi. Combining equations (1), (2) and (3), firm its profit function 
becomes: 
(4) ni = P. Q. - C. - Csi 
= (Pi - 02)(a t B1Pi t uPi t z) - ßo - C. 
It will be assumed initially that the firm is risk-neutral and therefore 
seeks to maximise expected profit E(ni). The first order condition for 
this maximum is given by: 
dE(ni) at 201Pi t UPS + PludPP - ß2ß1 - 02VdP - acsi dom. 
=0 dPi dPi dPi aP dPi 
(1) It should be pointed out that C. refers to the equilibrium level of 
search expenditure. The level Si of search activity and hence search 
expenditure is endogenous in this analysis and its determination was 
discussed at length in the preceding section. The method is concep- 
tually equivalent to maximising a profit function similar to equation (4) but where C. does not represent an optimum. Equilibrium search 
expenditure is 
Hen derived from the first order conditions. 
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Expression dPi /dPi which will be denoted by a shows the extent to which 
rivals will follow a price change which is initiated by firm 1. 
(l) 
if 
a=0 then rivals do not respond to firm i's pricing decision, 'which 
implies that the degree of collusion remains unchanged. However, if a 
is greater than zero then, like every one of its competitors, firm i 
will need to consider the effect of its own pricing policy on the degree 
of collusion. The expression aCsi/3Pj, which defines marginal search 
f 
expenditure with respect to collusion, will be denoted by cs. 
Solving for the equilibrium price Pi, we obtain 
(5) Pi = ß2(ßl + pa) -a- UP1 t csa 
2ßl + pa 
It can be seen that since the denominator is negative the equilibrium 
price will be a rising function of marginal costs, ß2. Furthermore, if 
a=0 then the equilibrium price is set in Cournot fashion, with firm 
interdependence essentially ignored, and Pi determined on the assumption 
that rivals will not respond to it. 
(2) 
In this case marginal search 
expenditure will have no influence on the equilibrium price since it does 
not appear in expression (5). However, since the average price of com- 
petitors, Pj, is still positive, search expenditure will also be positive. 
Hence in the Cournot case, search expenditure is essentially fixed and has 
no influence on the equilibrium price. We would explain this by suggesting 
(1) The term a is a very close approximation to what Cubbin (1974) has 
called the degree of "apparent collusion". It defines an expectation 
on the part of the firm concerning rivals' response to its own price 
change; an expectation which is only realised in equilibrium. 
(2) This would essentially represent Cournot behaviour, although it would 
be strictly correct to say that Bertrand-type behaviour is implied 
since it is price, not quantity, which is the decision variable. 
The distinction between the Bertrand and Cournot models is given in 
Chamberlin (1962), Chapter 3. 
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that firms will engage in some search activity, however little, even if 
they are acting independently. There are two reasons for this. First, 
even if pricing behaviour suggests no collusion, these expectations need 
continuous confirmation, given that firms recognise the benefits of 
collusion. Second, firms will search for information about the dynamics 
of prices, that is, about the rate at which competitors increase or 
decrease their prices. This aspect of search activity will be discussed 
further in the next section. 
If a>0 and marginal search expenditure it given by cs > 0, then 
the firm will need to consider the additions to search expenditure when 
determining the equilibrium price P. Thus there are marginal costs as 
well as benefits to increasing collusion. Furthermore, even if all 
firms in the industry set price in parallel fashion (a = 1), the highest 
joint profit maximising price attainable will still be lower than the 
monopoly price on account of the presence of marginal search expenditure 
Whilst the monopolist has no search costs, a group of firms acting as a 
monopolist has to bear the costs of policing through search. 
In order to determine the impact of search expenditure on price 
adjustment, we shall evaluate the derivatives of the equilibrium price Pi, 
with respect to the cost and demand parameters, ß2 and ßl respectively. 
Evaluating the degree of adjustment to a change in the demand parameter 
ßl, we obtain: 
dP! 2(a + uPý) - a(uß + 2c 
(6) dß1 (201 + ua) 
It should be noted that since ßl is negative, an increase in the absolute 
(1) The marginal benefits to firm i enter through the positive effect of 
a higher a on the equilibrium price. 
a 
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value of ßl implies a higher elasticity of demand and consequently a 
reduction in the equilibrium price P Conversely, when ßl falls 
in 
absolute value, the equilibrium price will rise. Furthermore, since 
the denominator is positive and cI appears with a negative sign, the s 
degree of price adjustment, whether upward or downward, is attenuated 
by the presence of marginal search expenditure. 
Turning to the marginal cost parameter, the derivative of Pi 
with respect to 02 is equal to: 
C7) dPi _ 
ßl t ua 
dß2 20 1+ya 
It is clear from expression (7) that expenditure on search has no 
influence on the adjustment of Pi to changes in 0 2. The asymmetry 
in 
the impact of search%on price adjustments to changes in marginal cost 
and demand is important, and the underlying rationale needs to be 
elucidated. 
(1) 
A change in ßl implies a different price elasticity of demand 
ceteris Paribus, and more specifically, that the response of quantity 
demanded to a price adjustment has changed. Expression (5) shows that 
the impact of search expenditure on the equilibrium price, Pi, is 
weighted by the term 2$1 which appears in the denominator. This means 
that when ßl is large in absolute value the impact of marginal search 
expenditure (csa) on the equilibrium price will be correspondingly 
small. This result is intuitively plausible since a large (negative) 
(1) If search expenditure was related to the price-cost margin as given 
by Pj/ß2, the equilibrium price for firm i would be: 
1t Ua) -a -UPS + 
(csa/B2) 
P. 
1 20 i+ 11 a 
It is easily verified that in this case the asymmetry still holds. 
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value of ßl implies that, for a given value of u, the impact of firm i's 
price adjustments on demand (Qi) will outweigh the corresponding influence 
of price adjustments by competitors. Hence, when the consequences of 
ignoring the effect of rivals' pricing strategies are relatively minor, 
the equilibrium level of search and hence marginal search expenditure will 
be generally low. In these circumstances it will have an insignificant 
effect on the equilibrium price. 
Thus a fall in ßl, which implies a steeper demand curve, will lead 
to greater expenditure on search through the greater impact of oligopolis- 
tic interdependence on firm i's demand. The same reasoning applies for a 
rise in the value of the parameters a and p, since this will also increase 
the influence of rivals' pricing decisions. However, it is interesting to 
note that search expenditure does not enter into the price adjustment 
decision following changes in the intercept (a), given that: 
dP. 
(8) 
da -- 2ß 
Yet the most general type of change in demand is likely to involve both 
a change in the slope and the intercept of the demand curve, and in that 
case search expenditure would remain an integral part of the price adjust- 
ment decision. Furthermore, the significance of the postulated change in 
the slope is borne out by the celebrated kinked-demand curve hypothesis, 
put forward by Sweezy (1939), concerning the effect on the slope of the 
firm's demand curve of different assumptions about inter-firm behaviour. 
Finally, since changes in the marginal cost parameter 62 are unrelated 
to the influence of oligopolistic interdependence, search expenditure 
will have no bearing on price adjustments which föllow in their wake. 
Before assessing and qualifying these results we shall briefly 
examine the influence of risk aversion on the adjustment process within 
0 
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the framework already developed. We shall introduce risk aversion into 
the model by using the well tried mean-variance approach. 
(') 
Thus firm i 
will be assumed to maximise an objective function ýi which is defined as: 
6Var(Tri) 
where Var(ni) is the variance of profit and 6 is a coefficient of risk 
aversion reflecting the extent to which firm i is unwilling to accept 
risk. Thus 6 is preceded by a negative. sign, and it is approximately 
equal to the coefficient of absolute risk aversion (RA) which was 
defined in the previous chapter. The variance of n is defined as: 
(10) Var(n) = E(ir - E(n))(n - E(n)) 
Substituting for ni we obtain: 
22 
i- 2ß2p; t02 2)a 
(11) Var(ni) (Pi - ß)a = (P 
2 
2zz 
Substituting equation (11) for Var(ni) in equation (9), maximising +i 
with respect to Pi and solving for the equilibrium price gives: 
ß2(ß1 t pa - 2&a2) -a- UPS + cSa 
(12) Pi = 
2(ßl - 602) + va 
It can be seen that expression (12) is similar to expression (5), the 
only difference being the appearance of the term del in the numerator 
and denominator of (12). Taking the derivative of P! with respect to i 
d it is immediately apparent that risk aversion will raise the 
equilibrium price relative to its level under risk neutrality. 
(2) 
(1) It has been shown by Pratt (1964) that maximising an objective 
function defined in terms of the mean and variance of profit is 
approximately equivalent to maximising the utility of profit. 
(2) This is consistent with the findings concerning risk aversion 
which were reviewed in the preceding chapter. 
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As before, we evaluate the derivative of Pi with respect to the demand 
coefficient B1 for the risk averter: 
dPi 
2(2&, Z 
2 
- pa) + 2a + 2uPý - 2(csa) 
(13) 
dßl (201 - 2602 + Ua)2 
As with expression (6), search expenditure appears with a negative sign 
in 
(13) thus exerting an attenuating influence on the degree of adjustment. 
Evaluating changes in the cost parameter, ß2: 
2 
(1 ) dPi 
_ 
ßl + Ua - 26a z 
dB 2ß1 + Va - 260 
2 
Expression (14) is similar to (7), but in the former the term 2 6az appears 
both in the numerator and the denominator. The effect of this is to raise 
the degree of price adjustment of the risk averse firm relative to the 
risk neutral firm, but this is hardly surprising since the former 
has a 
higher equilibrium price. Furthermore, since search expenditure 
does not 
appear in expression (14) it can be seen that the asymmetry of price 
adjustment to changes in cost and demand is not affected by the 
introduc- 
tion of risk aversion into the model. 
We must now qualify these results and examine the assumptions on 
which they are based. First, there is the assumption of linear cost and 
demand functions, and it is clear that the analysis would be considerably 
more complex, and the outcome less clear-cut, if this assumption were 
relinquished. In the context of the demand curve, however, linearity may 
be a tenable first approximation provided we are prepared to restrict the 
analysis to fairly small changes in price. As regards marginal costs of 
production, there exists considerable empirical evidence which suggests 
that they are constant over the normal range of output. 
(1) 
(1) See Scherer (1970), p. 77. 
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It must also be stressed that the comparative statics analysis, by 
its very nature, abstracted from considerations of time. Yet in the context 
of search costs it is possible that time may be of some importance. For 
example, in the short-run search costs may be high because there has been 
little opportunity to observe the behaviour of rivals. As time goes on, 
however, information may become available at small cost through the 
cumulative observation of firms' behaviour. The possibility that the 
costs of'search may vary with the time available for search activity has 
been noted by Alchian (1970): 
"Dissemination and acquisition (i. e. the production) of 
information conforms to the ordinary laws of production: 
faster dissemination, or acquisition costs more. "(') 
b 
Thus, although in our analysis we did not consider the question of time, 
it could have a significant influence on the costs of search which we 
would expect, on a priori grounds, to be greater in the short-run than 
in the long-run. This issue will not be pursued further, but it should 
be borne in mind in the context of the empirical findings reported in 
Chapter 6. 
In conclusion, whilst not particularly general, our comparative 
statics analysis would suggest that within a plausible scenario price 
adjustments following changes in demand could be attenuated relative 
to those occasioned by changes in marginal cost. This result is due 
to the influence of search costs on the adjustment decision. The con- 
sequential implications for quantity adjustments will be discussed in 
the concluding section of this chapter. 
(1) Alchian in Phelps ed. (1970), p. 29. 
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4.4 The Dynamics of Price Adjustment 
The dual decision approach implies that when the firm has established 
the magnitude of the price change required to restore equilibrium, it faces 
another and no less important decision concerning the optimal rate of 
adjustment. 
(') 
It achieves this by determining how much of the desired 
price change it should pass on in the current period, a decision which is 
necessary because there are costs associated with an instantaneous price 
adjustment. At the end of this section we shall have more to say about 
the implications of this methodology. 
The basic approach adopted here owes its origin to Griliches (1967). 
It consists of a partial price adjustment model in which the costs of 
adjustment are a crucial determinant of the adjustment coefficient, A- 
the latter representing the proportion of the desired price change which 
should be passed on in the current period. Our point of departure is to 
identify the variables which influence the adjustment process. The first 
is the degree of disequilibrium which is measured by the difference 
between the actual and the equilibrium price in the current period, Pt - Pt. 
The desired rate of adjustment is determined by the extent of disequilibrium 
and, while it persists, the firm's objective function will not be maximised 
and therefore some profits will be sacrificed. The other relevant decision 
variable is the actual rate of price change, measured. by the difference 
between the price in the current and the previous period, Pt - Pt-1 or APt. 
As will be argued below, the greater is this rate of price change, the 
higher will be the associated costs of adjustment. 
(1) In order to avoid confusion between optimal price adjustment and 
changes in the optimal price, we will refer to the latter as changes 
in the equilibrium price. All references to an optimum will be in 
connection with rates of change. 
0 
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In what follows it will be assumed that 'these profit losses and 
adjustment costs are quadratic functions of the deviations of Pt from Pt 
and the absolute rate of change (APt) respectively. This assumption ensures 
that the profit losses and adjustment costs will be positive and symmetric 
about the relevant variables, and that they will rise at an increasing rate. 
We would therefore suggest that as an approximation to the actual costs of 
adjustment this assumption is not unduly contentious. The functional 
specification to which we refer is as follows: 
(15) C= f(Pt - Pt )2 + g(APt)2 f' > 0, g' >0 
The first part of equation (15) represents the profits forgone by adjusting 
the price at anything less than the full amount required to restore equilib- 
rium. These losses exert pressure on the firm to pass on the entire price 
change in the current period, i. e. to adjust prices instantaneously. It is 
not clear whether the pressure for an instantaneous adjustment is greater in 
monopolistic or competitive industries, and we must therefore conclude that 
very little can be said a priori concerning the relationship between profits 
forgone due to delayed adjustment and market structure. 
Turning to the costs of adjustment per se, as defined by the second 
term of equation (15), it seems that traditionally these costs were pur- 
ported to arise from the need to disseminate information about forthcoming 
price changes. This essentially involves sending out new price lists, and 
the very nature of these costs suggests that they are fixed: they do not 
vary with the degree of adjustment. 
(1) 
However, our basic premise is that 
the costs of adjustment will be an increasing function of APt, with market 
structure playing a central role. The underlying rationale is based on 
the existence of two types of adjustment costs. The first stems from the 
(1) Except insofar as the frequency of adjustment may change. This ques- 
tion will be examined at the end of this section. 
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required information concerning the adjustment behaviour of rivals. 
For when the desired rate of price adjustment is established and the new 
equilibrium price is known, the firm then faces the problem of co-ordinating 
its price changes with those of its competitors. This is a problem of 
dynamic oligopoly and its importance is related to the fact that there 
are risks in disregarding the average rate of adjustment in the industry. 
Suppose one firm's partial adjustment coefficient is consistently higher 
than the industry norm; consumers will eventually learn that in times of 
rising costs the firm's price will be higher than the industry average, 
with a resulting loss of demand. 
(1) 
It is therefore crucial for firms 
to obtain information on the current and past adjustment rates of their 
competitors. But, as was indicated in an earlier section of this chapter, 
the costs of gathering this information will be inversely related to the 
degree of industrial concentration. Thus it is partly through its impact 
on the costs of search that market structure influences the rate of price 
adjustment. 
Market structure will also affect the costs of adjustment through 
its impact on the losses associated with deviations from the average in- 
dustry rate of change. We would hypothesise these losses to be inversely 
related to concentration, assuming that product differentiation tends to 
increase with the level of industrial concentration. For in this case, 
we would expect the cross-price elasticities of demand to be'lower in 
concentrated industries, and the demand shifts arising from differential 
adjustment rates to be correspondingly smaller. As regards the relation- 
ship between market structure'and product differentiation, Cowling et al. 
(1975) found strong evidence that advertising levels are positively 
related to concentration, 
(2) 
and this suggests a similar relationship for 
(1) With falling prices the risks stem from the fact that an instantaneous 
downward price adjustment might be mistaken for predatory pricing behaviour leading to an eventual breakdown of collusion. 
(2) The estimated relationship had an interior maximum. 
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product differentiation. 
In replacing equation (15) by a more explicit functional form we 
substitute APt -(APt for Pt'- Pt, where (APt)* represents the desired 
rate of adjustment, given that these two expressions are equivalent: 
(1) 
(16. C= a(APt - (APt)*)2 + (b/CR)(APt)2 
where a is the coefficient proportional to the profits lost through 
delayed adjustment and b/CR represents the costs of adjustment which are 
inversely related to industrial concentration (denoted by CR). 
Assuming that the firm minimises adjustment costs in each period, 
we differentiate equation (16) with respect to APt and set the derivative 
equal to zero. 
d(AP 
= 2a(APt - (APt)I) t 2(b/CR)(APt) =0 
t) 
This can be re-arranged to give: 
APt = x('&Pt) 
* 
where a= a+ b/CR 
or 
(17) Apt = A(Pt - Pt-1) 
Thus the optimal rate of adjustment is some fraction of the desired rate 
(Pt Pt-l) in the current period. The partial adjustment coefficient, x, 
which defines this fraction has an upper bound of unity and a lower bound 
of zero, and its actual size will 'depend on the relative magnitude of the 
parameters in the model. For example, in the case of a monopolist the 
costs of adjustment and hence the b coefficient' would be reduced to zero 
(1) (APt)* is defined as Pt - Pt-1 if the firm was previously in equilib- 
rium and Pt - Pt-1 otherwise. Therefore in both cases (APt) = Pt - Pt-1 
and hence AP - (AP )'ý=P -P - P* +P =P -Pý`. ttt t-1 t t-1 tt 
0 
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and this would effectively raise the partial adjustment coefficient to 
unity (A = a/a). 
(1) 
However, with more than one firm in the industry 
there will be non-zero adjustment costs, and consequently the adjustment 
coefficient will be lower than its upper bound. 
The relationships implied by the model can be best illustrated by 
means of a diagram. In figure 4.2 adjustment costs and profit losses 
are measured along the vertical axis and price along the horizontal axis. 
Three separate curves are depicted in the figure. The first, which is 
at a minimum when Pt = Pt, represents the profits forgone while being in 
disequilibrium. The other curve, which is at a minimum when Pt = Pt-1' 
defines the costs of adjustment per se. Thus if prices do not change 
from one period to another there will be no adjustment costs. The total 
costs curve is the vertical summation of the other two just described. 
Figure 4.2 
The Optimal Rate of Price Adjustment 
Adjustment costs, 
Profit Losses. 
Total costs 
il) 
_= 
(2) 
, 
Pt-1 
" 
Pt Pt 
Notes: (1) Adjustment costs curve 
(2) Profit Loss curve 
(1) In this situation the only costs are those associated with the 
deviation from the desired rate of adjustment, and therefore the 
optimal rate will be an instantaneous one. 
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The optimisation process which is implied in figure 4.2 can now be 
elucidated. In the situation depicted the current price needs to be 
adjusted upwards, since pt is greater than Pt_1. An instantaneous increase 
to Pt would reduce the profit losses to zero, but would raise the costs of 
adjustment to such a level that total costs will not be at a minimum. On 
the other hand, if the current price is kept at the same level as in the 
previous period, 'adjustment costs would then fall to zero but total costs, 
once again, will not be minimised by this strategy. 
The first order condition for a minimum requires that the gradient 
of the two functions which together make up total costs, i. e. the adjust- 
ment cost and profit loss functions, should be equal in absolute value. 
As this implies, at the point where total costs are minimised the sum of 
the gradients of the two schedules will be equal to zero since, as illus- 
trated in the figure, in the range between Pt-1 and Pt their gradients 
have opposite signs. 
The extent to which the optimal rate of adjustment approaches the 
desired rate will consequently depend on the slope of the adjustment cost 
function relative to the slope of the profit loss function. When adjust- 
ment costs rise fairly moderately away from Pt_l, the minimum of the total 
cost schedule will lie close to the equilibrium price, Pt. This result is 
intuitively plausible. It suggests that in industries where concentration 
is high, adjustment costs will be correspondingly low and hence the optimal 
adjustment rate will lie close to the desired rate. This in turn implies 
that the partial adjustment coefficient will be close to unity. 
Thus far the dynamic analysis has focused primarily on the influence 
of market structure, and it may seem that other potentially important fac- 
tors have been neglected. For example, it could be argued that the rate of 
adjustment may be influenced by the underlying cause of the price change, 
that is, whether cost or demand conditions are responsible for disequilibrium. 
6 
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However, this distinction is not relevant in the context of the "dual 
decision" approach since it implies that the cost and demand parameters 
jointly determine the equilibrium price, whilst its optimal rate of change 
is established by reference to the costs of adjustment. 
Yet another factor which needs to be considered is the role of infla- 
tionary expectations. These may exert a particularly strong influence in' 
times of high inflation when, fearing a continued rise in the inflation 
rate, firms may attempt to close the gap between rising costs and prices. 
Although inflationary expectations have come to be considered as a signi- 
ficant factor in the behaviour of prices, there is no evidence to suggest 
that they are systematically related to industrial concentration. 
Consequently' the omission of this factor from the theoretical and empirical 
analysis should have no bearing on the results. 
(') 
Finally, we must also consider the possibility that quality changes 
may be substituted for price changes thereby influencing the observed rate 
of adjustment. This would not constitute a problem if quality-adjusted 
price data were available, but unfortunately this was not the case. How- 
ever, what little evidence there is on this subject suggests that quality 
changes may be a characteristic of concentrated industries, 
(2) 
and thus we 
would expect these industries to be more likely to slow down the observed 
rate of adjustment by means of quality changes. Therefore, since we hypo- 
thesised a positive association between concentration and the rate of 
adjustment, any potential bias in the empirical analysis resulting from 
the use of unadjusted price data would run counter to the postulated 
relationship, and consequently the validity of the results need not come 
under question. 
(1) In particular, we do not expect the bias associated with an omitted 
variable in the regression analysis. 
(2) See Cowling and Cubbin (1971). 
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We conclude this section with one qualification. Setting up the 
adjustment problem in terms of discrete price changes in each period 
emphasises the "how much" question to the detriment of the "how often" 
question which, it could be argued, is equally important but was not 
considered in this analysis. However, in the context of the period 
spanned by the empirical tests (1963-1974), we would suggest that the 
rate of inflation during this time was sufficiently high for the losses 
resulting from delayed adjustment to be large relative to the purely 
administrative costs of adjustment. If this is accepted, then it is not 
unreasonable to concentrate attention on the "how much" decision, which 
is what has been done here. 
4.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter we attempted to analyse the price adjustment 
decision in a rigorous theoretical framework. The principle feature of 
this analysis consisted of giving explicit recognition to the role played 
by search in the price adjustment process. The importance of search stems 
from the limited information industrial setting within which price adjust- 
ments actually take place, and the impact of market structure on the latter 
arises through its influence on the costs of search. 
The comparative statics analysis indicated that there may be an 
asymmetry of price adjustments to changes in marginal costs and changes 
in demand; an asymmetry which was due to the unequal incidence of search 
costs. The hypothesis which is based on this result can be stated as 
follows: price adjustments in response to short-run changes in demand 
may be attenuated relative to those adjustments which take place follow- 
ing changes in costs. 
However, this hypothesis must be qualified on account of one impor- 
tant omission. It concerns the fact that, in the comparative statics 
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analysis, we did not consider the costs associated with quantity adjust- 
ments. As with redundancy payments in times of recession, the costs of 
output adjustments can be significant and, therefore, it must be accepted 
that by emphasising the costs of search associated with price adjustments 
and neglecting the costs of output adjustments our results would be biased 
in favour of the latter. Nevertheless, we would argue that the effect of 
this omission on the analysis is much reduced by the mitigating influence 
of two factors. First, quantity adjustments have the advantage of being 
less easily detected by competitors than price adjustments and therefore 
may be resorted to when firms wish to avoid disturbing the existing price 
structure. Second, some of the costs of output adjustments, such as 
unemployment benefits, are borne by the economy as a whole rather than by 
the firm which causes them. 
If it is supported by the empirical evidence, this hypothesis could 
have implications for short-run and cyclical fluctuations of economic 
activity. This is because the attenuation of price adjustments to demand 
changes in relation to what they would otherwise be under a regime of per- 
fect price flexibility, implies correspondingly larger output adjustments. 
This possibility has been considered in the disequilibrium literature dis- 
cussed in chapter 2 
(1) 
and the implications, particularly for downturns 
in economic activity, have been emphasised. 
The dynamic analysis was concerned with the determination of the 
optimal rate of price adjustment over time. The impact of market struc- 
ture on the optimal rate arose largely through its influence on search 
costs. From this analysis we derived the hypothesis that industrial 
concentration will be positively related to the rate of price adjustment. 
This hypothesis has clear implications for the link, which has often been 
(1) Particularly by Leijonhufvud (1968) and Hines (1971). 
a 
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assumed to exist, between industrial concentration and inflation: In 
terms of our own results the suggestion is that, by speeding up the 
adjustment process, concentration could aggravate the inflationary 
problems in times of rising costs. The consequential implications for 
the management of inflation will be considered in the concluding 
chapter. 
0 
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Chapter 5 
THE METHODOLOGY OF THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with the methodology of the empirical 
analysis which will be used to test the hypotheses previously derived. 
Several aspects of the analysis, including data specification, will be 
considered in order to allow for proper appraisal of the results. 
As a point of departure, some previous empirical investigations 
of price flexibility and adjustment will be evaluated. These studies 
can be subdivided into two distinct types. The first deal exclusively 
with the administered prices hypothesis, and they are solely concerned 
" with the relation between price flexibility, broadly defined, and 
industrial structure. The second type of empirical studies concentrate 
on the econometrics of price determination and adjustment per . se, and 
in addition they examine issues such as the "normal cost hypothesis" 
and the influence of demand on prices. The latter do not consider the 
administered prices hypothesis, and in many the estimates of the price 
equations have been at a high level of aggregation which did not allow 
inter-industry comparison. One notable exception is the early study by 
Yordon (1961) in which the effect of demand across a sample of fourteen 
industries in the U. S. was examined. 
This review is not intended to be exhaustive and will not encompass 
all the empirical studies which are of relevance. Rather, its purpose is 
to bring out the salient features of previous investigations with a view 
to avoiding the repetition of previous shortcomings and draw on useful 
lines of inquiry wherever possible. 
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5.2 Tests of the Administered Prices Hypothesis 
When Means first submitted his hypothesis in 1935 he also produced 
statistical evidence to support it. This consisted of some 677 monthly 
prices tabulated in terms of the frequency of price change. For the 
period from 1926 to 1933 Means found that 14 prices did not change at 
all and 77 prices changed only between one to four times. On the basis 
of this evidence Means then proceeded to divide the prices in his sample 
into a set of "administered" prices which displayed little variability 
over time, and another set which he called "market dominated" and which 
displayed considerable flexibility. Further evidence and arguments in 
support of the thesis were submitted in 1957 to the Kefauver Committee, 
and a case was made suggesting that the world-wide inflation of the 
1950's was due to price administration. 
Means' methodology has not changed much since his original 1935 
contribution. Essentially, it consists of noting the frequency and 
direction of price movements over selected time periods - usually 
upswings and downswings of the trade cycle. This kind of statistical 
analysis, although useful because it sheds some light on relative price 
movements, is unsatisfactory in one important respect. Simply looking 
at the frequency of price changes through the cycle does not reveal very 
much about how those prices would have behaved had they been "market 
dominated". Furthermore, since industries experience different levels 
of cost and demand fluctuations during the cycle, their price movements 
will naturally reflect these movements. However, Means' statistical 
tests make no allowance for this and consequently inter-industry dif- 
ferences in price flexibility allegedly due to administration could be 
the result of dissimilarities in cost and demand influences. 
Thus, before comparisons of price flexibility can be made across 
industries, it is necessary to normalise for the cost and demand 
conditions which lie behind price movements. 
4 
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Depodwin and Selden (1963) undertook some critical tests of the 
hypothesis. Their methodology involved single variable regression 
analysis of price movements during the 1953-1959 period. The dependent 
variable consisted of an index of price change over the period, and the 
explanatory variable was, alternately, the four- and eight-firm con- 
centration ratio. The authors found no evidence in support of the 
hypothesis and concluded that price administration did not contribute 
significantly to inflationary pressures during the period. 
The weakness of this analysis, like that of Means, lies in its 
neglect of other important factors which influence price movements. 
The omission of cost and demand variables from the regression tests 
would seriously bias any inferences about the impact of market 
concentration. 
A more sophisticated, multiple regression methodology has been 
adopted recently by other researchers. Weiss (1966) tested the hypo- 
thesis using price as the dependent variable and costs, output(') and 
concentration as explanatory variables. Weiss found that concentration 
had a positive and statistically significant effect on prices in only 
one period (1953-1959). But Phlips (1971), using European data, found 
no evidence in support of the hypothesis. 
Stigler and Kindahl (1970) opened a new chapter in this debate by 
compiling indices based on transactions prices. Conventional price 
index numbers reflect sellers' quotations, and it has often been argued 
that these are mere benchmarks around which transaction prices fluctuate. 
Stigler and Kindahl thus maintained that price administration could be a 
statistical phenomenon which stems from the method of collecting price 
data. 
(1) An index of, output was used as a proxy for demand. 
a 
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The new NBER(l) indices were therefore compared with the 
conventional BLS 
(2) indices. A breakdown of price movements in two 
recessions 
(3) is given in Table 5.1 below: 
Table 5.1 Price Movements in Two Recessions 
Price Change All Prices Excluding Steel Products 
BLS NBER BLS NBER 
Decreases 23 40 23 40 
No change 19 10 16 7 
Increases 26 18 18 10 
Source: Stigler and Kindahl (1970) 
On the basis of these results Stigler and Kindahl drew the following 
conclusion: 
11 .... we find no evidence here to suggest that price rigidity 
or "administration" is a significant phenomenon". 
Means (1972) disagreed with this conclusion and held that, on closer 
scrutiny, the NBER data supported his own hypothesis. To demonstrate this 
he divided the price data into "administered" and "market dominated" sub- 
samples. The results for the two recession periods are shown in Table 5.2 
below: 
Table 5.2 Price Movements in Two Recessions 
Price Change Total NBER "Administered" 
Sample 
Decrease in both recessions 22 7 
Not decreasing in both 46 46 
Total 68 53 
% Decreasing in both 32% 13% 
Source: Means (1972) 
Means interpreted table 5.2 as providing corroborative evidence but 
the link between administration and. inflation remains obscure. Furthermore, 
the definition of "administration dominated" prices was not clarified. 
(1) National Bureau of Economic Research 
(2) Bureau of Labour Statistics 
(3) July 1957 - April 1958, May 1960 - February 1961 
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Lustgarten (1975) carried out a comprehensive set of tests using regression 
analysis and, in addition, reviewed much of the empirical literature on the 
subject. His basic equations differed little from the conventional speci- 
fication and they included labour costs, material and capital costs, and 
measures of concentration as explanatory variables. The modern version of 
the administered prices hypothesis suggests that administered prices will 
lag behind market dominated prices during upswings, and move in a counter- 
cyclical direction during the downswing. Thus Lustgarten's a priori expec- 
tation was for concentration to have a negative sign in the lag period 
(upswing) and a positive sign in the catch-up period (downswing). Using 
225 4-digit industries in the U. S., the regressions were estimated for 
twelve separate annual time periods between 1958 and 1970. Lustgarten 
found that generally the results were not favourable to the administration 
hypothesis. He then went on to look at the influence of demand on prices. 
since according to the hypothesis, changes in demand have a lesser impact 
on price movements in concentrated as opposed to unconcentrated industries. 
Lustgarten's significant innovation lay in his abandoning the 
traditional proxy variables for demand in favour of a variable which was 
constructed using an input-output methodology. The construction of this 
variable will be elucidated in section S. S. 
On testing the hypothesis relating to the influence of demand using 
dummy variables for different concentration levels, Lustgarten found that 
demand had a uniform effect on prices across the entire concentration 
spectrum. Furthermore, the overall impact of demand, based on an all- 
industry sample, was found to be small in magnitude but statistically 
significant from zero. 
Summing-up these results, Lustgarten concluded that the evidence 
did not support the administered inflation thesis. This conclusion is 
significant because his tests were the most comprehensive to date and 
represented an improved statistical specification. 
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5.3 The Econometrics of Price Determination 
A considerable body of analysis exists on the subject of price 
formation. This literature is not concerned with the problem'of adminis- 
tered prices per se, but with theories of price determination and hence 
with factors leading to price changes. Although a large number of such 
studies exist, both for the U. S. and the U. K., most involve estimating 
price equations at a high (macro) level of aggregation. 
The central issue which these empirical studies explore is whether 
prices are purely cost determined(') in accordance with the celebrated 
"normal cost" hypothesis put forward by Hall and Hitch (1939), or whether 
they conform to the neo-classical excess demand hypothesis which states 
that prices are jointly determined by the forces of supply and demand. 
The basic approach common to all these studies is the estimation 
of a price equation in which the dependent variable is price and the 
independent variables are respectively material costs, unit labour costs 
(computed in a number of ways) and in some cases also a proxy for demand 
such as an index of output or capacity utilisation. Capital costs are 
not generally included in these studies, the rationale for their omission 
being that short-run pricing decisions will be unaffected by changes in 
fixed costs since profit-maximisation dictates that price be determined 
by marginal costs. 
A survey of price determination studies for the U. S. 
(2) has been 
conducted by Nordhaus (1972). After examining closely the functional 
specifications and the results obtained by the different studies, Nordhaus 
concludes that 
"... very little is known about the structurc of the impact 
of demand on' prices. " 
(1) Strictly speaking, "cost plus", since a mark-up over standard costs 
is included. 
(2) Up to the year 1970. 
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Nordhaus is particularly critical of some methodological conventions 
which are common to all the studies surveyed, notably the potential 
simultaneous equations bias which may result from including a demand 
variable on the right-hand side of the equation. 
Eckstein and Wyss (1972) have estimated price equations for 16 
individual industries in the U. S. at 2-digit (SIC) level of aggregation. 
This study constitutes a welcome departure from previous aggregative 
price studies using U. S. data. The authors' broad conclusion was that 
market structure has some influence on pricing behaviour although the 
exact relationship is somewhat obscure. In general the lags of adjust- 
ment were found to be short with prices responding rapidly to changes 
in costs. Changes in demand measured by a capacity utilisation index 
were found to have a small but significant effect on output prices. 
A recent empirical study by McCallum (1974) focused on a price 
equation which is deduced from an explicitly formulated demand and 
supply equation. Combining these relationship McCallum obtained a 
behavioural equation with price as the dependent variable and with wage 
rates, material prices, national income, price of substitute goods and a 
lagged dependent variable as the explanatory variables. A second model 
allowed for the'effect of inventories on output price. McCallum invoked 
the theory underlying inventory holding i. e. that the optimal level of 
inventories is given by the condition: 
Pe -P =W) ttl tt 
where Pe is expected price in period ttl and *(I) is the marginal cost ttl 
of storing inventories. Using an adaptive expectations model to estimate 
Pttl and substituting that expression in the demand relation the author 
obtained a price equation which included inventory holding (I) t as an 
additional explanatory variable. McCallum chose the lumber industry for the 
empirical testing on account of its atomistic structure. The results of the 
a 
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supply and demand specification were generally robust. The explanatory power 
of the regressions was high, all the coefficients had the expected signs, and 
they were also highly significent. The inventory specification was equally 
successful with the coefficient on the inventory variable taking the expected 
i. e. negative sign as well as being statistically significant. The author's 
conclusion was that the inventory model was generally superior to the less 
complex supply and demand formulation. 
One weakness of McCallum's study is the omission of any discussion 
relating to the institutional setting within which lumber prices are set. 
If there is no central "clearing system" then, although the industry is 
atomistic, firms will be price setters. In this case it is not strictly 
correct to specify an industry supply schedule since each firm sets its 
price in light of cost, demand, and competitive 
(1) 
conditions. However, 
the functional specification of the model is consistent with an imperfectly 
competitive price adjustment model since the explanatory variables included 
in the latter are the same as those of the supply-demand specification. 
Therefore McCallum's results do not provide definitive evidence on the 
structure of competitive price adjustments. 
Yordon (1961) in an early U. S. study of pricing behaviour attempted to 
identify the impact of industry structure on price adjustment. Yordon used 
monthly data for a sample of 14 industries which were split into two 
categories: concentrated and unconcentrated. 
(2) 
The industry price equations 
included three independent variables, labour costs, material costs, and 
capacity utilisation as a demand proxy. Yordon found little difference in 
the magnitude of price adjustments to cost changes between the two industry 
groups. However the finding may be due to the fact that Yordon's saipple of 
industries was not clustered around high and low concentration levels thus 
(1) This relates to the prices charged by rivals, which each firm needs to 
consider for its own pricing decision. 
(2) Following Kaysen and Turner a concentrated industry is defined in terms 
of a four-firm concentration ratio of 49% or above. 
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rendering sample means tests somewhat hazardous. Yordon also found that 
concentrated industries appeared particularly insensitive to demand effects. 
Neild (1963) conducted an early empirical study for the U. K.. One of 
the objectives of the study was to test the Godley hypothesis, which stated 
that firms' pricing behaviour is based on long-term estimates of productivity. 
This is in-contrast with the view that prices respond to short-run changes in 
output per man. Neild therefore deflated the wage rate variable by a long- 
run productivity estimate (2.5% p. a. ). The price equation also included 
material prices and a lagged dependent variable. Neild's results for the 
period 1950-60 appeared to support the normal cost hypothesis. A demand 
proxy was introduced in the equation, namely a measure of the excess of 
vacancies over unemployment. 
(l) 
The estimated demand coefficients turned 
out negative and insignificant and were consequently not reported. Neild 
extended his price equation analysis to five broad industry groups 
(SIC-order level), but no attempt was made to link industry structure to 
observed pricing behaviour. Neild also found the lag of price behind cost 
to be fairly short - between 3 to 6 months. 
A recent test of the normal-cost hypothesis is that of Godley and 
Nordhaus (1972). The methodology involves identifying all the components 
of unit costs including taxes and services. These costs are then purged 
of reversible cyclical components. The authors assumed historical cost 
pricing i. e. the cost of each input was calculated at the time of purchase. 
With this assumption the distributed lag between cost and price could be 
determined without recourse to the data. The predicted price in period t 
was then estimated as follows: 
Pt = (1963 mark-up) x (Historical normal unit cost) t 
The authors then compared the actual with the predicted aggregate price index. 
The two series followed each other closely but the authors were unable to' 
explain the fall of the mark-up over cost since 1964 as shown by a continuously 
(1) This index is compiled by the National Institute of Economic and Social 
Research. 
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widening gap between the actual and predicted series. 
To test the normal cost hypothesis Godley and Nordhaus regressed the 
change in the logarithm of actual price on the change in the logarithm of 
predicted price and a measure of capacity utilisation. The results were 
as follows: 
(1) AlogPt = 0.001399 + 0.6248AlogPt + 0.000238 log (X/XN)t 
(1.42) (5.36) (0.66) 
P is the predicted price and figures in brackets are t-statistics. 
The authors tested a large number of other proxies for demand, most of 
which turned out to be statistically insignificant, and they concluded 
that the evidence strongly supported the normal cost hypothesis. 
5.4 The Empirical Analysis: Outline of the Methodology 
The analysis of price adjustment in chapter 4 was conducted at the 
level of the "representative" firm. The testing of the hypotheses" which 
are based on that analysis will involve estimating a set. of price adjust- 
ment equations. However, although the empirical testing should also be 
conducted at the firm level, time-series data on costs and prices is not 
available at this level of aggregation. As an alternative the regression 
equations will have to be estimated at the industry level. It is clear 
that the estimated coefficients will represent an average for all firms 
within an industry. The question which arises, therefore, is whether 
these coefficients can be interpreted in the same way as if they were 
estimated for each firm individually. We would contend that this is so 
because the crucial determinant of search and adjustment costs in our 
model is industrial structure, as measured by an index of concentration. 
Thus, since it is the influence of this parameter on the adjustment pro- 
cess which is being tested, and since the degree of concentration is the 
same for all firms within an industry, its impact at the firm and the 
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aggregate industry level will be much the same. As a result, we can be 
confident that the industry-level estimates will constitute a valid test 
of our hypotheses. 
The empirical analysis will be divided into three parts. The first 
will be concerned with the influence of short-run changes in demand on 
price adjustments. Notwithstanding the existing empirical studies in this 
area, some of which were reviewed above, our own analysis will be based on 
an improved specification of the demand variable and a relatively low (MLH) 
level of aggregation. 
In the second part we shall test the hypothesised relationship between 
market structure and the rate of price adjustment. This will essentially 
involve estimating the rate of adjustment for different industries using 
time-series regressions, and then linking these estimates cross-sectionally 
to industrial structure. 
Finally, the third part will consist of an analysis of structural 
breaks in the price adjustment process. Using covariance tests, we shall 
examine the impact of acquisitions and mergers on the rate of price adjust- 
ment in the wake of the mergers boom which took place in the late 1960's 
and early 1970's. 
5.5 The Influence of Demand 
The effect of demand on prices has been the subject of several 
empirical tests, all of which employed some proxy index of demand in the 
price equations. The variables most commonly used for this purpose were 
indicators of excess demand for labour (e. g. Neild, 1963), capacity 
utilisation, or some measure of output. These demand proxies were intro- 
duced into the equation either in terms of period-to-period changes or in 
terms of levels. But as Lustgarten (1975) and Nordhaus (1972) have 
indicated, these measures of demand are prone to estimation bias and should 
generally be treated with caution. 
0 
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The excess demand for labour variable is in general negatively corre- 
lated with short-run labour costs, since, when excess demand is high, the 
rate of production will also be high thus depressing labour costs. 
Therefore, if long-run labour costs are included in the price equation along 
with the excess demand for labour variable, then the latter will pick up the 
effect of changes in short-run labour costs and thus exert a negative bias 
on the estimated coefficient. However, this bias will be present only if 
prices are adjusted to short-run changes in labour costs. 
As regards the capacity utilisation variable, which has been used 
extensively (e. g. Eckstein and Fromm, 1968) and has proved to be consis- 
tently positive and significant, its overall influence in terms of the 
size of the coefficients has generally been small. 
As regards output indicators, which have also been used extensively 
in empirical studies as demand proxies, these present a number of problems. 
First, output is not really a measure of demand but represents the joint 
outcome of the supply and demand decision. This constitutes a source of 
estimation bias. 
Second, as pointed out by Lustgarten (1975), output indicators are 
usually compiled by deflating the values of deliveries with an output 
price index. For this reason, changes in the output indicators will 
generally be inversely correlated with output price thus causing a down- 
ward bias in the estimated coefficient. 
The final problem associated with output indicators is the simul- 
taneity bias which may arise in ordinary least squares regressions. To 
illustrate this problem, consider the following price adjustment model 
for an'industry i: 
(2) dpit 'a+ bldgit +c bl >0 
(3) dgit =c+ b2dpit b2 <0 
I 
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Equation (2) is the industry price adjustment equation where the cost 
variable has been dropped in order to simplify the analysis. Equation (3) 
is a simplified demand function in first difference form. We shall assume 
that both equations represent the true model. 
Now, if equation (2) is estimated by ordinary least squares 
regression it can be shown that the b1 estimator will be biased. The bias 
arises because the explanatory variable and the error term are no longer 
independent in equation (2), given the specification of the model. 
w 
To see this consider the bl estimator in deviation form which is 
defined as: 
Edgitdpit 
bl 
Edgit 
Substituting equation (2) above for dpit and taking expected values this 
estimator reduces to: 
(4) E(bl) = bl tE Edgite 
2 Edgit 
The second term on the right hand side of (4) is the covariance between 
dgit and the error term c. Using the reduced form of equation (3) this 
covariance can be shown to be: 
Cav(dgitc) = b2 cJ 2 
1-b2b1 
A Now, since b2 <0 it therefore follows that E(bl)< b1. Hence there is 
an a priori expectation of a downward bias in the demand coefficient. 
This bias may account for the generally poor results obtained in the past 
with output indicators. 
To avoid these problems we used the method suggested by Lustgarten 
(1975). Instead of using observations on output of the industry whose price 
adjustments are being explained, the method involves using output data of 
industries which use the product of the industry in question in their own 
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production process. This index of demand is defined as the weighted sum 
of the gross output indicators of user industries, where the weights are 
the respective input-output coefficients. A detailed description of the 
data sources and methods which were used in the construction of this 
index will follow in section 5.9. 
The advantage of this index rests on the fact that it avoids three 
major problems commonly encountered with the measurement of demand. First, 
since it is not related to the output of the industry whose price is the 
dependent variable, there will be no inverse correlation caused by the 
usual method of deflating the index of deliveries by output price. Second, 
given that this index does not measure the actual output in the industry 
to which it relates, it should not reflect, as demand indicators often do, 
the joint supply and demand decision. Finally, and what is perhaps most 
important, the estimation problems resulting from the simultaneous price 
and demand relationships of the type which was illustrated above, are 
neatly circumvented by the use of this index. Hence ordinary least 
squares regressions may be used without danger of estimation bias. 
Nevertheless, the proposed demand index does suffer from two draw- 
backs. It is clear from its definition that the index is derived from 
observations on intermediate output only, and consequently the direct 
influence of final demand is implicitly ignored. However, given that we 
would expect a strong correlation between changes in intermediate and 
final output, this should not constitute a major weakness. The other 
difficulty stems from the fact that the U. K. Index of Industrial prod- 
uction is only available at an SIC-order level of aggregation. As our 
empirical tests will involve industries which are classified at a lower, 
MLH level of aggregation, the suggested index will represent an approxi- 
mation to the one which should ideally be used. Notwithstanding these 
qualifications, the proposed index was considered to be preferable to 
- 112 - 
conventional demand indicators, and was employed in the-empirical analysis. 
5.6 The Influence of Market Structure 
Of the two hypotheses which were derived in the previous chapter, 
one was concerned with the influence of market structure on the rate of 
price adjustment. In order to test this hypothesis, as well as the one 
concerning the influence of demand, a set of industry price adjustment 
equations will be estimated using regression analysis. In addition to 
providing a measure of the impact of cost and demand changes, the 
regression equations will also give estimates of the rate of price 
adjustment in each industry. 
The equation used for estimation was derived from the partial 
adjustment model in the following manner. Equation (17) of the preceding 
chapter was given as: 
(5) ePt = a(Pt - Pt-i) 
where A is the adjustment coefficient and Pt represents the current period 
equilibrium price. This equation may be rewritten as: 
(6) Pt = XPt + (1-a)Pt-1 
Replacing the equilibrium price Pt by a linear combination of the marginal 
cost and demand variables, the above equation becomes: 
C7) Pt = a0 1Ct + A0 2Dt + (1-A)Pt-1 
where C. and Dt represent current period marginal costs and demand respec- 
tively. This is the familiar price equation with a lagged dependent 
variable on the right hand side; its estimation would require data on out- 
put prices, input prices and demand. However, since these variables are 
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strongly trended, multicollinearity in the regressions is likely to result 
in highly imprecise estimates of the coefficients. To overcome this 
problem we took the first difference of equation (7), and consequently the 
functional specification used for estimation was linear in first-differences, 
as defined by equation (8) below: 
(8) APt = aßIACt + X62ADt +(1-a)ePt-1 
It should be noted that this specification implies the same lag of 
price adjustment to changes in cost and demand, since only one partial 
adjustment coefficient is estimated. This methodology was adopted for 
two reasons. First, there was no suggestion in the dynamic analysis of 
the previous chapter that a differential lag structure is the appropriate 
one. Second, when the estimating equation is suitably modified to incor- 
porate one adjustment coefficient for cost changes and one for demand 
changes, it is found that lagged values of the explanatory variables 
appear on the right hand side of the equation. This would lead to severe 
multicollinearity in the regressions, with all the associated estimation 
problems. 
The price adjustment equations will provide an estimate of the 
partial adjustment coefficient for each industry. As a 'first step in the 
analysis of the relationship between the rate of adjustment and market 
structure we shall employ the rank correlation method. The industries in 
the sample will be given a concentration ranking based on available 
measures of concentration, and an adjustment ranking based on the size of 
the estimated partial adjustment coefficients. The degree of correlation 
between these variables will then be evaluated by computing the Spearman's 
rank correlation coefficient. 
(1) 
(1) The computational formula of this statistic will be given in the next 
chapter. 
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As a second step in the analysis we shall attempt to derive a more 
precise, quantitative relationship between market structure and the rate 
of price adjustment. For this purpose we shall link the estimated adjust- 
ment coefficients cross-sectionally to concentration and other industry 
characteristic variables using multivariate regression analysis. Several 
alternative functional specifications will be tested, and a number of 
different concentration measures will be used in this analysis. Details 
of the sources and methods used in constructing the indicators of concen- 
tration will be given in section 5.8 below. 
5.7 The Analysis of Structural Breaks 
In the final section of the empirical analysis we shall examine. 
whether any structural changes in the price adjustment equations took 
place during the estimation period. The purpose of this is, essentially, 
to investigate whether any identified structural breaks could be linked 
to the rapid changes in concentration which resulted from the wave of 
horizontal mergers and takeovers which occurred in the late 1960's and 
early 1970's. Of relevance in this context is Stoneman's (1976) conclu- 
sion that approximately 50% of the changes in concentration which were 
observed during the 1960's could be attributable to mergers and take- 
overs. If this conclusion is accepted, and if changes in concentra- 
tion exert an influence on the price adjustment process, then there 
could be important policy implications concerning the long-run effects 
c: mergers on the rate of inflation in the U. K. The discussion of 
these implications will be deferred to a later chapter. 
The analysis will again involve estimating a number of price adjust- 
ment equations for a sub-sample of industries. However, in order to 
identify any structural breaks, these equations must allow for changes in 
(1) This was based on an extensive survey of the current evidence. 
- 115 - 
the partial adjustment coefficients in the post-merger period. One way 
of doing this would be to introduce a dummy variable into the equations. 
We would do so by way of a 'slope dummy' on the lagged dependent variable, 
the latter being our estimate of the adjustment coefficient. However, 
there are problems with this procedure. Since the estimated coefficients 
in the price equations incorporate the partial adjustment coefficient, a 
slope dummy solely on the lagged dependent variable (DPt_1) would force a 
change in the cost coefficients for the post-merger period, unless the dummy 
coefficient was insignificantly different from zero. To see this consider 
equation (8) from which the demand variable is excluded: 
APt = Aß1 ACt + (1-A)APt-1 
Now call the coefficient on ACt :=X1. Using the dummy variable 
technique we would get two estimates of the partial adjustment coefficient 
as follows: - 
Period before mergers: A 
Period after mergers: a+ Ad 
where Ad is the coefficient on the dummy variable which captures the effect 
on the adjustment process of the post-merger period. However, since our 
estimate of C remains the same for the entire period we have that: 
Before mergers: 61 = 
After mergers: ß1=C/iX+ad) 
Thus it is clear that we would be imposing a change on our estimate of ßl, 
unless ld =0 or unless E is allowed to change in the post merger period. 
It is therefore preferable to derive separate estimates of the price 
equations for the two periods without 
, 
using dummy variables. In this way 
no*a riori restrictions are imposed on the variables. The analysis of 
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structural breaks in the price adjustment mechanism will therefore be based 
on a number of "Chow" tests. This methodology consists of splitting up the 
estimation period in two parts, and then computing an r statistic from the 
residual sum of squares of the split-period regressions. A precise 
definition of this r test will be given in the next chapter. 
In the context of structural breaks we must also consider the anti- 
5.8 
inflation legislation which was introduced during our estimation period. 
We refer in particular to the Conservative government's Counter-Inflation 
Programme which was implemented in November 1972. One important aspect of 
this programme was the creation of the Price Commission for the purpose of 
monitoring and regulating price increases. The Commission's task was to 
examine applications for price increases using the twin criteria of "allow- 
able cost increases" and "reference profit margins". In the next chapter 
we shall therefore consider the potential influence of the Price Commission 
on the price adjustment process. 
Identifying Market Structure 
Market structure is a concept which is notoriously difficult to measure. 
In this thesis we followed convention by using the five-firm concentration 
ratios as indicators of industrial structure. Three sets of concentration 
ratios were used in the regressions, the 1963 and 1968 figures published 
in the 1968 Census of Production, and the more recent figures for 1971 
published in the annual Census Report. Both sets of concentration ratios 
had their shortcomings, but since no alternative measures are available for 
recent years, they had to be used. 
The problem with the 1963 and 1968 ratios is that most of them relate 
to industries which are defined at a finer level of disaggregation than 
those which were used for estimation. Thus, while these five-firm 
0 
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concentration ratios refer to specific commodity groups within an MLH 
classification, our price equations for the most part apply to MLH industry 
groups. To overcome this difficulty we based the industry structure indica- 
tors on the weighted and unweighted means of the component concentration 
ratios within each MLH industry class. The weights used were the values 
of sales for each product group. These figures are given alongside the 
concentration ratios in the 1968 Census. Clearly these measures will not 
represent the exact concentration ratio at this level of aggregation, but 
since individual coiºmodities within this classification are very closely 
related, the firms which produce one commodity group are likely to be 
producers of some or all*of the remainder. Furthermore for the 1968 
figures the range between the lowest and the highest concentration ratio 
within a single MLH group exceeded 25% in only 5 out of 21 cases. There- 
fore we suggest that these weighted and unweighted means proposed here are 
likely to be good indicators of the relative concentration position of the 
industries in our sample, and this is vindicated by the recent studies 
which have used such measures of concentration in the analysis of changes 
in industrial structure (see George, 1975). 
Turning to the 1971 concentration figures, the problem with these 
is that although they are defined at the required MLH level, they refer to 
the percentage of gross industry sales accounted for by the five largest 
enterprises by employment. Hence when the five largest employers are not 
those with the largest output the concentration ratio will be biased. 
In addition, we used the Herfindahl measures of concentration con- 
structed by M. Waterson of the University of Newcastle. These indicators 
are based on employment data published in the 1968 Report on the Census of 
Production. They relate to the years 1963 and 1968 and are based on an 
MLH level of aggregation. 
(') 
(1) These Herfin4ahl indices, together with the concentration ratios will 
be found in the appendix. 
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5.9 Data 
A large part of the data necessary for the analysis was previously 
unavailable and was generated from more basic sources. 
The dependent variable in the regression equations was the wholesale 
price index (WPI) of the relevant industry. The Department of Industry 
maintains a large number of continuous price series, including import prices. 
These WPI's are calculated at commodity and MLH levels of aggregation. The 
indicators are compiled free of value added tax (or purchase tax before its 
abolition), and represent price quotations by a number of sellers or 
manufacturers. 
On the explanatory variables side, two cost variables were included: 
material and fuel costs and unit labour costs. 
The price index of materials and fuel (PIMP) was previously available 
only at a rather high, SIC-order level of aggregation. These indices had 
been published in Trade and Industry (formerly the Board of Trade Journal) 
for broad sectors of industry e. g. steel industries, chemical and allied, 
and the like. It was felt that the use of order level data on material 
costs, which must necessarily differ between MLH's could seriously bias the 
results, particularly as regards accurate estimates of the industry partial 
adjustment coefficients. 
It was therefore necessary to construct a set of material cost indices 
(PIMF's) which related to industries defined at MLH level of aggregation. 
For this task the help of the Department of Industry was enlisted. 
The indicators were constructed as follows. The first requirement 
was a breakdown of commodities purchased by each industry for purposes of 
production. This information was obtained from the 1968 Census of 
Production tables. Consider the commodities purchased by industry j for 
production purposes in 1968. We define Sij as the amount of commodity i. 
purchased by industry j. In effect, the Census tables give an array of 
(1) The indices are base-weighted according to the Laspeyres formula. 
0 
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such purchases, as laid out below: 
Value (1'000) 
Purchases of commodity 1 Slj 
ýý ýý ýý 2 S. 
06... 0 .. 000.0.. 00000... 000 
ft It it n 
a00 
Snj 
Total value of input purchases T. 
3 
Dividing the value of each commodity purchase (Si7. ) by the total, we obtain 
a form of input-output coefficient i. e. aij = Sij/Tj 
These input-output coefficients were used as weights in deriving the PIMF's. 
In compiling these weights we adhered to the Department of Industry's practice 
of deriving the weights on a net sector basis. This means that intra-industry 
transactions i. e. Sýý are netted out. In most industries these flows were of 
relatively small magnitude. 
J rsr. r sr.. . 
The price index of materials and fuel was then calculated as the weighted 
average, in period t, of the price indices of individual commodities purchased 
where the weights were the "a' ä ii Is. Thus we have: 
[wp'l PIMF. a + WPI ä+ WPI äta äl tij 2t2ý 3t 3j nt ný] 
I1 
Where PIMFit is the price index of materials and fuel for industry j in period 
t and WPInt is the wholesale price index of commodity n in period t. Extending 
this calculation for all t we derived a continuous series for each PIMP covering) 
the entire estimation period (1963-1974). 
Since each industry purchases up to sixty individual commodity inputs, 
0 
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k the calculations involved in constructing the 
PIMF series were too extensive 
to be carried out manually. These calculations were therefore performed 
by 
computer once an appropriate program had been devised. 
(1) 
The Census Tables do not cover all purchases made by industries. Some 
purchases cannot be identified and they are lumped together under a 
"miscel- 
laneous" heading. In some industries this category comprised 25% of total 
purchases. Where possible the Department of Industry investigated the broad 
composition of purchases within this category in consultation with the 
Business Statistics Office, in order to reduce the size of this category in 
the weighting pattern. What remained of the miscellaneous component was used 
to derive its weight and was included in the PIMF with a composite price index 
of materials constructed by the Department of Industry. This 
index reflects 
the overall trend in the price of industrial raw materials and is used by the 
Department of Industry in the construction of the broad sector PIMF's. 
Since the weights used for calculation purposes were obtained from the 
1968 Census of Production, we were implicitly assuming constant input propor- 
tions throughout the period (l963-197'). Although this assumption is somewhat 
contentious, there is no alternative source of input purchase information 
except for the 1963 Census of Production. However, some experiments with 
input-output coefficients in the Netherlands (see Tilanus, 1966) suggested that 
the majority of sizeable coefficients changed little over the 1948-1960 period. 
Nevertheless, the. cost indices which were obtained represent a consider- 
able improvement on previously available data and a number of the PIMF series 
are to appear regularly in Trade and Industry. 
The unit labour cost (ULC) index was also constructed from primary data. 
Quarterly observations on average earnings, which were the series used as a 
(1) This program was written by Mark Partridge whose help is gratefully 
acknowledged. 
- 121 - 
measure of industries' labour costs, could only be obtained at SIC-order 
level of aggregation i. e. for broad sectors of industry. Whilst this 
deficiency could lead to errors of measurement, it is not implausible that 
earnings in broadly defined industrial sectors are promptly brought into 
uniformity through Union pressure for earnings parity. Indeed, earning 
differentials are not likely to be significant between MLH's within an SIC- 
order class, and will certainly not display the variance which might be 
expected with material costs. 
As our basic labour cost series we therefore used the monthly index of 
average earnings by industry groups which is published by the Department of 
Employment. The series goes back to 1963 and comprises gross remuneration 
including overtime payment, bonuses, and commission. The index takes into 
account the remuneration of manual and non-manual staff. 
To obtain the ULC index an allowance must be made for changes in labour 
productivity since actual labour costs rise only if wage cost rises exceed 
those of productivity. We therefore followed the majority of previous 
empirical studies in deflating the average earnings series by a produc- 
tivity index, to obtain unit labour costs. As regards the productivity index 
we were faced with a choice of assumptions about pricing behaviour. The 
problem was whether to deflate the earnings series by a quarter to quarter 
productivity index (output per man) or whether to use a long-run productivity 
trend. In order to resolve this dilemma we plotted ULC, defined as average 
earnings deflated by current quarter productivity, against time. This graph 
showed that the ULC variable thus defined displayed considerable quarter to 
quarter variability from the trend which was not reflected by output price 
movements. We therefore opted in favour of the hypothesis, originally sub- 
mitted by Godley(1) , that prices do not respond to short-run changes in 
(1) See Neild (1963), pp. 3-5. 
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productivity but rather to its trend. Thus the average earnings series were 
deflated by the long-term productivity trend in each industry, broadly defined. 
This trend was estimated by fitting the following equation to output-per-man 
data for the 1963-1974 period 
C9) log (Q/N it 'A+ 
bit 
where (Q/N)it is output per man in industry i at period t and t is time. 
Thus b is the estimated quarterly productivity trend for industry i. 
The unit labour cost index was then obtained as follows: 
ULClt = IAEit 
(1tbi)t 
where IAEit is the index of average earnings of industry i in period t. 
Thus the implicit assumption in the construction of these cost indica- 
tors was that technical progress over time reduces labour cost by exerting 
downward pressure on labour requirements per unit of output. Furthermore, 
since we assumed a fixed-coefficients technology, material inputs per unit 
of output were unaffected by technical progress. 
The proxy variable for industry demand was compiled in the following 
manner. As was previously stated this index is the weighted sum of output 
indicators pertaining to user industries. Thus the demand index for industry 
i is a weighted sum of the output of all industries which use i in their 
production process. The major difficulty lay in obtaining the weights. 
The ones used were aggregate input-output coefficients derived from the 
35 x 35 commodity by industry absorption matrix published in "Structural 
Change in the British Economy 1948-1968" (1974). 
(1) 
An element of the 
(1) A Programme for Growth, Volume 12. 
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absorption matrix xis shows the amount of commodity i absorbed by industry j 
in its production process. This matrix is based on 1963 trade flows between 
industries. In order to harmonise the 35 x 35 industry classification with 
that of the Index of Industrial Production - the output indicator which was 
used - the absorption matrix was aggregated into an 18 x 18 commodity-industry 
1 
matrix 
Thus the demand index for industry i's output in period t is given as: - 
_1p Dit 
CI 
Xil Qlt + X12 Q2t +"'xin `nt 
G 17 7 
Two simplifying assumptions were involved in the construction of this 
demand index. First, since our observations relate to demand at SIC-order 
level whilst our equations explain price changes defined at MLH level, we are 
implicitly assuming that changes in demand are evenly spread through broad 
sectors of industry. Second, since the pxij's are derived from a commodity 
by industry flow matrix, in order for the xi3's to be equivalent to the input- 
output coefficients aid's we must assume that each industry produces only its 
principal product. An examination of the "makes" matrix which shows the 
amounts of different commodities, including principal products, which are 
produced by each industry, revealed that although this assumption was not 
strictly valid in all cases, the off-diagonal elements of the "makes" matrix 
comprised a small proportion of total industry outputs(2 
). 
Hence for pur- 
poses of constructing a demand proxy this assumption need not be viewed with 
concern. 
It should, be noted that our index was made up of intermediate demands 
only i. e. inter-industry transactions, and that final demands were excluded. 
(1) This matrix will be found in the appendix. 
(2) The "makes! ' matrix, for 1963, is also given in the appendix.. 
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As Lustgarten (1975) pointed out, this omission was unavoidable since the 
proportion of gross output which goes to final demand displays a marked 
variability over time. Nevertheless in most of the 18 broad sectors of 
industry used in this analysis intermediate purchases accounted for well 
over half of gross output. 
5.10 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter we reviewed a number of empirical studies on the subject 
of pricing behaviour and developed our own methodology taking due care to 
avoid those problems which have arisen in the past. The research methodology 
was discussed in detail and the assumptions made were elucidated. 
An important requirement for our empirical analysis was the need to 
improve on existing data in light of the regression specification. . The major 
innovation lay in the construction of a materials and fuel price index at a 
disaggregated (MLH) industry level. This index was constructed with the help 
of the Department of Industry Wholesale Prices Section. The labour-cost and 
demand indices essentially involved adaptations of previous research method- 
ology. 
In the next chapter the empirical results will be reported and discussed, 
together with the specification of the functional forms and descriptions of 
the relevant statistical tests. 
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Chapter6 
THE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we shall report the empirical results and assess 
their significance. In section 6.2 we shall present the empirical tests 
of the hypothesis which was developed in chapter 4 concerning the 
influence of short-run changes in demand on price adjustment. The analy- 
sis will consist of estimating regression equations through which the 
effect of changes in demand may be identified. 
Section'6.3 will comprise the empirical tests of the relationship 
between industrial market structure and the rate of price adjustment. 
The estimates of the partial adjustment coefficient will be derived 
from time-series regression equations, and these estimates will then be 
linked to' industrial structure using cross-section regression analysis 
and rank correlation tests. 
In section 6.4 we shall attempt to estimate the specific influence 
of important mergers on the price adjustment process. The approach will 
consist of identifying structural breaks in the adjustment process by 
means of covariance tests. This section is not directly related to the 
theoretical analysis of chapter 4, but it is of interest nevertheless 
in view of the rapid changes in industry structure which have occurred 
during our period of investigation as a result of intensive merger acti- 
vity. In this section we shall also consider the potential influence of 
changes in the overall rate of inflation on the adjustment process, using 
the same analytical framework. 
Finally, section 6.5 will be devoted to a summing-up of the empirical 
analysis and will include a balanced appraisal of the results. 
0 
0 
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6.2 The Influence of Demand on Price Adjustment 
In this section we shall report the results relating to the influence 
of demand. The analysis consisted of estimating a set of industry price 
equations in first-difference form. These equations included a proxy index 
of demand. Our sample comprised a total of twenty-one industries identified 
A 
at MLH level or below and selected from seven different orders of the 1968 
Standard Industrial Classification. As far as possible, we selected 
industries which ranged widely across the spectrum of concentration, but 
the sample was ultimately restricted by the availability of data. The esti- 
mation period extended from 1963-1974, giving 48 quarterly observations in 
total. 
The functional specification of the regressions was as follows: 
(1) AWPIit =A+X. ß1iAPIMFit + Iiß2iAULCit + xiß31APRXit +(1-ai)AWPIit-1 + uit 
where WPIit is the wholesale price index of industry i in period t, and 
PIMFit9 U it and PRXit are respectively the price index of materials and 
fuel, the unit labour cost index and the demand proxy index of industry i 
in period t. 
(1) 
Our proxy index of demand is a weighted sum of output indicators of 
user industries, as was. described in the previous chapter. However, since 
user industries carry stocks of intermediate inputs to meet contingent 
increases in output, it will take some time before increases in output of 
user industries are felt as increases in demand of supplying industries. 
In order to take proper account of this time-lag in our analysis, we 
regressed WPIit on PRX it-1 i. e. we lagged the demand proxy index by one 
quarter. In addition to carrying 
'stocks 
of materials, many firms also 
have long or medium-term contracts with intermediate input suppliers 
(1) These index numbers had a common base-date, namely 1963 1= 100. 
I 
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and fixed-wage contracts with employees. In order to allow for their 
delayed impact, we also obtained a set of regression estimates based 
on lagged values of PIMF and ULC. In four equations the lagged 
variables gave an improved overall estimate. 
In order to avoid excessive repetition we shall restrict our 
discussion, in this section, to the general explanatory power of the 
regression and in particular to the estimated demand coefficients. 
Hence the analysis of the adjustment lag and cost coefficients will be 
presented in the subsequent section of this chapter. 
The ordinary least squares results for the engineering and non- 
engineering industries are reported in tables 6.1 and 6.2 respectively. 
This breakdown of our industry sample has no significance in the pres- 
ent analysis but will be elucidated further in section 6.3. 
At first glance the results suggest that the explanatory power 
of the regressions is reasonably good, especially in view of the fact 
that the dependent variable is the "highly noisy" quarterly first- 
difference of output price. However, closer inspection reveals sig- 
nificant negative serial correlation in the residuals of most equations. 
This is indicated by the h statistic, devised by Durbin for testing 
the presence of serial correlation in equations which include a lagged 
dependent variable on the right hand side. Since h has the standard 
normal distribution, if it exceeded - 1.675 we rejected the hypothesis 
of zero negative serial-correlation at the 5% level of significance. 
Serially correlated residuals are often an indication that an 
important explanatory variable has been omitted or that the model has 
been incorrectly specified. Since neither of these was applicable 
to our equation we would conclude that the auto-regressive scheme was 
the result of taking first-differences of index numbers together with 
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the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable. 
In general, auto-correlation does not lead to bias in the esti- 
mated coefficients. However, when a lagged dependent variable is 
included in the equation and auto-correlation is present, ordinary 
least squares regression will yield biased estimates. The extent of 
bias will depend on the severity of the auto-correlation. It was 
therefore considered inappropriate to use ordinary least squares 
estimates. 
Instead, we used an estimation method known as Generalised Least 
/ 
Squares. This method consists of a two-stage estimation technique by 
which the data is first transformed using an estimated value of p- the 
auto-correlation parameter - and ordinary least squares are then'applied 
to the transformed data. In this way, the autocorrelation is first 
removed so that ordinary least squares may be applied without danger 
of bias. The technique which was used to determine the appropriate 
value of p for each equation is )mown as the Cochrane-Orcutt iterative 
process. 
ýlý 
The generalised least squares results are reported in tables 6.3 
and 6.4. It is immediately apparent that whilst the degree of explana- 
tory power was not reduced, the negative auto-correlation was effectively 
removed, as testified by the h statistics. 
Looking at the estimated demand coefficients, we note that in fif- 
teen of the twenty-one equations they were insignificantly different 
from zero at the 5% level. However, in five equations, namely those of 
the Metal Working Machine Tools, Telegraph and Telephone Apparatus, 
Pharmaceutical Preparations, Paint and Abrasives industries, the demand 
coefficient had the wrong i. e. negative sign and was statistically 
(1) See Johnston (1972), pp. 259-265. 
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significant. Furthermore, only in the equation of the Bricks and 
Refractory Goods industry was the coefficient positive and statisti- 
cally significant. 
The broad sweep of these results would therefore seem to be 
that short-run changes in demand, as measured by our indicators, do 
not have an appreciable influence on price adjustments. Yet the 
relatively frequent incidence of negative coefficients on this vari- 
able would suggest that either our index may be subject to some error 
of measurement or it may be picking up the effect of an omitted vari- 
able. As was indicated in the preceding chapter, there are a number 
of factors which have tended to exert a negative bias on conventional 
indicators of demand. Although our index was constructed in a way 
which attempted to avoid this bias, nevertheless it may have crept in 
unnoticed. 
One major source of bias stems from measuring output as values 
of deliveries which are deflated by an output price index. The result 
of this is to cause negative bias in the coefficient on output, since 
increases in prices automatically deflate the value of deliveries thus 
creating a negative relationship between measured output and price. 
However, our demand indicator did not relate to the deliveries of an 
industry whose price changes we sought to explain, but to the weighted 
sum of output indicators of user industries. Nevertheless, if 
'l) 
prices of user and supplier industries move together through the cycle, 
then wherever price deflators are used the output, indicators will 
themselves be correlated. In that event the negative relationship 
between price and the demand index will be introduced into our equa- 
tions even though we used as proxy the output indicators of industries 
(1) The definition of user industries was given in section 5.9 of 
the preceding chapter. 
0 
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other than the one whose price adjustment we were attempting to explain. 
Therefore the negative bias which we sought to avoid may nevertheless 
be present in the equations. 
It is difficult to determine a priori the extent of this correla- 
tion in each industry. However, close to 50% of output indicators in 
the U. K. are measured in terms of values of sales deflated by a price 
index. (l) This figure alone suggests that the potential for correla- 
tion between the indicators does exist. 
The second source of bias in the demand coefficients is related 
to the possible misspecification of the labour cost variable. The 
behavioural assumption which we adopted in this analysis was that firms 
do not adjust prices in response to short-run changes in productivity. 
That is why our labour cost index was deflated by a long-run product 
tivity trend so as to obtain labour costs per unit of output. 
However, it is clear that since cyclical increases in output 
raise labour productivity, changes in the latter will not be reflected 
in our ULC index. Furthermore, cyclical increases in output will be 
negatively related to short-run labour costs and therefore, if firms 
do adjust prices to short-run changes in productivity, our index of 
demand may become a hidden cost variable. In that event, we would 
expect a negative bias on the demand coefficient because when output 
rises unit labour costs fall and exert a downward pressure on output 
price. 
(2) 
Thus, if our assumption concerning pricing behaviour is 
erroneous, the observed negative relationship between demand and output 
(1) See Central Statistical Office (1970), p. 2. 
(2) It should be pointed out that some previous empirical studies 
e. g. Neild (1963) and Godley and Nordhaus (1972), have come to 
the conclusion that prices are unresponsive to short-run produc- 
tivity changes. 
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price may be partly explained in terms of the misspecified 
labour cost 
variable. 
It is not possible to determine a priori which of the two 
factors 
may have the largest influence on the negative bias in the 
demand vari- 
able. However, we would discount the possibility of a simultaneous 
equations bias because, as was discussed at length in chapter 
5, our 
method of constructing the demand index ensures that the simultaneity 
is effectively removed. 
. The above discussion would indicate that although great care was 
taken in constructing a bias-free indicator of demand, the results 
suggested that this objective may not have been fully achieved. Thus, 
although our findings concerning the influence of demand are broadly 
in keeping with our hypothesis, they have to be treated with caution. 
A more definitive verification of the hypothesis must await the availa- 
bility of more reliable data. 
Yet it is- interesting to note that the single equation in which 
the demand coefficient was positive and statistically significant was 
that of the Bricks and Refractory Goods industry. It is interesting 
because this industry is highly concentrated. Hence, whilst not 
being a reliable test, this evidence is consistent with our hypothesis 
that concentration reduces search costs associated with an adjustment 
of price, thereby facilitating such an adjustment to changes in demand. 
It also suggests that where the influence of demand is strong, the 
proxy index is able to pick up its effect notwithstanding its short- 
comings. 
0 
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6.3 Market Structure and the Rate of Price Adjustment 
In this section we shall report the empirical findings concerning 
the hypothesis linking market structure and the rate of price adjustment. 
Our methodology will consist of estimating the partial adjustment coef- 
ficient for each industry in our sample and then relating them to our 
indicators of industrial structure. 
The regression equations reported in the previous section of this 
chapter included a lagged dependent variable (AWPIt_l). The coefficient 
on this variable represents an estimate of (1-A), from which the partial 
adjustment coefficient X can be derived. However, as was previously 
shown, the proxy index of demand did not contribute to the explanatory 
power of the regressions and may also have incorporated some errors of 
measurement. Consequently, the regression equations which will be 
reported in this section will omit this variable. This omission imp- 
lies that the estimated partial adjustment coefficient (X). is based 
specifically on the rate of price adjustment to changes in costs. 
Nevertheless, an inspection of the adjustment coefficients obtained 
from the two sets of regressions showed that the omission of the demand 
proxy did not have a significant effect on the estimates. Thus, the 
functional specification of the regressions reported below was as follows: - 
(2) &WPIit =A+ IialittPIMFit +11021AULCit + (1-Ai)AWPIit-1 t uit 
The variables in equation '(2) above are defined in the same way as in 
equation (1) of the preceding section. The only difference in these 
two equations is the omission of the demand proxy from equation (2). 
In this section we shall also examine in some detail the overall 
fit of the equations together with the performance of the explanatory 
9 
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variables i. e. the price index of materials and fuel, the unit labour 
cost index, and the lagged dependent variable. The important innova- 
tion of our empirical analysis was the construction of an MLH-based 
price index of materials and fuel from basic data sources. It was 
felt that without this index our partial adjustment estimates would be 
somewhat imprecise. 
The analysis of the relationship between market structure and 
the rate of price adjustment will be divided in two parts. As a 
first step, we shall test our hypothesis by means of a special form 
of correlation analysis. This test involves ranking the industries 
in our'sample in descending order of concentration. Each industry 
will also be allocated an adjustment ranking based on the size of its 
estimated partial adjustment coefficient, A. The two rankings of con- 
centration and adjustment will be related to one another and the degree 
of association tested by computing the Spearman's rank correlation 
coefficient which is defined below: 
R. 1 
n 
61d. 2 
i 
n(n2-1) 
where d1 is the difference between the respective concentration and 
adjustment rank of industry i and n is the sample size. Since R 
has approximately the standard normal distribution, the statistical 
significance of the rank correlation coefficient may be verified for 
any given level of confidence. 
(1) 
Furthermore, like the conventional 
correlation coefficient, R has an upper bound of +1 and a lower bound 
of -1. It is therefore a test statistic for negative as well as posi- 
tive association between the respective ranks. 
(1) See Freund (1973), pp. 433-435. 
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This preliminary analysis is useful in two ways. First, the 
correlation coefficient provides a ready indicator of any positive or 
negative relationship which may exist between concentration and the 
rate of price adjustment. In addition however, by juxtaposing the 
partial adjustment coefficients and the concentration ratios in the 
tables on which the rank correlation test is based, we were able to 
take a closer look at the industries in our sample and to examine 
those which may represent outlying observations. In this way any 
wide discrepancies between the expected concentration and adjustment 
rankings may be investigated and explained. 
Since 1968 is closer to the median year of the 1963-1974 esti- 
mation period than either 1963 or 1971, the 1968 concentration ratios 
were used for the rank correlätion analysis. Thus we attempted to 
ensure that the concentration ratios employed represented, as closely 
as possible, an estimated average for the period from which the partial 
adjustment coefficients were derived. 
The second part of the empirical analysis will consist of a 
detailed multivariate regression analysis of the relationship between 
concentration and price adjustment.. In these quantitative tests we 
shall employ the 1963 and 1971 concentration ratios as well as the 
Herfindahl indices. 
In chapter 4 we were led to the prediction that X is positively 
related to concentration. However, in our model, the way in which 
concentration influenced search costs - the latter being the critical 
factor in determining the rate of price adjustment - was not particu- 
larly general. Consequently, we shall not attempt to derive an 
explicit functional form linking A and concentration based on our 
theoretical result. To specify such an equation directly from the 
4 
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model would render our hypothesis unduly restrictive. Thus whilst 
concentration remains the key explanatory variable in the equation, 
the preferred functional form was determined empirically. 
It should be noted that our theory defined the lower limit of 
a to be zero. Nevertheless, we expect Xi to be positive irrespec- 
tive of the level of concentration and consequently we included a 
constant term in the regression equations. The constant term rep- 
resents an estimate of the mean rate of adjustment across industries 
in the sample when the level of concentration is at its minimum. 
As will be discussed further below, we expect significant dif- 
ferences in the adjustment coefficients of the engineering and non- 
engineering industries because of the longer gestation period from 
input purchases to final deliveries in engineering sectors. To 
capture these differences we included a dummy variable in the equa- 
tions, taking the value of 1 when i is an engineering sector and 0 
otherwise. 
As was previously stated, our estimates of A relate to the 
1963-1974 period, but our indicators of concentration relate to speci- 
fic years within that period. Thus while each estimate of A repre- 
sents an average over this time, the concentration measures do not. 
Yet changes in concentration could influence I since the latter may 
vary within each industry over time. Therefore, where the data per- 
mitted, we included changes in concentration as an additional explana- 
tory variable in the equations on empirical rather than theoretical 
grounds. Our regression specification was as follows: - 
, 
(3) 
, 
X. =A+ b1CRlt + b2(CRit+a - CRit) + b3EDi + ui 
b1> 0; b2> 0; b3< 0 
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where CRit is the concentration ratio of industry i in period t and ED1 
is the engineering industry dummy. The relationship between concentration 
and the rate of adjustment was also estimated by transforming the variables 
into a semi-log, a log-linear, and a quadratic functional specification. 
In this way we were able to compare the goodness of fit of the linear and 
non-linear relationships. The quadratic specification was included in 
order to test for the presence of a turning point in the relationship. 
The ordinary least squares estimates of equation (2) for the industry 
sample revealed much the same degree of negative serial correlation as that 
which was present in the results reported in the previous section. Since 
the implications for estimation bias are identical, only the generalised 
least squares results will be considered here. 
(1) 
These results are reported in tables 6.5 and 6.6, and it is 
immediately apparent that serial correlation is no longer present in any 
of the regressions. The industry sample was divided into engineering and 
non-engineering groups on account of our a priori expectation that the 
respective adjustment coefficients come from two distinctly different 
populations. The results supported our hypothesis. The mean adjustment 
coefficient of the engineering industry group was . 34909 whilst that of 
the non-engineering group was . 6215. The statistical significance of this 
difference in the means was confirmed by a t-test (t = 2.2876). 
From table 6.5 it can be seen that the constant term was in no case 
significantly different from zero, a result which is consistent with our 
" expectation. The price index of materials and fuel had a statistically 
significant impact on output price adjustments in every one of the 
(1) The ordinary least squares results are reported in appendix tables 
A. 3 and A. 4. 
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nine equations. However, the unit labour cost variable did not perform 
so well, being statistically significant in six equations only. Its 
relatively poorer performance may have resulted from the errors of 
measurement caused by using SIC-order data for MLH industry estimates. 
The coefficients on the lagged dependent variable, representing the 
estimates of (1-ai), were statistically significant and showed a widely 
diverging partial adjustment structure. 
Table 6.6 presents a very similar picture. With only one excep- 
tion the constant term in the equations was not significantly different 
from zero. The single exception was the Man-made fibres industry equa- 
tion in which the constant term was negative and statistically signifi- 
cant. We would explain this result in terms of the influence of 
technical progress on output prices. It is well known that this indus- 
try has experienced considerable technical innovation during our esti- 
mation period, both in product specification and production methods. 
This technological trend is therefore reflected in a downward trend of 
output prices, although in the remaining industries it was adequately 
captured through the allowance made in labour costs for the growth of 
productivity. 
(1) 
As in table 6.5, the price index of materials and fuel had a stati- 
stically significant impact on output price changes in all twelve equa- 
tions and unit labour costs in nine equations only. The partial 
adjustment coefficients of this sample displayed considerable varia- 
bility and in two cases they were insignificantly different from zero 
implying instantaneous price adjustment i. e. A-1. One interesting 
result was that. the estimated coefficient for the Abrasives industry 
was negative and statistically significant thus implying that. A was 
significantly greater than one - its theoretical upper bound. The 
(1) It should be noted that our unit labour cost index was based on an 
SIC-order,. and not an MLH level of aggregation. 
- 144 - 
industry is highly concentrated and therefore this result may be 
explained in terms of rapid price adjustments which reflect full or 
over compensation for cost increases based on inflationary expecta- 
tions. 
Having estimated the adjustment coefficients we are now able 
to relate them to concentration. However, it should be emphasised 
that the estimates of A are based on a period when the trend was one 
of increasing inflation. Hence our coefficients apply essentially 
to upward movements in prices. Tables 6.7 and 6.8 report the-1968 
mean concentration ratios, the partial adjustment coefficients, and 
the respective rankings for the engineering and non-engineering 
industries. The correlation coefficients are given at the bottom 
of the tables. The figures in brackets represent the unweighted 
mean concentration ratios and their corresponding rankings. 
Taking the engineering industries sample first in table 6.7., it 
can be seen that the rank correlation coefficient based on the weigh- 
ted means was . 6500 and hence was in accord with our hypothesis. The 
coefficient based on the unweighted means was somewhat smaller at 
. 6000. Furthermore, both correlation coefficients were statistically 
significant at the 5% level, as testified by the z-ratios. 
Turning next to the non-engineering industry sample in table 6.8, 
it can be seen that the coefficients of rank correlation based on the 
weighted and unweighted means were, respectively, . 5839 and . 5717. 
Both coefficients were statistically significant at the 5% level. 
From these preliminary results and notwithstanding our reserva- 
tions concerning the 1968 measures of concentration, the hypothesis 
of a positive association between concentration and rate of price 
adjustment appears to be given some support. A more precise, 
a 
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Table 6.7 : 1968 Concentration Ratios, Adjustment Coefficients and Rankings: 
Engineering Industries 
MLH Industry Description 
1968 Mean 
Concentration 
Ratios (%) 
Industry 
Structure 
Ranking 
Partial 
Adjustment 
Coefficient 
Adjustment 
Ranking 
363 Telephone & 97.2 (98.2) 1 (1). . 4714 2 
Telegraph 
362 Insulated Wires & 87.2 (89.3) 3 (2) . 3058 5.5 
Cables 
365/2 Broadcast Receiving 89.6 (84.6) 2 (3) . 6054 1 
Equipment 
368 Domestic Electrical 81.4 (78.5) 4 (4) . 3602 3 
Appliances 
369 Other Electrical 74.7 (73) 5.5 (5) . 3068 5.5 
Goods 
361 Electrical Machinery 75.5 (71.2) 5.5 (6) . 1751 9 
339/1 Mining Machinery 59.1(59.1) 7 (7) . 2926 7 
333 Pumps, Valves, 40.1 (40.2) 8.5 (8.5) . 3378 4 
Compressors etc. 
'332 Metal Working Machine 40 (39.2) 8.5 (8.5) . 2863 8 
Tools 
Rank Correlation Coefficient: weighted means: 0.6500 
(1.8385) 
unweighted means: 0.6000 
(1.6971) 
Notes: denotes a concentration ratio specific to the industry. as defined 
by the three or four-digit classification in the left hand'column 
of the table. Figures in brackets refer to the unweighted mean 
concentration ratios and their corresponding, rankings. Figures 
in brackets under the correlation coefficients denote z ratios. 
The weights used in calculating the mean concentration ratios were 
the values of sales by product groups published in the Census 
tables. Rankings which do not appear as whole numbers occur where 
two industries are given equal rank. 
Source: Report on the Census of Production 1968. ' Summary Tables H. M. S. O. 1974. 
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Table 6.8 : 1968 Concentration Ratios, Adjustment Coefficients and Rankings: 
Non-Engineering Industries 
MLH Industry Description 
1968 Mean 
Concentration 
Ratios (%) 
Industry 
Structure 
Ranking 
Partial 
Adjustment 
Coefficient 
Adjustment 
Ranking 
411 Man-made Fibres 100. E (100)ß, t 1 (1)' 1,0000 2.5 
469/1 Abrasives 88.8 (88.3) 2 (2) 1.3956 1 
462 Pottery 76 (80.7) 3 (3) . 6233 4.5 
461 Bricks & Refractory 61 (62.5) 4.5 (4) . 5014 7 
Goods 
272/1 Pharmaceutical 61 (61)S: 4.5 (5) . 3877 10 
Chemicals 
274 Paint 53.8 (57.8) 6 (6) . 3933 9 
419 Carpets & Rugs 51.7 (51.7) 7 (7) . 5618 6 
473 Bedding & Soft 45.1(45.1)" 8.5 (8) . 4002 8 
Furnishing 
414 Woollen 
.& 
Worsted 40.7 (39) 10 (10) . 6248 4.5 
422/1 Household Textiles 44.7 (39) 8.5 (9) 1.0000 2.5 
272/2 Pharmaceutical 34.9Y(34.9)* 11.5 (11.5) . 2189 12 
Preparations 
483 Manufactured 35.2(35.2)' 11.5 (11.5) . 3506 11 
Stationery 
Rank Correlation Coefficient: weighted means: 0.5839 
(1.9366) 
unweighted means; 0.5717 
(1.8961) 
:s 
Notes: denotes a concentration ratio specific to the industry as defined 
by the three or four digit classification in the left hand column of 
the table. Figures, in brackets refer to the unweighted mean concen- 
tration ratios and their corresponding rankings. Figures in brackets 
under the correlation coefficients denote z ratios. The weights used 
in calculating the mean concentration ratios were the values of sales' 
by product groups published in the Census tables. Rankings which do 
not appear as whole numbers occur where two industries are given equal 
rank. 
Source: Report on the Census of Production 1968. Summary Tables H. M. S. O. 1974. 
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quantitative analysis of this relationship follows as the next step. 
However, before proceeding we should draw attention to the 
following points. First, our correlation test was based on concen- 
tration ratios measured at a specific point in time. No allowance 
was made for the potential effect of changes in concentration on the 
partial adjustment coefficients. This is particularly relevant in 
the context of the results in table 6.8. In the case of the House- 
hold Textiles industry there was an extremely large discrepancy 
between the adjustment and concentration rankings. This would indi- 
cate a non-positive association between concentration and the rate of 
adjustment for this industry, but the discrepancy may stem from the 
fact that since 1968 there have been many important mergers in this 
industry. These mergers and the associated changes in industrial 
structure may have influenced the rate of adjustment over time. 
Therefore, the 1968 concentration ratio would be a poor indicator of 
industry structure where considerable change had taken place. On 
the other hand, many mergers occurred in industries which were already 
highly concentrated prior to their incidence. In these sectors the 
observed changes in concentration during this period will therefore 
be small. 
") 
Nevertheless, in the regression analysis which follows, changes 
in concentration will be included as an additional explanatory vari- 
able in order to estimate their influence, if any, on the rate of 
adjustment. Moreover, section 6.4 below will examine in some detail 
the specific effect of important mergers on the price adjustment pro- 
cess. The analysis will attempt to identify any structural breaks 
(1) For example, the weighted mean concentration ratio for the Domestic 
Electrical Appliances industry rose from 75.4% in 1963 to 81.4% 
in 1968 even though some important mergers took place in this 
sector. 
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in the adjustment process which may have taken place during the esti- 
mation period. 
In addition, this period saw two important phases when Government 
institutions designed to regulate and control price increases were set 
up. We refer to the National Board for Prices and Incomes created by 
the Labour Government in 1965 and abolished in March 1971, and the 
Price Commission which was set up by the Conservative Government in 
1973. There were also two periods of statutory prices and incomes 
standstill, the first following the sterling crisis of 1966 and the 
second under stage I of the Counter-Inflation programme which lasted 
from November 1972 until April 1973. Nevertheless, under both stand- 
still phases price increases were allowed where firms experienced 
rapid increases in cost. 
It is not clear, however, in what way the impact of these insti- 
tutions and statutory regulations will influence our empirical findings. 
It is commonly believed that price controls operate more effectively 
in concentrated industries because the monitoring activity of price 
controlling institutions is facilitated when relatively few firms 
account for a large part of the industry's output. 
It is clear that within each industry the rate of price adjust- 
ment can be partially controlled by these institutions. Yet it is 
not possible to capture their direct effect in our analysis. However, 
if the hypothesis mentioned above is correct then should the empirical 
results indicate a positive relationship between A and concentration, 
the validity of the findings would be strengthened. This will be so 
because such a result would suggest that the activity of price con- 
trolling institutions is not as effective in delaying oligopolistic 
price increases as market fragmentation is in delaying those of 
a 
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competitive firms. 
We now turn to the regression analysis linking concentration 
with the rate of price adjustment. The regression results based on 
equations were estimated using different measures of concentration. 
the linear specification are reported in table 6.9. Five alternative 
In equations (1) and (4) the concentration change during the 1963-1968 
period was included as an additional explanatory variable. 
Taking equation (1) first, we note that the constant term was 
positive but not statistically significant. The 1963 concentration 
ratio had a positive and statistically significant effect on the rate 
of price adjustment (X). The estimated coefficient implies that for 
every percentage point increase in concentration the partial adjust- 
went coefficient will increase by 0.0075. This is a plausible order 
of magnitude. The change in concentration between 1963 and 1968 was 
statistically insignificant from zero, although it had the expected 
i. e. positive sign. As will be discussed further below, this result 
suggests that the concentration change during this period was either 
too small or that its relatively long lag means that its influence on 
the adjustment rates could not be quantified with our data. The 
engineering industry dummy gave a negative and statistically signifi- 
cant coefficient thus confirming our earlier prediction. This coef- 
ficient shows that on average, the adjustment rate in engineering 
sectors is considerably lower than in non-engineering sectors. 
Equation (2) presented a very similar picture. Again, the 
constant term was positive but not statistically significant. The 
coefficient on the 1968 concentration ratio was 0.0076 - almost 
identical in size to the coefficient on the 1963 concentration ratio - 
and was also statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 6.9 Partial Adjustment and Industrial Structure* 
Dependent Variable: Partial Adjustment Coefficient (X) 
Linear specification. Twenty one industries sample 
Explanatory 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)t 
(5)f 
Constant 0.1782 0.1852 0.3141 0.5191 0.5180 
(1.0662) (1.1614) (2.3464) (5.9815) (6.2056) 
CR63 0.0075 
(2.9143) 
_CR ] 
E CR 0.0091 68 63 (1.1433) 
CR6 0.0076 8 (3.0069) 
CR71 0.0066 
(2.6734) 
H 63 
2.1453 
(2.3395) 
[H68-H63] 2.3986 
(1.1611) 
H68 2.1913 
(2.7774) 
Engineering Dummy -0.3821 -0.3775 -0.3549 -0.3649 -0.3630 
(-3.4144) (-3.5339) (-3.2526) (-3.2346) (-3.3638) 
R2 0.4770 0.4756 0.4361 0.5175 0.5171 
F Statistic 5.17 8.16 
. 
6.96 5.36 8.57 
* t-ratios are given in parentheses. 
CR63 1963 industry concentration ratio, being a- weighted mean (weighted 
by sales) of component concentration ratios published in the Report 
on the 1968 Census of Production H. M. S. O. 1974. 
CR68 1968 industry concentration ratio derived in the same manner as 
CR63 using the same data sources. 
CR71 1971 industry concentration ratio by MLH groups published in the 
Summary tables of the 1971 Census of Production. H. M. S. O. 1976. 
H63 Estimate of the 1963 Herfindahl index calculated by M. Waterson 
from employment data published in the 1968 Census Report. 
H. M. S. O. 1976. 
H68 Estimate of the 1968 Herf indahl index compiled in the same way as 
H63' 
t In regression (4) and (5) two sample observations were omitted 
(MLH 365/2 and 483) because the Herfindahl index was unavailable 
for these industries. 
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In equation (3), the key explanatory variable was the 1971 con- 
centration ratio which, unlike the 1963 and 1968 measures, was not an 
estimate but applied directly at MLH level of aggregation. It is 
therefore-interesting to note that the coefficient on this variable 
was not only positive and statistically significant, but at 0.0066 it 
was not much smaller than the corresponding coefficients obtained in 
equations(l) and (2). This result would suggest that the relation- 
ship between concentration and the rate of adjustment is independent 
of minor differences in the measurement of concentration. 
As a further test of the hypothesis we regressed the adjustment 
coefficients on M. Waterson's estimates of the Herfindahl index of 
concentration for 1963 and 1968. The results are reported in columns 
(4) and (5) of the table. The coefficient on Hfi3 was positive and 
statistically significant. However at 2.1453 it was much larger than 
the coefficients obtained when using the concentration. ratios. This 
can be explained by reference to the fact that the Herfindahl index is 
measured on a scale between zero and one, whilst the concentration ratio 
may range from just above zero to one hundred. As for equation (1), 
the coefficient on the change in the. Herfindahl index (H68 - H63) was 
positive but not statistically significant. 
Looking at equation (5) we. note that the coefficient on H68 was 
almost of equal size to the one on H63, and was statistically significant. 
The results obtained for the engineering industry dummy coeffici- 
ents were remarkably consistent in the five equations. They were 
negative and statistically significant in every case, and were restricted 
to between -0.3549 and -0.3821. The F ratios confirmed the statisti- 
cal significance of the regressions. 
I 
0 
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The semi-log regressions reported in table 6.10 gave as good a statis- 
tical fit as that of the linear specification. The coefficients on all the 
concentration ratios were statistically significant at the 5% level, and 
those in equations (1) and (2) indicated that every percentage point increase 
in the concentration ratio raises the partial adjustment coefficient by 14 
percent. As before, the concentration change did not have a discernable 
impact on the speed of adjustment. 
Turning to the log-linear results reported in table 6.11, it would 
appear that, although broadly similar, these regressions did not provide 
as high a degree of explanatory power as either the linear or the semi-log 
equations. In particular, the Herfindahl measures of concentration no 
longer had a statistically significant impact on the rate of adjustment 
and, furthermore, in equations (3), (4), and (5) the significance of the 
regressions, as measured by the r statistic, was much reduced. 
Finally, the quadratic functional form did not yield statistically 
significant estimates of the relationship between concentration and the 
rate of adjustment. Since this specification is clearly inappropriate, 
the results will not be reported here. 
(') 
To sum up, our results indicate that a consistently positive and 
significant relationship exists between industrial concentration and the 
rate of price adjustment. The results are given added support by the 
fact that the relationship is invariant with respect to the type of con- 
centration index which was used and the year in which it was measured. 
However, our findings raise one important question. Given that 
the 1963-1974 period saw considerable merger activity leading to 
substantial increases of concentration in some sectors, how can this 
be reconciled with our findings that changes in concentration did not 
(1) These results are reported in the appendix. 
6 
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Table 6.10 Partial Adjustment and Industrial Structure 
Dependent Variable: Partial Adjustment Coefficient(Log 
Semi-Log Specification. Twenty one industries sample 
Explanatory 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4)t (5)t 
Constant -1.3272 -1.3253 -1.0745 -0.7517 -0.7535 
(-4.7193) (-4.9463) (-4.6557) (-5.1328) (-5.3498 
CR63 0.0125 
(2.8732) 
[cR 
-cR 
] 0.0129 68 63 (0.9594) 
CR68 0.0125 
(2.9606) 
CR71 0.0102 
(2.3762) 
H63 3.1849 
(2.0585) 
-H ] [H 3.5983' 68 63 (1.0323) 
H68 3.2599 
(2.4490) 
Engineering -0.6771 -0.6759 -0.6285 -0.6716 -0.6684 
Dummy (-3.5961). (-3.7653) (-3.3405) (-3.5275) (-3.6707) 
R2 0.4933 0.4933 0.4265 0.5250 0.5247 
F Statistic 5.52 8.76 6.69 5.53 8.83 
* t-ratios are given in parentheses. 
CR63 1963 industry concentration ratio, being a weighted mean (weighted 
by sales) of component concentration ratios published in the Report 
on the 1968 Census of Production H. M. S. O. 1974. 
-CR68 1968 industry concentration ratio derived in the same manner as 
CR63 using the same data sources. 
CR71 1971 industry concentration ratio by MLH groups published in the 
Summary tables of the 1971 Census of Production. H. M. S. O. 1976. 
H63 Estimate of the 1963 Herfindahl index calculated by M. Waterson 
from employment data published in the 1968 Census Report. 
H. M. S. O. 1976. 
H68 Estimate of the 1968 Herfindahl index compiled in the same way as 
H63' 
t In regressions (4) and (5) two sample observations were omitted 
(MLH 365/2 and 483) because the Herfindahl index was unavailable. 
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Table 6.11 Partial Adjustment and Industrial Structure* 
Dependent Variable: Partial Adjustment Coefficient (Log X) 
Log-linear specification. Twenty-one industries sample 
Explanatory 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)t 
(5)t 
Constant -3.5729 -3.5630 -2.2841 -0.2017 -0.1253 
(-3.2126) (-3.3495) (-2.6046) (-0.5095) (-0.3473) 
Log CR63 0.7414 
(2.7075) 
Log [cR /CR ] 0.7771 68 53 (0.9842) 
Log CR68 0.7399 
(2.7981) 
Log CR71 0.4473 
(1.9357) 
Log H63 0.1249 
(1.1746) 
Log[H68/H6 0.3443 
J (0.5439) 
Log H 0.1337 68 
'(1.3022) 
Engineering Dummy -0.6709 -0.6693 -0.6049 -0.6264 -0.6396 
(-3.5155) (-3.6628) (-3.0935) (-3.0037) (-3.1599) 
R2 0.4750 0.4750 0.3764 0.4202 0.4091 
F Statistic 5.13 8.14 5.43 3.62 5.54 
* t-ratios are given in parentheses 
CR63 1963 industry concentration ratio, being a weighted mean (weighted 
by sales) of component concentration ratios published in the Report 
on the 1968 Census of Production H. M. S. O. 1974. 
CR68 1968 industry concentration ratio derived in the same manner as 
CR63 using the same data sources. 
CR71 1971 industry concentration ratio by MLH groups published in the 
Summary tables of the 1971 Census of Production. H. M. S. O. 1976. 
H63 Estimate of the 1963 Herfindahl index calculated by M. Waterson 
from employment data published in the 1968 Census Report. 
H. M. S. O. 1976. 
H 68 Estimate of the 1968 Herfindahl index compiled in the same way as 
H63. 
t In regression (4) and (5) two sample observations were omitted (MLH 365/2 and 483) because the Herfindahl index was unavailable. 
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influence the adjustment coefficient, A? We would suggest that this result 
is due, in part, to the deficiencies in the measurement of concentration 
change. Since our variable only covered the period from 1963 to 1968, any 
mergers which took place after 1968 and which had influenced market 
structure would not have been captured. Consequently, it is likely that 
we would have generally underestimated the degree of concentration change 
by using this variable in the regression analysis. In addition, several 
mergers. took place in industries which were already highly concentrated 
prior to the merger. Hence in these sectors the observed change in 
concentration could be very small, notwithstanding the incidence of. sig- 
nificant mergers. It is also possible that the time lag between changes 
in concentration and its impact on A may be fairly long, so that it may 
take several years before the effect of an increase in concentration 
leads to a change in the price adjustment behaviour of the industry. 
However, since the relationship between the level of industrial 
concentration and the rate of adjustment was clearly established, the 
effect of mergers which lead to increases in concentration must 
ultimately be to increase the rate of price adjustment. Nevertheless, 
in the subsequent section we shall investigate the influence. of mergers 
on the price adjustment process. In particular, we shall examine whether 
any significant structural breaks in the price adjustment process of a 
sub-sample of industries can be traced back to important mergers. This 
question is of interest because mergers could have an impact on indus- 
trial pricing behaviour which would not be observed if concentration 
increased more gradually through internal growth. Furthermore, in view 
of the fact that the rate of inflation had' accelerated rapidly in the 
latter part of our estimation period, a structural break in the adjust- 
ment process could have taken place simply on account of newly formed 
inflationary expectations. 
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6.4 Structural Breaks in the Price Adjustment Process 
If we accept that mergers are positively related to increases in 
industrial concentration('), then it is of some interest to examine 
whether mergers which have a significant impact on industrial structure 
also lead to an eventual change in the price adjustment process. In 
this section we shall attempt to identify and analyse structural breaks 
in the price adjustment equations of industries which have experienced 
significant merger activity. 
An essential prerequisite for this analysis was a measure of 
changes in industrial concentration, over selected time periods, which 
would permit the identification of mergers with a significant impact 
on the industry. In effect, the major problem with this analysis lay 
in the inadequacy of the data. The problem arose because of the non- 
comparability of the two sets of concentration ratios at our disposal. 
The ones available were for the years 1963,1968,1970, and 1972, *and 
so would appear to provide considerable scope for measuring changes in 
concentration. However, the 1963 and 1968 concentration ratios are not 
comparable with those for 1970 and 1972 because the two sets are based 
on different levels of industry aggregation. Thus we can evaluate 
changes in concentration between 1963 and 1968 or 1970 and 1972, but 
cannot do so between 1968 and 1970 or 1972. 
The non-comparability of these concentration ratios restricted 
our ability to measure changes in industrial structure which could be 
used to identify significant mergers. As most of the important mergers 
which affected the industries in our sample occurred in the late 1960's 
and early 1970's, if we were to use the 1963-1968 concentration changes 
(1) For evidence see Hart, Utton, and Walshe (1973), and Stoneman (1976). 
I 
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as the basis for identifying significant mergers we would run the risk of 
omitting important ones which took place after 1968. 
To safeguard against such omissions we selected our sample of indus- 
tries on the basis of two criteria: - the incidence of important mergers 
in terms of the asset size of the taken-over firm, and the change in 
concentration from 1963 to 1968 and 1970 to 1972. 
The sample which was selected for our analysis comprised six indus- 
tries, four of which had experienced important mergers, with an increase 
in concentration of at least 20% during the estimation period. The 
remaining two industries did not belong to this category but were included 
for purposes of comparison, that is, in'order to ascertain whether any 
structural breaks are confined to industries with significant mergers or 
are due to more general factors such as changes in the overall rate of 
inflation. 
To test for the significance of structural breaks in the equations 
we used the familiar "Chow Test"('). The data set was divided in two 
parts so as to obtain two separate estimates of the price adjustment 
equations in the two sub-periods. If the first period comprised m obser- 
vations and the latter period n observations, then the r statistic which 
was used to test for structural breaks was defined as: 
[e2 21 
F(p, m+n-2p) m+n m -le nt 
/p 
2] [e2 
Ä+ 
len / [m+n2p] 
where lemtn, lee, and let are the residual sum of squares of the regressions 
using m+n, in, and n observations respectively. The number of estimated 
parameters in the equations is given by p. Since F has an "F" distribution 
with p and mtn-2p degrees of freedom, if it exceeded the critical value 
for a predetermined level of confidence we rejected the null hypothesis of 
(1) For a discussion of this methodology see Johnston (1972), Chapter 6. 
0 
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no structural break in favour of the alternative hypothesis. This result 
would indicate that the adjustment process in the post-merger period was 
significantly different from that in the first period. 
The industries selected for the analysis, with their respective 
concentration changes are reported in table 6.12 below. 
Table 6.12 Changes in Concentration 
MLH Industry Description 
1963-1968 * % Concentration Change 
1970-1972 
$ Concentration Changet 
422/1 Household Textiles 20 83 
339/1 Mining Machinery 40 10 
368 Domestic Electrical 8 20 
Appliances 
411 Man-made Fibres 0 -3 
419 Carpets and Rugs 21 14 
469/1 Abrasives 6 -3 
* Based on the weighted concentration ratios reported in the appendix. 
fi From the Report on the Census of Production 1970 and 1972, Summary 
Tables. 
The Household Textiles industry, traditionally fragmented, was sub- 
jected to a large number of mergers during the 1960's, a particularly 
significant one being that between Courtaulds and Ashton Brothers Ltd., 
in the second quarter of 1968. The value of the assets taken over was 
Ill. 2 million. 
In the Mining Machinery industry the important merger was between 
the Dowty Engineering group and Anderson-Morris Ltd. in the second 
quarter of 1970, with the assets acquired valued at 119 million. However, 
by far the largest merger in our sample was that between GEC and English 
Electric in the Domestic Electrical Appliance industry. The value of the 
assets taken over was 1417 million. This merger took place in the second 
quarter of 1968. 
The Man-made Fibres and Abrasives industries, although highly con- 
centrated, did not experience any significant takeovers or changes in 
concentration during the relevant period. In the Carpets industry an 
important merger took place in the second quarter of 1969 between 
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the Guthrie Corporation and James Templeton Ltd. with the assets of 
the acquired company valued at 114.1 million. 
Before reporting our results it should be stressed that our 
analysis did not aim at identifying the quarter when the structural 
change took place, but only at determining whether one had occurred 
in the post-merger period. 
Our methodology was therefore to allow a period of six months 
after the merger had taken place as the basis for splitting up the 
sample period. Thus, in the case of the Mining Machinery industry 
with an important merger in the second quarter of 1970, the early 
estimation period was from 1963 I to 1970 IV and the post-merger 
estimation period was from 1971 I to 1974 IV. For those industries 
which had not experienced any significant mergers the estimation 
period was divided as follows: 1963 1 to 1968 IV and 1969 1 to 
1974 IV. 
In tables 6.13 and 6.14 both ordinary and generalised least squares 
estimates are reported on account of the potential bias associated 
with serial correlation in the regressions. However, only the esti- 
mated coefficients on the lagged dependent variable are reported 
since the remainder are of no relevance to this analysis. As these 
coefficients represent the estimates of (1 -ai) the implied values 
of ai are also reported in the tables. 
From table 6.13'it can be seen that the adjustment coefficient of 
the Household Textiles industry increased from . 4873 
in the early 
period to 1.279 -a value which is greater than its theoretical upper 
bound of unity. This suggests that during the post-merger period 
the price adjustment process in this industry involved an element of 
overcompensation for cost increases based, perhaps, on inflationary 
expectations. 
6 
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Table 6.13 Split Period Estimates of the Price Adjustment Coefficients: 
Variable Periods 
Industry Estimation AWPIt-1 4WPI 
- 
Implied F(4,36) 
Description Period (OLSQ) 
t 1 
(GLSQ) A 
1963 1-1968 IV 0.4571 0.5127 . 4873 Household (2.9697) (4.0822) 
4 77? 9 Textiles . 
(422/1) 1969 I-1974 IV -0.2889 -0.2791 1.2791 
(-1.9749) (-2.4387) 
1963 I-1970 IV 0.5889 -0.6625 . 3375 Mining (3.8189) (4.5731) 
Machiner 2.97h y 
(339/1) 1971 I-1974 IV 0.5886 0.7276 . 2724, (3.1189) (6.6859) 
Domestic 1963 I-1968 IV 0.0028 0.0880 1.000 
Electrical (0.0139) (0.4284) 0.32 
Appliances 
(368) 1969 I-1974 IV 0.6496 0.6613 . 3387 (4.2928) (4.4191) 
1963 1-1968 IV -0.1022 0.3549 . 6451 Man-made (-0.4672) (1.8089) ' 
" fibres 
4.64 = 
(411) 1969 I-1974 IV -0.0349 -0.0365 1.000 
(-0.5022) (-0.5230) 
1963 I-1969 IV -0.0649 -0.0616 1.000 
Carpets and (-0.2941) (-0.2732) 
Ru s (419) 2.85* g 
1970 1-1974 IV 0.2963 0.3197 . 6803 (1.9224) (2.3105) 
1963 I-1968 IV -0.0196 0.2654 . 7346 Abrasives (-0.0934) (1.4514) 
(469/1) 0.79 
1969 1-1974 IV -0.3969 -0.4367 1.4367 
(-2.4533) (-2.7532) 
Notes: t- ratios in parentheses 
denotes a significant r statistic at the 5% level. 
NPI: Wholesale Price Index. 
OLSQ: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates. 
GLSQ: Generalised Least Squares Estimates. 
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What is curious, however, is that the adjustment coefficient of the Mining 
Machinery, Domestic Electrical Appliances and the Carpets industry actually 
decreased in the later estimation period. This drop was from . 3375 to 
. 2724 in the case of the Mining Machinery industry, and from unity to . 3387 
and . 6803 in the case of the Domestic Electrical Appliances and the Carpets 
industry respectively. Furthermore, the r ratio was statistically signifi- 
cant at the 5% level in two out of the three cases. 
(') 
These results are puzzling and contrary to our a priori expectations, 
but they are open to an alternative interpretation. Consider, for example, 
the change in the Wholesale Price Index of Domestic Electrical Appliances 
during the 1963 to 1974 period. Between 1963 and 1966 this index rose by 
only 2.6% and, similarly, by only 2.1% in the next three years. By contrast, 
between 1969 and 1971 the index rose by 17.6%, and from 1972 to 1974 by 
24.2%. It is clear from these figures that the rate of price increase from 
1963 to 1968 was extremely small compared to the rate prevailing in the 1969 
to 1974 period. Hence the period stretching from 1969 onwards represents a 
very different history of price movements than the six years which preceded 
it. The marked divergence of the rate of price increase between the two 
periods was also evident in the Mining Machinery industry, and to a lesser 
extent in the'Carpets industry. 
Therefore, these results may be explained by suggesting that, regarding 
these three industries, the absolute magnitude of the desired rate of 
(1) The F test concerns the break in the overall relationship and is not 
specific to individual parameter changes. However, since a productivity 
trend was incorporated in the equations, we would not expect structural 
breaks to be associated with changes in the cost coefficients. 
0 
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adjustment in the 1963 - 1968 period was so small that the costs of 
instantaneous adjustment were negligible and that therefore firms in 
these industries found it expedient to pass on the entire increase 
in price during the current quarter. Although this type of behaviour 
was not specifically discussed in the theoretical analysis it is intui- 
tively plausible that for extremely small changes in the rate of price- 
adjustment the costs of adjustment are effectively ignored. Thus in 
these situations a distributed lag structure of price adjustments 
would not be observed since changes would be effected instantaneously. 
It is clear that the type of behaviour described above is consistent 
with the estimated coefficients which were obtained. 
Turning to the Man-made Fibres industry it can be seen from 
table 6.13 that the* estimated adjustment coefficient rose from . 6451 
to 1.000 and that the F ratio was statistically significant thus indi- 
cating a structural break in the equation. The coefficient of the 
Abrasives industry rose from . 7346 in the early period to 1.436 
in 
the later period but the F ratio was not statistically significant 
at the 5% level. 
What may be concluded from the results presented so far? The 
results do not reveal a consistent set of reactions to merger activity 
and changes in the rate of inflation. Furthermore, in view of the 
fact that three industries in our sample showed a reduction of the 
adjustment coefficient in the later period it is evident that the 
sample observations used to obtain the pre- and post-merger adjustment 
coefficients are not strictly comparable. This is so because the 
early estimation period was characterised by relatively moderate price 
increases whilst in the later period all the industries in the sample 
had moved into the double figure inflation phase. The marked difference 
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in economic conditions in the two periods may influence the adjustment 
behaviour of firms and consequently render our comparisons somewhat 
unreliable. More specifically in periods of rapid inflation firms 
may increase their partial adjustment coefficient so as to shorten the 
lag between cost and price increases. They would do so because in 
times of inflation, lagging behind cost increases could lead to severe 
short-run liquidity problems. Therefore it may be that the observed 
increases in the adjustment coefficients in table 6.13 are influenced , 
to a greater extent by the overall rate of inflation in the 1969-1974 
period than by the incidence of mergers. 
It is particularly interesting that the two industries which ex- 
hibited an increase in the adjustment coefficient and had a statisti- 
cally significant F ratio were characterised by either a high increase 
in concentration (Household Textiles) or an existing high level of 
concentration (Ilan-made Fibres). This evidence suggests that in con- 
junction with inflation both a high level as well as a large increase 
in concentration have a similar effect in reducing the lag of adjust- 
ment. 
In order to improve the comparability of our adjustment coeffici- 
ents we re-estimated the equations by splitting up the period from 
1968 to 1974 into one extending from 1968 1 to 1971 II and the other 
from 1971 III to 1974 IV. This sample breakdown was used for all 
six industries because the small number of observations did not permit 
changing the estimation period to take into account the date of a 
merger. Nevertheless, since the earliest relevant merger was that of 
GEC and English Electric in the second quarter of 1968 we can be con- 
fident that the adjustment coefficients estimated from 1968 1 to 1971 II 
would not have been influenced by the merger. More important, since 
.ý 
r 
E 
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both estimation periods lie within the higher inflation phase. the 
comparison of adjustment coefficients will not be subject to those 
problems of interpretation discussed above. 
From table 6.14 in which the results based on these alternative 
estimation periods are reported, it can be seen that the adjustment 
coefficient of the Household Textiles industry rose from unity to 
1.402 -*i. e. to a value greater than its theoretical upper bound. 
In addition the F ratio indicated a statistically significant struc- 
tural break in the equation. Moreover, since the estimate based on 
the 1968 1 to 1971,11 period was unity this indicates that the process 
of increasing the rate of price adjustment was already well under way 
by the early 1970's. The increase in the coefficient to a value 
greater than unity may be explained in terms of inflationary expec- 
tation and an attempt by the industry to increase price-cost margins 
over time, so that when met with cost increases prices were raised 
by a greater amount than that required to restore former price-cost 
margins. 
In contrast to the results based on the 1963 - 1968 and 1969 - 
1974 estimation periods, the adjustment coefficient of both the 
Mining Machinery and the Domestic Electrical Appliances industry did 
rise somewhat as can be observed in table 6.14 although the F ratios 
did not indicate a structural break in the equations. Since the 
mergers took place in 1970 1 and 1968 II respectively, these results 
{ 
would suggest that the mergers did not lead to a significant change 
in the price adjustment process. Furthermore they suggest that these 
industries did not respond to an accelerating rate of inflation with 
a substantial increase of their adjustment coefficients. They also 
support our hypothesis regarding the observed drop in the coefficients 
ýý I 
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Table 6.14 Split Period Estimates of the Price Adjustment Coefficients: 
(1968 1- 1971 II, 1971 III - 1974 IV) 
Industry Estimation AWPIt-1 AWPIt-1 Implied F(4,18) 
Description Period (OLSQ) (GLSQ) 
X 
1968 I-1971 II -0.4799 0.1846 1.000 
Household (-0.1550) (0.7528) 3.35* 
T i ext les 
(422/1) 1971 III-1974 IV -0.3699 -0.4023 1.4023 
(-2.0358) (-5.6413) 
1968 1-1971 II 0.6931 0.7585 0.2415 
Mining (3.0769) (4.5066) 2.43 
hi M ac nery 
(339/1) 1971 III-1974 IV 0.5658 0.7358 0.2642 
(3.0819) (5.5480) 
Domestic 1968 I-1971 II 0.5618 0.8991 
0.1009 
Electrical 
(2.1683) (6.2733) 2.34 
Appliances 
(368) 1971 III-1974 IV 0.6769 0.7366 0.2634 (3.7975) (4.1605) 
1968 1-1971 II -0.0476 0.4439 . 5561 
Man-made (-0.2305) (2.2265) 2.25 
fib res 
(411) 1971 III-1974 IV -0.0441 -0.0445 1.000 
(-0.5313) (-0.5110) 
1968 I-1971 II -0.2972 -0.2699 1.000 
Carpets and (-0.9787) (-0.9879) 1.48 
R (419) ugs 
1971 I1I-1974 IV 0.3547 0.3505 . 6495 
(1.6501) (1.9294) 
1968 I-1971 II -0.1838 0.0370 1.000 
Abrasives (-0.5789) (0.1349) 1.63 (469/1) 
1971 II1-1974 IV -0.5337 -0.5198 1.5198 
(-2.7816) (-2.4737) 
Notes: t- ratios in parentheses 
denotes a significant F statistic at the 5% level. 
" WPI: Wholesale Price Index. 
OLSQ: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates. 
GLSQ: Generalised Least Squares Estimates. 
i 
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reported in table 6.13 which was discussed above. 
The coefficient of the Ilan-made Fibres industry increased from 
. 5561 to unity and that of the Abrasives industry from 1.000 to 
1.5798. 
By contrast, the coefficient of the Carpets industry fell from 1.000 to 
. 6495 in the later period. In all three cases the F ratio was not 
statistically significant at the 5% level. It is interesting to note 
that both the Ilan-made Fibres and the Abrasives industry are highly 
concentrated while the Carpets industry is not. Thus the two increases 
in the adjustment coefficient teere observed in concentrated industries 
whilst the only case of a decrease in the coefficient was in an industry 
of moderate concentration. 
In conclusion, the following tentative inferences may be drawn. 
On the one hand it would appear, that concentrated industries are more 
successful at raising their rate of price adjustment in times of infla- 
tion, as suggested by the results in table 6.14. Also, the adjustment 
coefficients of the Household Textile industry in table 6.13 would 
suggest that rapid increases in concentration through merger activity 
may have the same effect on the adjustment process. On the other hand 
the results in table 6.13 would also indicate that when faced with very 
small increases in prices, firms may abandon the partial adjustment 
process in favour of full price increases in the current period. The 
rationale for such behaviour is that since in such circumstances the 
costs of price adjustment are negligible, they may therefore be ignored 
by firms which are contemplating an adjustment of price. 
More interesting, perhaps, are the inferences which may be sugges- 
ted regarding the impact of price-controlling institutions. In relation 
to the Conservative Government's anti-inflation programme, which also 
included the creation of the Price Commission in 1973, the results 
ýý 
.ý 
1: 
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reported in table 6.14 suggest that concentrated industries are more success- 
ful at withstanding the pressure of the Price Commission than those of low 
concentration. This finding is particularly significant because it has 
often been suggested that the Price Commission is much more effective in 
controlling price increases of the industrial giants than those of their 
lesser brethren. This hypothesis is based on the premise that it is 
easier to monitor an industry where a few large sellers account for a 
large proportion of the industry's output. However, the evidence presen- 
ted in this section, whilst by no means definitive, casts doubt on this 
notion. 
Hence, to sum up, our results indicate that important mergers may, 
after some time, raise the rate of price adjustment by facilitating a more 
co-ordinated pattern of reactions by firms to economic change. However, 
two important caveats should be entered. First, the rather small sample 
of six industries does not permit any significant generalisation to be 
made. Therefore, any inferences which might be drawn from the structural 
breaks analysis must be treated with caution and considered tentative. 
Second, although the evidence did indicate that mergers may be associated 
with a change in the price adjustment behaviour of the industry, it was 
also found that an overall increase in the rate of inflation appeared to 
have a comparable if more consistent influence on the price adjustment 
process. 
6.5 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter was concerned with detailed empirical tests of the 
hypotheses which were developed in chapter 4. In addition, we examined 
the stability of the price adjustment process over time by looking closely 
at a sub-sample of industries. This was carried out in order to identify 
any structural breaks in the adjustment process which could be associated 
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with important influences on industry pricing behaviour, notably the 
impact of significant mergers and marked accelaration in the overall 
rate of inflation. 
The first part of the empirical analysis in this chapter was 
concerned with the influence of short-run changes in demand on price 
adjustment. This involved estimating a price adjustment equation for 
each of the 21 industries in the sample. The dependent variable in 
these equations was the wholesale price index and the explanatory 
variables were the price index of materials and fuel, the unit labour 
costs index, the indicator of demand, and the lagged dependent variable. 
However, capital costs were excluded from the equations, but this 
omission can be justified on theoretical grounds since the familiar 
prediction in the orthodox theory of the firm is that fixed costs are 
of no relevance to price adjustments. 
(1) 
The essential innovation of this analysis lay in the construction 
of the demand indicator which was based on an input-output methodology 
previously suggested by Lustgarten (1975). By using this approach we 
attempted to overcome the usual problems of estimation and measurement 
which have bedevilled many empirical studies in the past. One of these 
is the difficulty of measuring demand rather than output which represents 
the joint demand and supply decision. The other, and potentially more 
severe estimation problem, arises from the simultaneity bias which occurs, 
when the demand variable appears on the right hand side of the adjustment 
equation. 
(1) It should be noted that capital costs were not included in most of the 
empirical pricing studies which were reviewed in the previous chapter. 
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Notwithstanding the improved data specifications, the regression 
results were somewhat ambiguous and could have several interpretations. 
On the one hand the results appeared to support our hypothesis concern- 
ing the influence of search costs on the adjustment of price to changes 
in demand. For in fifteen out of twenty-one equations the coefficients 
obtained were insignificantly different from zero. But on the other 
hand, the preponderance of coefficients with the wrong i. e. negative 
sign, of which five were statistically significant, suggests that our 
demand proxy may not be free from bias and that therefore the results 
should be considered tentative. 
The sources of bias most likely to be present were first, the 
measurement of output as, values of deliveries deflated by a price index 
and second, the possibility of the demand variable picking up the effect 
of changes in the rate of production on short-run labour productivity., 
A priori it is not possible to determine the extent to which these effects 
might be present, but our findings suggest that their influence cannot be 
discounted. 
One other possible interpretation of these results needs to be con- 
sidered. In the empirical analysis it was assumed that fixed costs do 
not enter the firm's short-run pricing decision, and similarly, that only 
the long-run trend in labour productivity is used to establish unit 
labour costs. However, if the firm's pricing decision was based on 
short-run average costs, then changes in fixed costs would affect short- 
run price adjustments. Thus the negative coefficients could be explained 
in terms of the relationship between changes in output and changes in 
average fixed costs, the latter falling with increases in output. The 
demand variable may be picking up the influence of average costs on 
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price adjustments through the effects of changes in output. 
(1) However, 
this interpretation is somewhat speculative as it is based on unorthodox 
assumptions about pricing behaviour of firms. 
Only in one equation did the demand variable have the expected i. e. 
positive sign and was statistically significant. It was also noted that 
this coefficient related to an industry of high concentration, and that 
therefore it was consistent with our hypothesis. However, the findings 
gave no insight into the relationship between the degree of price adjust- 
ment to changes in demand and industrial market structure. Further 
results must await the availability of more reliable data. 
More definitive were the results concerning the relationship between 
market structure and the rate of price adjustment. A set of estimated 
partial adjustment coefficients was obtained from the price equations, one 
for each industry in the sample. A rank correlation test was then carried 
out using the 1968 concentration ratios. The results indicated ä positive 
and statistically significant association between the two variables. Con- 
sequently, as a second step in the analysis, the relationship was tested 
by means of ordinary least squares regressions which enabled estimates of 
the quantitative impact of concentration on the rate of adjustment to be 
derived. Five concentration measures were used, covering the three years 
1963,1968 and 1971. These different measures were used because our esti- 
mates of A were averages for the 1963-1974 period, yet the concentration 
ratios referred to specific years within that time span. By using the 
three annual concentration ratios we were able to test the sensitivity of 
the hypothesised relationship to changes in the measurement of concentration. 
(1) Agarwala and Goodson (1970), have suggested this interpretation in 
their empirical study. 
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Linear, semi-log, log-linear and quadratic functional specifications 
were tested in this analysis. The results of the latter were not reported 
in this chapter on account of the poor statistical fit which was obtained. 
The other functional forms performed considerably better. In the linear 
specification the coefficients on the concentration ratios for 1963,1968 
and 1971 and on the Herfindahl indices (1963 and 1968 only) had the expec- 
ted, i. e. positive sign and were statistically significant at the 5% level. 
The results also indicated that the rate of price adjustment in the engineer- 
ing sectors was significantly lower than in the non-engineering sectors. 
The semi-log regressions gave equally robust results, but those of the log- 
linear specification, while generally similar, did not give as good a 
statistical fit as the other two functional forms. 
-Thus, the empirical analysis came out in support of our hypothesis by 
indicating a positive and statistically significant impact of concentration 
on the rate of price adjustment.. Of particular interest was the finding 
that the relationship was neither sensitive. to the type of concentration 
index used nor the year in which it was measured. 
In addition, the results cast doubt on the proposition that concentra- 
ted oligopolies are slow in adjusting prices, at least for the United Kingdom, 
and consequently they do not appear to support the administered prices 
hypothesis. - The findings suggest that in times of rising costs, industrial 
concentration could aggravate the inflationary problem by speeding up the 
rate of price increases. The resulting policy implications will be discussed 
in the next chapter. 
One important aspect of the results was the finding that changes in 
concentration, measured between 1963 and 1968, did not have a significant 
impact on the partial adjustment coefficient X. It was suggested that 
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this may be due to problems of measurement which would be particularly 
severe if the time lags involved were greater than our data permitted 
us to capture. Hence in the last section of this chapter we examined 
the stability of the price adjustment process over the estimation period. 
The analysis consisted of a test aimed at identifying structural 
breaks in the pricing behaviour of six industries which were selected 
from our twenty-one industry sample. The potential influence of impor- 
tant mergers in a number of industries was also investigated as part of 
this structural breaks analysis. 
Three related findings may be tentatively put forward. First, 
when prices are rising very slowly firms may abandon the partial price 
adjustment process in favour of full adjustment during the current 
period. This finding was interpreted in terms of the insignificance 
of search costs under such a regime. Second, a series of important 
mergers may have an impact, after a time, on the price adjustment'pro- 
cess as attested by the pricing behaviour of the Household Textiles 
industry. Third, in times of inflation firms may raise their rates 
of price adjustment in an effort to keep up with rising costs. Of 
special interest here was the finding that concentrated industries do 
this to a larger extent than unconcentrated industries. This raises 
important policy implications with regard to price controlling institu- 
tions but these will not be explored here. 
However, since these results are based on a small sample of indus- 
tries, the inferences made above should be considered tentative. 
By way of conclusion we suggest that the results concerning the 
impact of market structure on the rate of adjustment constitute the most 
significant empirical finding of this thesis. The other empirical tests 
were subject to important caveats relating to their statistical reliability 
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and should therefore be considered suggestive rather than definitive. 
It should also be emphasised that since the 1963-1974 estimation period 
included downturns as well as upturns in the level of economic activity, 
the empirical findings should be relatively free from the usual problems 
of sensitivity to the time period used for estimation. The link between 
the findings reported in this chapter and those of the studies purporting 
to support the administered prices hypothesis, together with any result- 
ing policy implications, will be discussed in the final chapter of this 
thesis. 
I 
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Chapter 7 
CONCLUSIONS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS, AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
7.1 A Summing-up 
The main concern of this thesis, as outlined in the introductory 
chapter, lay in relinquishing the traditional assumptions about the 
pricing behaviour of market participants thereby permitting amore 
realistic scenario of price adjustment to be explored. The essence of 
our approach was to consider a fairly general pricing model in which 
the potential action of rivals and the information costs associated with 
monitoring their behaviour are explicitly introduced into the model. 
Our analysis revealed the existence of a potential asymmetry in the price 
response induced by changes in marginal cost compared to the one induced 
by changes in demand. The rationale for this asymmetry was suggested to 
be the unequal incidence of search costs associated with the price adjust- 
ment decision. The search for relevant information is required because 
the emergence of disequilibrium does not, by itself, reveal the values of 
the key parameters which are necessary for equilibrium to be restored. 
However, we are not suggesting in this thesis that adjustments to short- 
run variations in demand will be effected entirely through changes in 
output levels, whilst those occasioned by changes in costs will fall 
solely on price. What we are suggesting is that adjustments to demand 
are attenuated relative to those stemming from changes in cost. 
In the beginning of this thesis it was pointed out that our analysis 
shared a common theme with the theoretical controversy known as the "new 
view" of Keynes and the administered prices hypothesis. In both of these 
the question of adjustment to disequilibrium in the modern industrial 
- 175 - 
economy features prominently. However, we went a step further to propose 
a broad synthesis between the two controversies and to argue that our own 
conclusions were consistent with both views provided the market setting 
within which firms operate was explicitly defined. The administered 
prices hypothesis emphasises the sluggishness of industrial prices in the 
context of cyclical variations in economic activity, whilst the "new view" 
of Keynes gives a central role to the reversal of price and quantity 
adjustment velocities. Yet both of these lines of thought are consistent 
with the proposition that search costs may play an important part in 
attenuating price adjustments to changes in demand. Thus the approach 
adopted in this thesis is characterised by what Coddington (1976) has 
described as: 
refocusing the market theory on 
disequilibrium states whilst retaining the 
standard choice-theoretic foundations". 
(') 
Before summing up the empirical results it should be remembered 
that the analysis focused on the costs associated with price adjustment, 
whilst those attendant to changes in. the level of output were admittedly 
neglected. Furthermore, our results related specifically to the direct 
influence of short-run changes in demand on output price adjustments. 
Without dwelling on this issue, it was recognised that demand changes 
may influence price adjustments in the longer-run - through indirect 
effects on production costs. 
(2) 
We also recognised the fact that search 
costs would be partially determined by the time available for information 
gathering, so that they may be considerably reduced in the long-run. 
(1) Coddington (1976), p. 1271. 
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In chapter 4 we examined the comparative statics and the dynamics 
of price adjustment on the basis of the dual-decision process. The 
question of price dynamics was analysed through a partial adjustment 
model, from which the optimal rate of price adjustment over time could 
be derived. The key result of this analysis was based on the influence 
of information costs associated with the monitoring of the rate of 
price adjustment among rivals. Without information about these rates 
of adjustment, dynamic co-ordination of prices in the industry would 
not be possible. From the partial adjustment model it was possible to 
infer that industrial concentration facilitates a co-ordinated pattern 
of price reactions because it reduces the search costs associated with 
the monitoring process. This conclusion is contrary to the administered 
prices hypothesis since it implies that oligopolists will be far from 
sluggish in their price response compared to that of firms in competitive 
or low-concentration industries. How can these conflicting predictions 
be reconciled in view of their allegedly common underpinnings? The 
reason lies in the fact that there is a fundamental difference between 
low-concentration industries and perfectly competitive industries, which 
Means calls "märket-dominated". In perfectly competitive markets of the 
Walrasian type, price adjustment is costless and instantaneous. But in 
low-concentration industrial markets this is not the case. Thus indus- 
trial concentration raises the rate of price adjustment, but this does 
not mean that concentrated industries adjust more rapidly than perfectly 
competitive markets in which clearing systems exist. Therefore the basis 
for Means' controversial assertion rests on a comparison of oligopolistic 
and perfectly competitive markets. 
(') 
Hence the paradoxical feature 
(1) This is in sharp contrast to our own analysis which specifically 
linked the rate of adjustment to the level of industrial concentration. 
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associated with Means' hypothesis stems from the lack of precision in the 
definition of administered and market-dominated prices. 
The empirical findings may be summed up as follows: regarding the 
question of demand, the results were broadly in keeping with expectations, 
although they were not conclusive. There remained a problem of inter- 
pretation on statistical grounds, and it was suggested that it arose from 
the traditional difficulties associated with the measurement of demand. 
More conclusive empirical findings must therefore await improvements in 
the data. 
The results of the empirical tests concerning the dynamics of price 
adjustment were more definitive. Using different measures of industrial 
concentration, we found that in every case the estimated partial adjust- 
ment coefficient A was positively related to the concentration variable. 
Furthermore, the relationship was marked by a consistently high level of 
statistical significance. Hence the empirical evidence provided consider- 
able support for our hypothesis and indicated that oligopolists in highly 
concentrated industries adjust prices more rapidly in response to cost 
increases than firms in more fragmented industries. 
The evidence concerning the short-run impact of mergers and changes 
in the rate of inflation on the dynamics of adjustment was somewhat 
ambiguous. We found some indication that significant merger activity and 
increases in inflation caused the rate of price adjustment to increase, 
but the pattern of reactions was by no means conclusive or systematic. 
Furthermore, the results must be treated with caution on account of the 
small, six-industry sub-sample on which they were based. 
Another finding, which was incidental but interesting nevertheless, 
was that increases in the rate of price adjustment occurred either in 
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rapidly concentrating industries or in those which were already highly 
concentrated. This result raises important questions concerning the 
effectiveness of price controlling institutions, but these will be dis- 
cussed in the next section of this chapter. 
By far the most significant implication of the results is that the 
factors which lead to increases in concentration in the long-run, will 
also lead to higher rates of price increases with important consequences 
for the management of inflation. 
7.2 Some Policy implications 
Our findings have relevant implications for the question of monopolies 
and mergers and the contiguous problem of inflation management. In the 
past, these policy questions have not always been linked to one another, 
although it has recently been suggested that the inflationary experience 
of the United Kingdom economy may be associated with increasing industrial 
concentration. 
The policy implications to which we refer concern the impact of 
market structure on the inflationary process, but they relate to an aspect 
of this issue which hitherto has not been discussed. We are not suggesting 
that concentration is a prime cause of inflation, for there is no evidence 
in this research that would support this view. However, the results did 
point to an association of industrial concentration with a faster response 
to cost increases. The implication of this result is that in an economy 
where product market power is considerable, the short-run rate of inflation 
stemming from an exogenously determined increase in primary input prices 
may be substantially higher than if industrial concentration was less 
pronounced. However, in the context of inflation management, it could 
(1) See Cowling and Waterson (1976). 
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be argued that if primary input price increases have to work their way 
through the economy until a new equilibrium is ultimately obtained, 
then the authorities will be indifferent as to whether the adjustment 
process is completed in the short or medium term. But on the other 
hand a case could be made for suggesting that the authorities would 
not be indifferent between a two-figure inflation rate over a one 
year period and a single-figure inflation rate over a two or three 
year period. For policy makers would be anxious to contain inflation 
to levels below what might be termed the "stability threshold" 
What we imply by this concept is that if the rate of inflation should 
exceed a critical level which is determined by social and political 
considerations of the time, the consequences for efficient management 
of the economy could be significant. Thus if inflation exceeds the 
stability threshold trade unions may become particularly militant in 
their efforts to protect their members' real disposable income and 
wage demands may escalate to the point where further price increases 
are inevitable. In addition, holders of sterling balances, anticipa- 
ting the foreign exchange pressures which would accompany a rise in 
inflation, may decide to pull out of sterling thus placing an added 
burden on the domestic exchange rate. If the authorities then allow 
the rate to fall relative to other currencies, the pressures of 
inflation will be further aggravated through the resulting domestic 
price increases of imported raw materials and fuels.. 
On the basis of this reasoning we would suggest that the 
authorities are unlikely to be indifferent between a high short-run 
rate of inflation and a lower rate which extends over a longer period. 
(1) Until the early 1970's an inflation rate in excess of 10% per annum 
would have been considered unacceptable. 
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Their preference is likely to be for the latter, for the reasons which 
were outlined above. 
Thus we would contend that our findings introduce an added dimen- 
Sion to policies concerned with the control of monopolies and mergers. 
For as has been indicated, a high level of market concentration makes 
the attainment of the short-run price stability objective less likely. 
in the face of exogenous rises in input costs. This is because market 
concentration leads to a faster rate of adjustment in the industry, 
thereby raising the rate of inflation in the short-run. Thus, from a 
policy viewpoint, it is important that proper attention should be given 
by the relevant authorities to this aspect of mergers and the increased 
level of concentration to which they lead, as well as to the high levels 
of concentration which already exist in a number of important sectors 
(l) 
In this context it is interesting to observe that no evidence was 
found to indicate that the activity of the National Board for Prices 
and Incomes and the Price Commission was effective in restraining the 
rate of price increases in concentrated sectors relative to those in 
more competitive sectors. Furthermore the structural breaks analysis 
indicated that concentrated industries were more successful at raising 
their rates of adjustment in response to increases in inflation than 
more fragmented industries. These findings cast some doubt on the 
effectiveness of Government institutions for price control in comparison 
with what could be achieved in, a more competitive economy. 
Regarding incomes policy, the implication of our findings is 
that by raising the short-run rate of inflation, market concentration 
will ultimately undermine attempts to conduct an effective incomes 
policy, unless rigid price controls are imposed and import prices stay 
relatively stable. 
(1) See Monopolies Commission report on Parallel Pricing, (1973). 
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It should be pointed out that our analysis did not indicate what 
the specific economy-wide effect of higher partial adjustment coef- 
ficients in concentrated industries might be on the short-run inflation 
rate in terms of the time paths of output prices. To this end we must 
allow for the interaction of different rates of adjustment through the 
intermediate chains of production. Hence the answer to this question 
(1) 
requires extensive research which is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Our findings also have implications for general demand management 
and particularly for policies aimed at increasing the growth rate of 
the United Kingdom economy. Since 1973, when the fixed exchange rate 
regime was abandoned in favour of the fully-floating type, it has been 
held that the balance of payments would no longer impose an effective 
constraint on the rate of growth in the United Kingdom. Previously, 
an acceleration of the rate of economic expansion was accompanied, 
within a short space of time, by a balance of payments crisis which 
invariably led to excessive speculation culminating in a devaluation 
of the domestic currency. 
(2) 
Thus the constraint operating on economic 
growth, namely the balance of payments, was seen to arise from the 
authorities'commitment to a fixed-rate convertibility of sterling. Once 
this commitment was removed the road to economic expansion would be 
wide open, particularly through increases in exports. 
However, the recent British experience has shown that other prob- 
lems stand in the way of achievement of this policy objective. The 
balance of payments has ceased, to be an effective constraint on economic 
growth, and furthermore, the authorities may, within limits, actively 
(1) A research methodology will be proposed in section 7.3 of this 
chapter 
(2) One such crisis took place in November 1967. 
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support the downward floating of the exchange rate as this would 
increase the competitiveness of British manufactures, thereby leading 
to a salutary increase in the demand for exports. But a fair in the 
exchange rate will raise the price of imported raw materials in terms 
of the domestic currency. Thus, before long, the associated cost 
increases will be fed through to final output prices, and the initial 
competitive advantage induced by the exchange rate adjustment may be 
partially or even totally wiped out. 
Thus the effectiveness of export-led growth policies, which rely 
on the international competitiveness of British manufactures, depends 
largely on the relative speed of adjustment of the demand for exports 
and final output prices. For if the adjustment of export demand is 
slow relative to the adjustment of output. prices, the effect of rising 
import costs will largely offset the effect of competitive exchange- 
rate policies. Therefore the implication of our analysis is that 
since increased concentration has the effect of raising the speed of 
price adjustment, increases in concentration are incompatible with 
policies designed to improve the competitiveness of British exports 
in order to stimulate economic growth. 
The above discussion also implies that the old balance of pay- 
ments constraint has re-appeared under a new guise. For rapid expan- 
sions in economic activity, which spill over into an increased demand 
for imports, will cause a downward pressure on the exchange rate which 
will aggravate the inflationary problem via the increased costs of 
imports. It is therefore questionable whether the former constraints 
on rapid economic growth 
Iin 
the United Kingdom have been removed. Our 
(1) This is essentially the monetarist view of inflation. An extensive 
survey is given in Flemming (1976). An analysis of the U. K. 
experience is given in Williamson and Wood (1976). 
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reasoning suggests that a mere substitution has occurred, of the threat 
of inflation in place of the former balance of payments constraint. 
To conclude, we would sum-up our policy implications as follows. 
Under a freely floating exchange rate regime industrial concentration 
is likely to aggravate the problem of inflation and is therefore incon- 
sistent with policies aimed at economic stability. Our evidence 
suggests that inflation is likely to come from exogenous increases in 
primary input prices and not directly from excess demand, since the 
estimated price response to these pressures appeared uncertain and 
unsystematic. However, excess demand may have an indirect effect if 
it spills over into the demand for imports causing a downward move- 
ment in the domestic exchange rate which raises import prices. 
The analysis indicated that market concentration will make the 
attainment of inflation management, incomes policy and growth objec- 
tives more elusive on account of the associated rates of price adjust- 
ment. Current policies towards monopolies and mergers should be 
critically re-appraised in light of these findings. 
7.3 Directions for Further Research 
The empirical results which have been discussed in chapter 6 
suggest a number of spheres in which the present research may be use- 
fully extended. 
The first stems from the desirability of additional analysis of 
the influence of demand on price adjustments, since the results 
obtained in this thesis were not conclusive. However, as has already 
been pointed out, the problems with this analysis were due largely to 
deficiencies in the data, and specifically with reliable measures of 
demand. Therefore further research in this area will depend on - the 
availability of improved data. 
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Another useful extension of the research would consist of 
enlarging the sample of industries on which the findings concerning 
market structure and the rate of price adjustment were based. Although 
these results were generally robust and hence fairly conclusive, an 
increase in the sample of industries, particularly by adding some from 
the SIC-orders which were not included in the present analysis, would 
considerably enhance the significance of the results. 
But perhaps the most valuable extension of the present research 
would involve an analysis of the economy-wide effects of the higher 
rates of price adjustment which are associated with industrial concen- 
tration. In this thesis we derived quantitative estimates of the 
influence of concentration on rates of adjustment in individual sectors. 
But since every sector in the economy is linked to others through the 
intermediate chain of production,. it is clear that high rates of adjust- 
ment in any one sector will affect industries which use that sector's 
output as inputs in their own production processes. Thus in an economy 
where the degree of interconnectedness in production is high, the 
potential for interaction among the different rates of adjustment will 
be considerable. Hence, a high rate of price adjustment in a concen- 
trated industry will carry an influence beyond its own relative weight 
in the vector of final output prices. It will have economy-wide 
. 'repercussions by influencing the adjustment process of industries 
which use its output in production, these in turn will influence other 
user industries and so the process will go on. 
From the above discussion it should be clear that an input-output 
approach, which explicitly allows for sectoral interdependence in 
production, is the most appropriate for our purpose. Furthermore, the 
partial price adjustment model which was developed in chapter 4 can be 
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neatly extended to cover any number of related industries, as will be 
demonstrated below. The elements of the proposed dynamic input-output 
model are as follows: 
EA] 
: The matrix of input-output coefficients. An element aid shows 
the amount of commodity i used in the production of one unit 
of commodity j. ' 
[Ba: The matrix of primary input coefficients. This is the matrix 
of required inputs whose prices are determined outside the 
model. 
[J: Diagonal matrix of partial adjustment coefficients. Each 
element X. shows the proportion of the relevant price change 
which is-passed on in the current period. (0<Xi 1). - 
[Apt] : Vector of endogenously determined price changes in period t. 
[tvt]: Vector of primary input price changes in period t. 
The single sector price adjustment equation can now be extended 
to the whole economy: 
(1) APtI = [XAI 
[t Pt] + 
[iB[v] 
+ [I - X' 
][A 
For a two-sector economy this may be expressed as: 
(2) APlt = X1a11APlt + ala21AP2t t Xlb11AVlt + Xlb21AV2t + (1-ý1)APlt-1 
(3) AP 2t - X2a12APit + a2a22AP2t + a2b12AVit t A2b22AV2t t 
(1-X2) AP2t-1 
Thus in each sector, the current period adjustment is determined by the 
current period change in intermediate and primary input prices, plus the 
change in intermediate input prices in the previous period. 
0 
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Equation (1) may be re-arranged so that Apt appears on the left hand 
side only: 
i4) ["] = 
CI 
- aAý]-1 
LA$] [AV 
t]+ 
[I - ý] 
[APt-1] 
Equation (4) represents a modified, dynamic version of the conventional 
dual to the static Leontief system. 
(') 
The inverse[I - 
IA J -1 is 
analogous to the static Leontief inverse[I - A]-', so that subject to 
the usual stability conditions, it represents the infinite series 
I+ XA' +r^5A 
]2... In the same way, this inverse captures the total, 
that is, the direct. and indirect effects of price changes affecting any 
one sector on all other sectors. If we call this inverse[A]*, then an 
element aid denotes the total direct and indirect effect of a price 
change-originating in sector i on the output price change of sector j, 
given the degree of industrial interdependence in the economy and the 
partial adjustment mechanism of each sector. In this manner, the pro- 
posed model allows for the interaction suggested above amongst the 
price adjustments of different but interdependent industries. The sys- 
tem could be used to trace or simulate the ripple effects of primary 
input price increases on output price movements which work their way 
through the economy. 
More specifically, the proposed dynamic model could be used to 
estimate the length of time after which changes in primary input prices 
are reflected in a new vector of output prices. It may also be used to 
test the sensitivity of output price trajectories to differences in the 
partial adjustment rates of key industrial sectors, and the effect of 
different dynamic price policies of nationalised industries. Finally, 
it could be used to estimate the overall impact of concentration on the 
(1) For an analysis of this system see Dorfman, Samuelson and Solow (1958). 
a 
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short-run rate of inflation following input price increases. 
To conclude, we would suggest that although the proposed dynamic 
input-output model is subject to the usual restrictive assumptions of 
linearity and rigidly specified pricing behaviour, it nevertheless pro- 
vides a useful method of analysis of the way in which input price 
increases are transmitted through interconnected sectors of the economy. 
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APPENDIX 
Table Al The Absorption Matrix for 1963 in Coefficient Form 
Industry 
Commodity 
1 Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 
2 Mining and Quarrying 
3 rood, Drink and Tobacco 
4 Coal. and Petroleum Products 
5 Chemical and Allied Industries 
6 Metal Manufacture 
7 )ech. Instrmt. Electl. Engineering 
8 Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering 
9 Vehicles 
10 Metal Goods n. e. s. 
11 Textiles 
12. Leather, Fur, Clothing and Footwear 
13 Bricks, Pottery, Glass, Cement etc. 
14 Timber, Furniture etc. 
15 Paper, Printing and Publishing 
16 Other Manufacturing Industries 
17 Construction 
18 Gas, Electricity and Water 
19. Transport Services n. e. s. Distributi 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
. 0209 0 . 1944 . 0002 . 
0232 0 0 
. 0016 . 0143 . 0041 . 1428 . 
0217 . 0091 . 0021 
. 1306 . 0008 . 1600 0 . 
0109 0 . 0001 
. 0149 . 0087 . 0044 . 0217 . 
0242 . 0449 . 0037 
. 0496 . 0090 . 0358 . 0287 . 
2302 . 0116 . 0179 
. 0013 . 0377 . 
0049 . 0016 . 0083 . 
3143 . 1139 
. 0126 . 0533 . 0105 . 0073 . 
0224 . 0367 . 1598 
. 0023 0 0 '0 
0 . 0005 0 
. 0026 . 0022 . 0005 . 
0004 . 0008 . 0078 . 
0022 
. 0125 . 0050 . 0162 . 
0024 . 0206 . 0111 . 
0409 
. 0039. . 0065 . 0020 
0 . 0046 . 0002 . 0032 
. 0002 . 0037 . 0000 
0 . 0006 . 0001 . 
0003 
. 0023 . 0085 . 0066 . 0006 . 
0077 . 0123 . 0104 
. 0020 . 0149 . 0027 . 
0002 . 0025 . 0013 . 
0067 
. 0003 . 0037 . 0305 . 
0014 . 0194 . 0028 . 0108" 
. 0047 . 0176 . 0048 . 
0006 . 0092 . 0021 . 
0120 
. 0119 . 0173 .. 0033 . 
0005 . 0044* -. 0019 . 0021 
. 0072 . 0313 . 0082 . 
0199 . 0241 . 0300 . 
0110 
. 0986 . 0742 . 0975 . 0379 . 
1319 . 0898 . 0882 
Source: A programe for Growth (1974), vol. 12. 
London: Chapman and Hall 
"' 
." 
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Table Al (continued) 
89 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 0°0p 
. 0445 . 0005 00 
. 0398 0 . 0011 . 0024 . 0022 . 
0004 
. 0009 1 
. 0081 . 0018 . 0922 ' 
p0 . 
0012 
. 0118. . 0058 . 0110 . 2093 . 0033 2 0 
. 0004 0 . 0010 0.0 . 
. 0001 00. 
. 0022 3 
. 0027 . 0049 . 0048 . 0030 . 0017 . 0303 . 0035 . 0043 . 0048 -. 0067 . 0536 . p12g 4 . 
0090 . 0099 . 0179 . 0362 . 0141 
. 0991 . 1206 . 2570 
. 0331 . 0199 . 0283 . 1724 . 0200 . 0064 . 0070 5 . 0000 . 0012 . 0068 . 0075 . 0060 , 0075 . 0444 . 0171 . 0011 6 
. 0722 . 
0836 
. 0230 . 0130 . 0086 . 0370 
. 1584 00 
. 0068 . 0155 . 0190 . 0366 . 0480 . 0143 .:, 07 00 ~' 00i. 
. 0007 
000 
. 0048 . 1884 . 0013 . 0006 
8 
. 0002 . 0026 -. 0003 . 0009 . 0023 . 0028 .. 0013 . 0138 9 
. 0762 . 0788 . 1154 . 0019 . 0157 . 0134 . 0241 . 0025 . 0228 . 0181 . 0033 . 0082 . 
0052 
. 0077 . 0032 10 . +000 . 2669 . 0051 . 0313 . 0072 . 0622 . 0018 . 0007 . 0083 11 ° . 0012* . 0004 , 0007 . 1115 . 0001 . 0003 , 0008 . 0024 0 . 0002 . 0008 12 
. 0052 . 0052 . 0031 . 0009 . 0003 . 0625 
, 
. 0087 . 0004 . 0037 . 1067 . 0060 . 0008 13 . 
0115 
. 0114 . 0023 . 0004 . 0012 . 0064 . 2410 . 0035 10016 . 0058 ., 0077 
. 0078 . 0602 . 0021 . 0020 14 . 0061 . 0109 . 0246 " . 0107 ... 233S . 0320 . 0063 . 0031' . 0347 15 
. 0043 . 0316 . 0077 ... . 
6047 
. 0196 . 0063 . 0111 . 0081 . 0458 . 0075 . 0016 . 0114 16 . 
0050 
, 0021 . 0020 . 0023 . 0027 . 0014 . 0015 . 0020 . 0017 . 1502 . 0023 . 
0129 
. 0110 . 0177 '. 0088 17 . 0111 . 0057 . 0365 . 0071 . 0127 . 0157 . 0030 . 0579 . 0154 18 
0645 . 0821 . 0969 . 0533 . 0799 . 1344 . 0747 . 1232 "1010 . 0668 . 0751 . 0910 19 
." 
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Table A2 The "Makes" Matrix for 1963 
i million) 0 
industiy 
' Commodity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Agriculture, Forestry 1664.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
and Fishing 
2 Mining and Quarrying 0 1058.0 3.2 0 0.1 0 0.9 
3 Food, Drink and Tobacco 0 0 3176.9 0 19.6 0 0.2 
4 Coal and Petroleum 0 0 0 649.1 17.6 0 0.2 
Products 
5 Chemical and Allied 0 1.2 42.0 6.1 1979.0 3.2 5.0 
Industries 
6 Metal Manufacture 0 0.1 0 0 10.8 2411.6 21.0 
7 Mech. Instrmnt. Electl. 0 0" 0 0.1 . 3.4 35.2 4305.0 Engineering 
8 Shipbuilding and Marine 0 0 0 0 0 0.9 20.1 
Engineering 
9 Vehicles 0 "0 0 0 0 4.0 90.6 
10 Metal Goods n. e: s. 0 0 0 .0 
6.2 30.0 27.3 
11 Textiles 0 0 0 0 6.0 0 1.8 
12 Leather, Fur, Clothing 0' .0 0.1 0 0.2 0 0.2 
and Footwear 
13 Bricks, Pottery, Glass, 0 5.1 0 0 1.3 0.1 3.7 
Cement etc. 
14 Timber, Furniture etc. 0 0 0 0 0.4 0 1.3 
. 
15 Paper, Printing and 0 0 0 0 0.3 3.4 1.0 
Publishing. . 
16 Other Manufacturing 0 0 0.1 0 10.5 0.4. 3.8 
Industries 
17 Construction 0 0.3 0 0 0.2 0.9 12.9 
18 Gas, Electricity and' 0. 0 0 97.0 18.4 0 .0 Water 
. 19 Transport, Services n. e. s . "0 
0 32.1 -0 0 ., 0. 
'2 0 
Distribution 
Total 1664.0 1064.8 3254.3 752.3 2074. "1 2490.011 4494.8 
Diagonal element as % of 100.0 99.4 
I 
97.6 86.3 95.4 96.8 95.8 
Total 
Source: Department of Applied Economics, 
University of Cambridge 
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Table A2 (continued) 
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16, 17 18 19 
0 0 0 14.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 4.4 0 0 0 1.2 1.1 0.7 2 
0 0 0.0 0.1 0 0.1 1.5 0.2 0.1 0 0 134.3 3 
0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 41.3 0.1 4 
0 0.5 0&1 0.8 0.1 3.5 0 0.8 7.0 4.8 9.0 30.2 5 
0.3 2.5 38.0 0 0 0.5 0.2 2.6 1.7 0.8 9.3 9.2 6 
18.9 40.0 37.5 0.1 0.1 3.0 1.1 0.5 10.0 16.0 0 60.4 7 
394.8 1.5 0.1 .0 0 0.1 0.2 .0 0.2 2.2 0 '0 
.8 
3.2 2582.2 12.5 4.1 0.3 0.2 1.4 0.3 2.9 0.1 1.6 16.6 9 
0.2 4.5 1276.0 0.6 0.2 0.4 1.6 1.2 5.4 5.8 0 6.4 10 
0 0. 0.1 2053.3 3.3 0.2 0.3 2.4 3.3 0 0.3 7.8 11 
0 0.1 0.1 2.4 989.0 0.1 0.2 0 4.0 0 0 10.0 12 
0 0.6 0 2.7 0 725.9 1.0 0.3 0.6 13.8 0.1 5.1 13 
0 0.5 3.7 1.6 0.5 1.1 635.6 2.0 1.7 5.0 0 2.8 14 
0 0.8 0.8. 0.9 0.2 0.5 0.6 1612.9 8.6 0 0.2 11.0 15 
0 2.3 1.7 3.2 4.4* 0.9 1.9 1.4 745.0 0 0 12.5 16 
0.6 0 0.9 0 0 9.7 6.4 0 0.2 3861.0 0 9.9 17 
0 
,. 
0 "0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1598.6 0 18 
0.2 -6.4 0 21.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13535.5 19 
418.2 2641.7 1371.5 2105.5 998.1 749.6 651.8 1625.5 790+5 3910.6 1661.6 13853.0 
94.4 97.7 93.0 97.5 99.1 96.8 97.5 99.2 94.2 98.7 96.2 97.7 
in 
a 
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Table A. 5 
Concentration Indices Used in the Re, ession Analysis 
MLH CR63 CR68 CR71 H63 1168 
363 94.6 97.2 92 0.14510 0.24256 
362 91.7 87.2 87 0.13549 0.12469 
365 74.1 89.6 70 of s'I 
368 75.4 81.4 58 0.04447 0.04680 
369 67.9 74.7 51 0.03847 0.05010 
361 55.2 75.5 54 0.04689 0.07652 
339/1 42.2 59.1 64 0.00621 " 0.00573 
333. 36.4 40.1 24 0.02055 0.01982 
332 34.0 40.0 28 0.02096 0.02532 
411 99.9 100.0 98 0.23868 0.20000 
469/1 83.5' 88.8 77 0.122630 0.17871 
462 60.7 76.0 40 0.01729 0.04043 
461 50.8 61.0 50 0.01787 0.02761 
272/1 53.9 61.0 39t 0.03678 0.03695 
274 52.6 53.8 45 0.02965 0.03074 
419 42.7 51.7 37 0.03761 0.04553 
473 51.4 45.1 34 0.01994 0.02294 
414 30.2 40.7 21 0.00940 0.01097 
422/1 37.9 44.7 40 0.00835 0.01212 
272/2 28.7 34.9 39+ 0.03678 0.03695 
483 39.2 35.2 35 ý` ýý 
Source: CR63 and CR68 are the estimated percentage con- 
centration ratios for 1963 and 1968 respectively. They 
are weighted means (weighted by value of sales) of the 
concentration ratios of individual commodity groups pub- 
lished in the Summary Tables of the Report on the Census 
of Production, 1968 H. M. S. O. 1974. 
CR7 is the 1971 concentration ratio at MLH level pub- 
lised in the Report on the Census of Production, 1971. 
H. M. S. O. 1976. 
1163 and H68 are unpublished estimates of the Herfindahl 
index of concentration calculated by H. Waterson of the 
University of Newcastle. They are based on employment 
data published in the Census of Production Report, 1968. 
H. M. S. O. 1974. 
+ This concentration ratio applies to MLH 272 i. e. 
Pharmaceutical Chemicals and Preparations industry. 
- 195 - IN Table A6 : Partial Adjustment and Industrial Structure 
Dependent variable : Partial Adjustment Coefficient (X) 
Quadratic specification. Twenty-one industries sample 
Explanatory 
Variables (1) 
(2) (3) (4)t (5)t 
Constant 0.5741 0.7715 0.5229 0.5317 0.5459 
(1.2189) (1.3305) (1.4259) (4.7535) (4.3186) 
CR63 -0.0044 
(-0.2661) 
CCR63]2 0.0001 (0.6842) 
CR68 -0.0123 
(-0.6464) 
[CR 68 
2 0.0002 
(1.0514) 
CR71 -0.0017 
(-0.1246) 
rCR71]2' 0.0001 
L (0.6134) 
H63 2.1305 
(0.6040) 
1H63] 
2 0.4207 
(0.0269) 
H68 1.1497 
(0.3233) 
]2 
CH 4.4879 68 (0.3009) 
Engineering Dummy -0.3404 -0.3698 -0.3478 -0.3392 -0.3622 
(-3.0955) (-3.4646) (-3.1141) (-2.7839) (-3.2577) 
R2 0.4519 0.5076 0.4483 0.4741 0.5200 
F Statistic' 4.67 5.84 4.60 4.51 5.42 
t-ratios are given in parentheses. 
CR63 1963 industry concentration ratio, being a weighted mean (weighted 
by sales) of component concentration ratios published in the Report 
on the 1968 Census of Production H. M. S. O. 1974. 
CR68 1968 industry concentration ratio derived in the same manner as 
CR63 using the same data sources. 
CR71 1971 industry concentration ratio by MLH groups published in the 
Summary tables of the 1971 Census of Production. H. M. S. O. 1976. 
H63 Estimate of the 1963 Herfindahl index calculated by M. Waterson from 
employment data published in the 1968 Census Report. H. M. S. O. 1976. 
H68 Estimate of the 1968 Herfindahl index compiled in the same way as H63. 
t In regression (4) and (5) two sample observations were omitted 
(MLH 365/2 and 483) because the Herfindahl index was unavailable for 
these industries. 
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Table A. 7 
Price Index of Materials and Fuels (Quarterly) 
1963 I 
= 100 
Building 
Materials etc. 
MLH 469 
Paint 
MLH 274 
Metal working 
Machine Tools 
14LH 332 
Electrical 
Machinery 
MLH 361 
1963 I 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
II 100.8 99.9 100.3 100.2 
III 100.9 99.9 100.3 100.3 
IV 101.2 100.4 100.8 100.7 
1964 I 101.6 100.5 102.5 101.9 
II 101.8 100.4 103.1 103.1 
III 102.3 100.8 103.7 103.9 
IV 104.0 101.4 104.8 106.2 
1965 I 104.0 101.9 106.0 107.4 
II 104.5 101.6 106.8 108.5 
III 105.9 101.5 107.0 108.7 
IV 106.1 101.8 107.9 110.7 
1966 I 106.1 102.9 110.3 115.2 
II 107.2 103.1 113.1 121.1 
III 107.5 103.1 112.3 119.5 
IV 107.3 102.4 111.7 117.5 
1967 I 107.0 102.2 111.2 116.4 
II 106.8 102.1 110.2 113.5 
III 108.7 104.0 111.1 114.2 
IV 110.5 105.5 114.3 120.2 
1968 I 112.6 108.4 119.0 129.0 
II 113.0 108.9 117.7 124.7 
III 113.0 108.9 117.5 123.2 
IV 113.3 109.0 118.3 124.3 
1969 I 115.1 109.8 120.4 127.9 
II 115.6 110.2 122.6 131.1 
III 116.4 111.5 125.1 135.8 
IV 118.9 112.7 128.8 139.3 
1970 I 122.0 114.1 133.5 145.4 
II 124.5 116.2 135.7 148.4 
III 126.4 119.5 134.6 146.3 
IV 130.5 120.7 136.0 146.8 
1971 I 134.7 123.4 140.7 148.7 
II 141.2 125.0 145.2 154.9 
III 144.6 128.0 147.2 155.6 
IV 145.0 127.8 147.5 154.5 
1972 I 145.9 128.7 148.8 155.9 
II 148.0 130.2 152.1 159.1 
III 149.0 131.9 154.0 160.9 
IV 150.4 134.1 156.6 163.0 
1973 I 151.3 135.8 158.8 168.0 
II 153.5 139.7 164.4 177.1 
III 158.1 151.3 171.7 190.7 
IV 162.2 158.6 179.6 204.6 
1974 I 178.2 192.0 195.2 230.7 
II 198.3 211.7 217.7 260.0 
III 210.1 222.6 225.2 255.3 
IV 222.8 232.6 233.8 254.7 
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Table A. 7 (continued) 
1963 I= 100 
Year 
Carpets 
and rugs 
MLH 419 
Manufactured 
Stationery 
MLH 483 
Broadcast 
receiving 
and sound 
reproducing 
equipment 
MLH 365 
Bedding 
and soft 
furnishings 
MLH 473 
1963 .I 100.0 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
II 100.5 100.1 100.1 100.2 
III 101.0 100.2 100.3 100.3 
IV 103.1 100.6 101.1 100.8 
1964 I 103.9 101.6 103.0 102.3 
II 103.6 102.0 103.9 103.1 
III 104.4 102.2 104.8 104.0 
IV 105.2 102.8 106.3 105.0 
1965 I 104.4 104.4 107.5 106.6 
II 104.6 104.6 108.2 107.0 
III 105.1 104.7 110.0 107.5 
IV 105.6 104.8 111.0 107.9 
1966 I 106.4 105.3 113.9 109.2 
II 107.8 105.7 115.8 110.4 
III 108.2 105.7 115.6 110.5 
IV 106.9 105.5 115.8 110.2 
1967 I 105.4 104.9 116.4 109.5 
II 105.0 105.1 115.4 108.6 
III 103.7 105.2 116.8 108.7 
IV 103.7 105.7 120.8 110.5 
1968 I 112.5 112.2 125.2 114.9 
II 113.2 113.7 125.0 115.0 
III 113.8 113.6 125.0 115.4 
IV 116.9 113.8 125.5 116.8 
1969 I 111.4 115.8 124.9 118.9 
II 112.2 116.3 127.0 120.4 
III 112.4 118.0 129.8 122.3 
IV 111.8 119.3 132.8 124.1 
1970 I 112.6 124.4 136.4 127.0 
II 114.3 125.7 139.8 129.8 
III 115.0 129.2 142.1 130.9 
IV 114.9 130.4 144.1 131.9 
1971 I 116.2 134.6 148.4 134.9 
II 119.1 135.5 151.8 138.3 
III 122.1 136.5 153.9 141.1 
IV 123.1 137.0 155.5 141.7 
1972 I 127.1 139.3 159.3 144.0 
II 132.2 141.0 162.3 146.7 
III 136.8 142.5 165.7 150.6 
IV 149.5 144.7 169.5 157.2 
1973 I 163.0 146.5 172.8 162.4 
II 165.5 149.1 179.5 169.8 
III 173.1 158.9 186.2 184.7 
IV 178.2 164.4 195.1 198.7 
1974 I 190.2 184.4 209.5 215.7 
II 194.8 204.7 225.2 228.8 
III 194.6 231.4 238.0 236.3 
IV 197.5 242.4 249.2 237.4 
1975 I 201.2 263.9 265.7 241.8 
II. 209.2 271.3 274.5 246.2 
III 215.1 278.1 287.2 252.3 
IV 222.9 283.8 294.9 259.2 
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Table A. 7 (continued) 
1963 I= 100 
Year Pharmaceuticals 
MLH 272 
Pumps; Valves 
etc. 
MLH 333 
Mining Machinery 
MLH 339/1 
1963 I 100.0 100.0 100.0 
II 100.2 100.5 100.2 
III 100.8 100.6 100.4 
IV 101.5 101.3 100.7 
1964 I 101.4 103.7 102.1 
II 101.6 105.8 102.6 
III 102.3 107.2 103.0 
IV 102.8 109.3 103.7 
1965 I 103.3 109.8 104.8 
II 103.8 111.0 105.7 
III 103.6 111.0 105.9 
IV 103.8 113.2. 106.5 
1966 I 104.6 119.2 108.2 
II 105.1 122.1 110.8 
III 105.0 118.8 110.6 
IV 104.5 118.0 110.2 
1967 I 104.2 117.1 109.9 
II 104.1 114.4 109.3 
III 105.0 115.6 110.1 
IV 106.4 121.9 112.2 
1968 I 108.9 129.9 115.2 
II 109.0 125.4 115.1 
III 108.7 124.9 115.0 
IV 109.0 126.4 115.5 
1969 I 109.8 130.0 116.4 
II 110.9 133.8 118.2 
III 111.4 138.3 122.0 
IV 113.2 141.9 124.3 
1970 I 115.1 146.7 129.5 
II 116.7 148.7 132.4 
III 119.0 145.0 132.8 
IV 121.0 144.4 136.1 
1971 I 124.7 150.5 139.9 
II 126.6 156.2 145.9 
III 128.4 157.6 147.8 
IV 128.6 157.2 148.0 
1972 I 129.0 159.0 149.0 
II 130.5 162.6 153.5 
III 132.1 164.7 155.1 
IV 134.4 167.5 157.4 
1973 I 136.1 171.6 158.8 
II 138.9 179.0 164.6 
III 144.9 179.0 171.0 
IV 150.2 200.6 177.9 
1974 I 176.0 218.1 192.1 
II 197.1 245.3 221.1 
III 207.4 245.0 230.2 
IV 215.4 249.6 238.1 
1975 I 227.7 267.8 264.3 
II 239.9 280.0 276.7 
III 248.4 290.1 284.5 
IV 256.3 298.1 291.5 
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Table A. 7 (continued) 
1963 lst Qrtr 
100 
Telegraph and 
Telephone 
MLH 363 
Other elec- 
trical goods 
MLH 369 
Man-made 
Fibres 
MLH 411 
1963 I 100.0 100.0 100.0 
II 100.3 101.1 100.1 
III 100.6 101.8 100.4 
IV 100.9 103.0 100.6" 
1964 I 102.6 105.6 100.1 
II 103.7 108.0 99.9 
III 104.6 111.1 100.3 
IV 107.0 115.4 100.3 
1965 I 108.4 117.2 100.6 
II 109.4 115.6 100.5 
III 109.6 114.6 100.5 
IV 111.7 117.4 100.7 
1966 I 116.3 121.6 101.0 
II 122.1 125.4 101.6 
III 120.4 122.9 101.6 
IV 118.1 120.1 101.2 
1967 I 117.0 118.8 100.6 
II 113.7 115.8 100.4 
III 114.7 116.8 101.0 
IV 121.1 123.5 102.6 
1968 I 130.3 133.2 104.8 
II 125.9 128.8 105.6 
III 124.4 128.2 106.0 
IV 125.7 129.4 106.0 
1969 I 128.7 132.9 105.6 
II 132.1 137.0 106.5 
III 135.6 142.1 107.1 
IV 137.9 145.1 107.6 
1970 I 141.1 149.5 109.2 
II 143.1 151.6 110.4 
III 141.0 149.8 112.8 
IV 140.3 143.5 113.8 
1971 I 141.9 151.8 116.4 
II 145.2 156.3 118.0 
III 145.8 157.2 118.6 
IV 145.8 155.7 118.5 
1972 I 149.0 159.0 118.0 
II 154.2 162: 4. 119.8 
III 155.9 164.8 121.2 
IV 157.3 167.6 122.5 
1973 I 160.6 172.6 123.3 
II 165.7 181.0 123.8 
III 174.3 194.2 128.8 
IV 181.5 208.5 132.6 
1974 I 195.5 231.5 159.2 
II 214.8 257.4 181.6 
III 207.6 250.0 199.0 
IV 208.7 253.3 209.1 
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Table A. 7 (continued) 
1963 I= 100 
YEAR 
Pottery 
MLH 462 
Bricks etc. 
MLH 461 
Insulated 
Wires and 
Cables 
MLH 362 
1963 I 100.0 100.0 100.0 
II 100.9 100.7 100.4 
III 101.2 100.7 100.5 
IV 101.4 100.8 101.1 
1964 I 101.9 101.2 103.6 
II 102.0 101.3 106.3 
III 102.6 101.7 109.1 
IV 103.5 102.4 117.7 
1965 I 104.6 104.1 119.8 
II 105.1 104.5 122.7 
III 105.4 104.7 123.6 
IV 105.8 105.0 131.2 
1966 I 106.9 105.5 146.2 
II 108.1 108.1 167.9 
III 108.1 108.5 153.8 
IV 107.3 108.4 149.9 
1967 I 107.0 108.3 143.8 
II 106.7 108.1 130.9 
III 108.3 110.4 132.3 
IV 110.8 112.1 157.0 
1968 I 114.0 113.6 190.6 
II 113.8 113.7 161.9 
III 113.4 113.5 155.8 
IV 113.5 113.9 159.9 
1969 I 115.0 115.0 175.0 
II 115.6 116.4 187.8 
III 116.5 116.9 199.6 
IV 117.6 117.7 206.9 
1970 I 119.3 120.2 214.6 
II 121.3 121.8 213.2 
III 123.4 124.0 191.6 
IV 125.2 128.1 177.0 
1971 I 128.7 132.7 177.3 
II 131.8 137.5 187.5 
III 133.5 138.9 182.2 
IV 134.0 139.6 175.7 
1972 I 136.7 142.9 181.4 
II 138.4 146.7 182.3 
III 140.4 148.3 184.1 
IV 142.4 149.8 187.1 
1973 I 143.6 150.3 205.8 
II 146.8 151.6 228.8 
III 151.9 155.9 266.6 
IV 157.4 159.6 289.3 
1974 I 174.3 185.7 322.5 
II 191.1 214.6 364.0 
III 197.7 219.6 287.3 
IV 209.3 235.4 262.0 
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Table A. 7 (continued) 
1963 (1st qrtr) 
= 100 
Domestic 
Electrical 
Appliances 
MLH 368 
Made-up 
textiles and 
handkerchiefs 
MLH 422/1 
Woollen and 
Worsted 
MLH 414 
1963 I 100.0 100.0 100.0 
II 100.2 100.3 102.4 
III 100.4 100.5 103.6 
IV 100.8 101.7 109.6 
1964 I 102.1 102.9 111.2 
II 102.9 104.1 105.9 
III 103.5 105.2 102.9 
IV 105.1 106.2 98.8 
1965 I 106.1 107.1 96.4 
II 106.9 107.4 96.4 
III 107.1 108.1 98.9 
IV 108.3 108.9 100.3 
1966 I 111.1 108.8 99.7 
II 114.9 109.2 100.6 
III 113.8 109.5 98.0 
IV 112.6 108.8 95.0 
1967 I - 111.8 107.9 93.8 
II 110.0 107.2 94.2 
III 110.7 106.8 89.6 
IV 115.0 108.8 87.5 
1968 I 121.5 114.7 91.6 
II 119.1 115.3 94.3 
III 118.3 116.2 94.6 
IV 119.1 118.1 97.3 
1969 I 121.9 119.4 95.3 
II 124.5 121.2 96.8 
III 128.0 121.9 96.1 
IV 130.3 123.0 93.6 
1970 I 135.0 125.0 92.7 
II 137.9 128.4 93.7 
III 137.7 131.3 92.2 
IV 139.1 132.9 89.5 
1971 I 141.6 134.5 90.2 
II 145.8 136.8 93.4 
III 147.0 140.3 93.8 
IV 147.0 141.7 92.8 
1972 I 148.6 143.1 101.0 
II 152.0 145.9 108.5 
III 153.9 150.1 122.8 
IV 156.2 153.4 157.3 
1973 I 158.6 156.1 198.4 
II 165.1 163.2 199.7 
III 173.6 181.3 208.8 
IV 182.0 202.7 207.5 
1974 I 198.5 226.8 207.0 
II 223.8 238.9 199.2 
III 226.1 247.4 187.0 
IV " 231.0 247.2 171.9 
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Appendix (continued) 
Data: Sources and Methods 
Some, but not all of the data which was used in this thesis is 
available from official published and unpublished sources. Where this 
is the case we shall only report the data sources, and where appropriate, 
describe the methods used in adapting or transforming it for the purpose 
at hand. In this way we also circumvent the disclosure restrictions 
which applied to a number of price series supplied by the Department of 
Industry on a confidential basis. These series cannot, in any event, be 
reported here. 
Where the data used was previously unavailable and was generated 
from primary sources, it will be reported in this appendix. 
WHOLESALE PRICE INDEX Published in Trade and Industry (formerly Board 
of Trade Journal), London: H. M. S. O., and available monthly. The output 
price indicators cover a range of industrial products defined at MLH 
level or below. A number of required price indices are subject to dis- 
closure restrictions and are therefore not published. The Department of 
Industry released this information on a confidential basis and consequently 
these indicators will not be included in this appendix. 
INDEX OF EMPLOYMENT This index was constructed from monthly data of 
employees in employment by broad (SIC-order) industry groups. For the 
years 1963 to 1968 the source was British Labour Statistics, Historical 
Abstract (1971) London: H. M. S. O. Data for subsequent years is published 
in the Department of Employment Gazette, London: H. M. S. O. 
INDEX or AVERAGE EARNINGS Published in British Labour Statistics, 
Historical Abstract for the years 1963 to 1968. The index is given for 
0 
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broad (SIC-order) industry groups on a monthly basis. The same index, 
for the years 1969 to 1974 inclusive, was obtained from the Department 
of Employment Gazette. 
I14DEX OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION Compiled by the Department of Industry, 
this index is available monthly on an SIC-order industrial breakdown, 
and is published in Trade and Industry. The index is also published in 
the Monthly Digest of Statistics, London: H. M. S. O. 
PRODUCTIVITY TREND REGRESSIONS 
As outlined in chapter 5, the quarterly productivity trend was 
obtained by regressing the logarithm of output per man, in index number 
form, on time. The estimating equation was as follows: 
A 
log (Q/N)it 'A+ bit 
where Q is the index of industrial production, N is the employment index, 
t is time and bi is the estimated quarterly productivity trend. The 
w 
values of bi obtained from these regressions for each broad industry group 
are reported below: 
Industry bi 
Chemical and Allied 0.0141 
(47.3675) 
Textile 0.0134 
(30.7942) 
Engineering 0.0066 
(17.0456 
Timber and furniture 0.0047 
(6.3995) 
Bricks etc. 0.0085 
(14.2652) 
Paper and Printing 0.0054 
(11.8470) 
0 
Note: Figures in brackets are t-statistics. 
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4 
PRICE INDEX OF MATERIALS AND FUEL 
This data was previously unavailable at MLH level of aggregation 
and was generated with the help of the Department of Industry Economics 
and Statistics Division. 
The "weighting pattern", that is, the breakdown of material inputs 
purchased by industries was obtained from table 10 of the Report on the 
Census of Production 1968, London: H. M. S. O. A weighted average price 
index of materials and fuel was then calculated using wholesale price 
indices supplied by the. Department of Industry. Given the large number 
of calculations involved these indicators were generated by computer, 
using a program written for this purpose by M. Partridge of the University 
of Warwick. The results of the calculations are reported in table A. 7. 
0 
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